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ABSTRACT
With this Thesis an attempt is made at charting the area of the 
Metaphysics of Intentionality, based mainly on the Philosophy of 
Jean-Paul Sartre. A Philosophical Analysis and an Evaluation of 
Sartre’s Arguments are provided, and Sartre’s Theory of 
Intentionality is supported by recent commentaries on the work of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Sartre’s Theory of Intentionality is proposed, with few 
improvements by the author, as the only modem theory of the mind 
that can oppose effectively the advance of AI and physicalist 
reductivist attempts in Philosophy of Mind and Language.
Discussion includes Sartre’s critique of Husserl, the relation of 
Sartre’s Theory o f Intentionality to Realism, its applicability in the 
Theory of the Emotions, and recent theories of Intentionality such as 
Mohanty’s, Aquilla’s, Searle’s, and Harney’s.
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L Introduction.
In the Introduction I shall attempt a description of the first use of the term 
’'Intentionality” by Brentano; in addition, I shall provide an outline of some of 
the components any theory of Intentionality has to have in order for it to use the 
term comprehensively and to follow the legacy that Brentano left us.
i) Intentionality: Brentano’s Use of the Term.
The word comes from the Latin mtendere (to stretch, to point at), and means 
the metaphorical stretching of consciousness in order to be o f something, i.e., to 
have an object, which may or may not actually exist.
Brentano1 first coined the term Intentionality for distinguishing (from other 
kinds of acts) and characterising mental acts as "the direction of the mind to an 
object" in perception, judgement or belief approval or disapproval. In 
Brentano's theory the mental acts contain their object intentionally within 
themselves.
With what is called "Brentano's Irreducibility Thesis" it is claimed that 
Intentionality is an irreducible feature of mental phenomena, and since no 
physical phenomena could exhibit it, mental phenomena could not be a species 
of physical phenomena.
1 See in Franz Brentano, Psvcholoeie vom emvirischen Stancbunkt (1874).
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 7
Brentano also coined the phrase "Intentional Inexistence of the Intentional 
Objects of Mental Acts", to indicate that the intentional object may or may not 
exist in reality. By this he meant that even though we cannot want or believe 
without wanting or believing something, what we want or believe may not 
necessarily exist. For example, we may want the care of ex-associates of ours, 
while they disregard us and it is almost certain that they shall not care for us in 
the future; or we believe that ex-associates of ours still care for us, even though 
it is almost certain that they do not.
ii) What any proposed account of Intentionality must therefore have as 
components and criteria.
(These are necessary components and criteria but not sufficient. I am not 
certain whether we can ever establish the necessary and sufficient criteria of 
Intentionality. These criteria can be as varied as the human minds themselves!)
Three major truths have to be taken into consideration, if any proposed 
account of Intentionality is to be faithful to the legacy of Brentano:
a) The modes of Intentionality may or may not be only symbols, sentences, 
propositions. Intentionality is far more complex than any known mode of 
representation, having as parts logical, linguistic, emotive, imaginary, conscious 
and unconscious elements and relations. These elements and relations that can 
involve the body, the will and the intellect, cannot be easily put in any single 
category o f representation.
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b) Intentionality does not only have as objects things that exist, or have 
existed, or that shall exist. It may also have things that never existed, or shall 
never exist (e.g. things such as fictional beings, and even logically impossible 
beings).
c) Intentionality is also of things that are not ours, i.e., do not belong to 
human intellects, neither to their artifacts. An example of this is a cliff for a 
geologist and a painter, or a poet; a drift-wood for an artist, etc. The cliff and 
the drift-wood do not actually have Intentionality in the same way as for 
example a book has Intentionality for a reader, however they are treated as if 
they had it (this point shall become clearer later on).
iii) Additional components and criteria that any valid theory of 
Intentionality should have.
Any account of Intentionality has to take into consideration at least some of 
the theses of those students of Brentano who were most successful in defending 
their teacher's theory, allowing thus Phenomenology to survive almost seventy 
years of austere philosophical criticisms. A discussion of these win also clarify 
the notion of Intentionality further, and will make our consequent investigations 
on Husserl's and Sartre's theories of Intentionality more digestible. The 
following account is based on Reinhardt Grossmann’s, Phenomenology and 
Existentialism: An Introduction 2, with few alterations and additions from me.
-There is an "act" of presentation that is the foundation of every mental 
"act": nothing can be judged, desired, hoped or feared unless one has a
2 Reinhardt Grossmann, Phenomenology and Existentialism: An Introduction. 
Routledge & Regan Paul, London, 1984, pp.29-67.
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presentation of that thing. (I put the word “act” in quotation marks to indicate 
my disagreement with the use of the term by Brentano and his followers. I shall 
explain my reasons for this later on in relation to Searle’s and Mohanty’s views, 
see III,iii,c and Vl,i,iii).
-Every intentional phenomenon is directed toward an object. This differs 
from Brentano's «all mental phenomena have an object»; this difference is 
important because it is not clear that such mental phenomena as pain must 
always have an object; it keeps Brentano’s truism however, that any occurrence 
of Intentionality must have an object of some sort.
-An occurrence of Intentionality must involve a relation of sorts to an object 
(Grossman3 calls this the Intentional Nexus, a term I agree with and shall keep). 
For example, Tom’s belief that the earth is round is related in some way to the 
earth being round.
-The objects of an occurrence of Intentionality can be individual things (e.g. 
an elephant), but also states of affairs, circumstances, and relations between 
individual things (I will discuss these issues more in my investigation of 
Husserl).
-The Intentional nexus does not realty hold between a mental "act” and its 
object, but between a property o f a mental "act” and its object. For example, 
Tom and Alex believe that the earth is round: we have two mental "acts" here 
but the same object. The property that is the same in both HactsH is called the 
content of those mental "acts”.
- Relations form a metaphysical category of their own, since they can neither 
be things nor properties of things. The reduction of relations to properties of
3 Ibid.
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things and acts of comparison is not satisfactory since a property is an 
unfortunate term to describe the complexity and multi-applicability of "x greater 
than y" etc., and since an act of comparison can always be analysed in terms of a 
description of a relation but not vice versa.
-Relations also give order and have a direction. They can be distinguished 
into symmetrical (the relation R is symmetric iff whenever aRb in that order, 
then bRa in that order, e.g. being in two parallel lines) and non-symmetrical (any 
relation that is not symmetric). Asymmetrical relations hold iff the following is 
always the case: if the relation holds between A and B, in that order, then it 
does not hold between B and A, in that order.
-Intentional relations are asymmetric: if an intentional nexus holds between 
the content of a mental “act” and an object, then it does not hold between the 
object and this content, i.e., the relation of content to object is one-way.
-Non-existent objects and relations to them cannot be explained in terms of 
some property of the non-existent object (as in Brentano's, Alexius Mekong's 
and the Aristoteleians' view), nor in terms of real and nominal existence and 
being (Russell's distinction between existence and being), but in a way similar to 
Kasimir Twardowski's distinction between what a given idea represents (what 
its object is), and whether or not this thing that is represented exists. In this 
account every idea has an object, and the intentional nexus always holds, even 
when the intentional nexus does not connect with an existent.4
4 See Kasimir Twardowski, On die Content and Object of Presentations, transl. by R. 
Grossman, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977.
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-The Intentional nexus need not have itself as its object (and it usually does 
not). In such cases it avoids infinite regress of mental "acts" (it also goes against 
Brentano's distinction between primary object- which is the object-, and 
secondary object- which is the "act" itself). Also it may be that the Intentional 
nexus cannot or it is very difficult to have itself as an object (for example 
Freud's repressed desires are supposed to be the object of an "act" in some way 
when they are repressed; however, the same desires cannot be or it is extremely 
difficult for them to be the object of "acts", when the person who has them 
attempts to analyse his/her behaviour without the help of psychoanalysis).
-Finally, there is the additional metaphysical category of structures. In this 
way, there are things (substances), properties of things, relations of things, and 
structure of things in a whole {Gestalt). Two things can share the same 
property, be in the same relation to each other, and be isomorphic to each other. 
Two structures (Tx and Ty) can be isomorphic iff: for every non-relational part 
of Tx there is a precisely one non-relational part of Ty, and conversely; and for 
every relation of Tx there is precisely one relation of Ty and conversely; and the 
parts of Tx that correspond to the parts of Ty stand in the relations of Tx to 
each other that correspond to the relations of Ty and conversely (e.g. the series 
of even and odd positive integers).
In this way one complex thing can represent another complex thing. 
Language can represent the world.
The Four Dogmas that come as a consequence, introduced by Christian von 
Ehrenfels5 are: a structure is not the same as the set of its parts; a whole may 
have properties which none of its parts has (emergent properties), and these
5 Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932), a famous student of Brentano.
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properties may be or may not be anthropomorphic; a whole cannot be analysed; 
a whole is not determined by its parts, but, to the contrary, determines the 
nature of its parts.
After we have seen the origin of the term in Brentano, some of the necessary 
components and criteria any theory of Intentionality must have to use the term 
comprehensively and successfully, and some additional elements which any 
Theory of Intentionality would find useful to have in mind, we can turn now to 
the main target and raw material for Sartre’s own theory: Husserl's concept of 
Intentionality.
n . Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality.6
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), a student o f Brentano, tried to formulate a 
response to the Idealist attacks of the Neo-Kantians and the Neo-Hegelians on 
Brentano's theses by developing a new methodology for doing philosophy: 
Phenomenology. With it he (and all early Phenomenologists), tried to follow 
Brentano's steps in purging Philosophy from all prejudices regarding 
consciousness and its contents, and developing it according to the standards of 
a rigorous science (but not an empirical one). Phenomenology, however does 
not stop at methodological considerations: Husserl himself after Frege’s critique 
on his early psychologist account of numbers (evidenced in Husserl's 
psychologist Philosophie der Arithmetic. Psychologische und logische 
Untersuchungen, VoLl, 1891), launched with his Logical Investigations
6 My main sources for the ideas expressed in this section were: Robert C. Solomon, 
Continental Philosophy Since 1750: The Rise of the Self. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1988; Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth and Russell Keat, Understanding 
Phenomenology. Blackwell, Oxford, 1991; David Woodruff Smith, Ronald McIntyre, 
Husserl and Intentionality D.Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984; David Bell, HusserL Routledge, 
London, 1991.
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(1900), not only a methodological revision of his philosophy, but also a review 
of his Metaphysics to determine what of its corpus is agreeable to such a 
rigorous methodology.
Husserl’s emphasis was placed on the investigation of things, but not as they 
are in themselves; Kant and the Idealists of his time were far too influential to 
allow such an optimistic aspiration. And Husserl's veneration of Descartes' 
distinction between the mind and the body placed a further serious obstacle in 
the wholehearted acceptance of any theory of metaphysical realism. Things 
were to be investigated as they appear in the mind, as intentional contents, and 
not as they are, independently of their observation.
In such an investigation, logic had to be the main tool of analysis; the actual 
circumstances surrounding the existence of things in the world had to be 
bracketed and reserved for a later inquiry. Husserl called such a bracketing 
"epoche"7, and the analysis carried out while in ”epoche" he called 
phenomenological. His main targets with such a bracketing were Naturalism, 
Historicism, Psychologism, and all reduction of necessary truths to empirical 
science: his earlier experience in the area of Philosophy of Mathematics, had 
convinced him that these theories and approaches could not escape scepticism 
and relativism.
Husserl maintained that phenomenological descriptions should get to the 
essences of things in terms of kinds (eide) and not particulars. 
Phenomenological descriptions in this way become pre-suppositionless: analyses 
not of various "facts" of experience, but of those features o f experience, which 
are "absolutely given in immediate intuition".
7 Obviously taken from the Stoic enozrj.
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The phenomenologist according to Husserl should limit his investigations 
only to what is inside his consciousness: within his consciousness he can find the 
essential foundations for his experience of the whole world. To go outside 
consciousness would be to invite scepticism and relativism; for any distinction 
between appearances of things, and things-in-themselves makes these 
appearances relative, and radically divorces them from the things they are 
appearances of.
With the "epoche" the phenomenologist attempts to understand the full 
potential of his consciousness; with the help of “epoche” the phenomenologist 
avoids interferences from an undue importance on things and distorting 
prejudices about their reality. He/She realises the essential feature of Human 
Consciousness, which is to be intrinsically and necessarily tied to intentional 
objects: what Brentano called the Intentionality of Human Consciousness.
After the exercise of this "epoche" we also begin to realise that there is an 
ego or a self which accompanies all of our mental presentations but is beyond 
them, and which is different from the empirical self that the Naturalists 
identified with the totality of the self In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl 
claims that even if the whole universe outside us were to be destroyed, this 
transcendental ego would still remain
Such a radical emphasis on epoche and the existence o f the transcendental 
ego however, should not be seen as Husserl's attempt to escape from reality: 
Husserl's Phenomenology had a serious commitment to Realism. One of its 
most frequently stressed mottos was "back to the things themselves" {zu den 
Sachen selbst): with this motto the Phenomepok)gists stressed the feet that their
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 15
sole concern is not to get locked within Human Consciousness, but to purge it, 
and thus make it reach out to things in a better condition than before. Its 
objects, stripped from their spatio-temporal "natural" existence, gain their true 
value as intentional objects.
In this way, one’s perceiving an object becomes a cogitatio. The description 
of the object of consciousness (cogitatum) becomes a noematic description; and 
the mode of consciousness or cogito (e.g., perceiving, remembering, etc.) with 
which consciousness is tied to the object becomes noetic (and its description a 
noetic description). In this theory of consciousness, Husserl's views on 
Intentionality8 become of paramount importance for our (and his) 
investigations: "Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the 
word Intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental 
property of consciousness: to be consciousness o f something".9
The Intentionality of any mental "act" is due to there being associated with 
the "act" an entity which Husserl calls its intentional content or noema. He 
sharply distinguishes the noema of the act from the act's object. The object 
intended in an "act", (i.e., that toward which the "act" is directed), is usually 
some ordinary sort of thing like a physical object (existing or non-existing). The 
noema of an "act" is an abstract, or "ideal", entity, and in Husserl's words a 
"meaning" or "sense". In this way, Husserl's theory of Intentionality, according 
to many commentators, is not an object-theory but a mediator-theory, since an 
"act" is directed toward an object through an intermediate "intentional" entity, 
the "act's" noema.10
8 In the Second Meditation, of his book Cartesian Meditations (Cartesianische 
Meditationen).
9 See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, transl. by Dorion Cairns, Maitinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977, p.33.
10 See David Woodruff Smith, Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality. D.ReideL, 
Dordrecht, 1984, p.87; see also Dagfinn Follesdall, "Husserl's Notion of Noema",
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In a phenomenological investigation, objects around us come to be known by 
us through their transformation (via Intentionality) into intentional objects, a 
"third realm of entities", or noemata. Objects gain their meaning according to 
Husserl completely within our experience of them, and not outside it (in the 
world). This meaning is arrived at intuitively and directly from the facts, once 
they become parts of contents of consciousness.
In his early works, Husserl keeps the role of the transcendental ego in rather 
low profile. With the Cartesian Meditations (1929-35) however, he transforms 
the whole phenomenological endeavour into an "eg o lo g y the study of the 
essential structures of the ego, a discovery, to be intuited directly; and in 
Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929), Husserl insists that the transcendental 
ego exists absolutely, and everything else is relative to it. In his last book The 
Crisis of European Philosophy (1936) however, he considerably weakens such 
options, insisting that the transcendental ego is "correlative" to the world, and 
shifting his emphasis from the individual transcendental ego to the 
intersubjective community o f individuals. In this last book he also remarks on 
the importance of history, and the contribution of community practices and the 
unarticulated principles of daily life (Lebenswelt) to the standards of rationality 
and scientific knowledge. However, he never rejected his earlier views that the 
truth is to be found in the self and that this truth is universal and necessary.
It is also important to note Husserl's emphasis on the Intentionality of the 
Human Mind as a necessary structure of the ego. The ego does not merely 
have a certain property, evidenced in a relation to things; the ego does not 
exist and cannot exist except as in relation to things. And it cannot be reduced
Journal o f Philosophy, 66 (1969), pp.680-87; Dagfinn Follesdall, "Brentano and 
Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception", in RM. Chisholm, ed., Die
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to awareness of things. (This part of Husserlian phenomenology becomes 
clearer once one considers our earlier discussion of the metaphysics associated 
with the categories of substance, property, relation, and structure in a single 
whole- the Gestalt theory of consciousness.) Intentionality here attains a 
significance of far more importance than in Brentano’s earlier Irreducibility 
thesis, since the Husserlian ego is not reducible to mental states (or even mental 
"acts"); such a reduction would make the ego an empirical self, a transformation 
which Husserl rejected, due to its Naturalistic tendency to identify the empirical 
self with the totality of the self.
Husserl's theory of Intentionality thus is richer and has more metaphysical 
commitment than Brentano's, through its connection to a slightly different 
philosophy of mind regarding the ego.
In addition, we see in Husserl a turn of emphasis from the object of the "act" 
to the "act" itself. The Intentionality of an "act" is a phenomenological feature 
of the "act" itself. Any problems in the theory of Intentionality become problems 
not about the kinds of object that "acts" intend, but about the nature of 
consciousness itself insofar as consciousness is intentional. In this way, Husserl's 
theory of Intentionality is not a theory about the ontological status of objects of 
consciousness (as the theory of Brentano and, in some ways, that of Frege and 
his circle are) but an integral part of a phenomenological theory of mind.
In particular (and as a consequence of Husserl's drive away from the object 
and into the consciousness), Husserl attacked Brentano's doctrine of 
"intentional inexistence": Husserl holds that the object of an act is not a mental 
or "immanent" entity that literally "exists in" the "act" in which it is intended.
Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Rodolphi, Amsterdam, 1978, pp.83-94.
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Only "acts" of reflection are directed toward subjective states or processes in 
the subject's own stream of consciousness, and even for these "acts" Husserl 
distinguishes the object intended in an "act" from the "act", or experience, that 
intends it. In the case of non-reflective "acts", the object of an "act" is not 
something subjective or immanent to consciousness, but an "external" and 
"transcendent" entity (e.g., a physical object). For example, when someone sees 
a tree, the object of his perception is not a sense-datum or any other kind of 
intentional object; it is a tree, a physical individual in the world.
In other words, there is no distinction between the intentional presentation 
and its actual object: they are the same and, when appropriate, the intentional 
presentation is as its external object. In this way, a distinction between the 
object intended in an "act" and the "act" that intends it is always maintained and 
observed. However, Husserl does not disagree with Brentano in this: the object 
intended in an "act” is not what makes the «act» intentional; imaginations, 
hallucinations and other "non-veridical" experiences show that an «act» can be 
intentional even if there foils to exist any object to which the «act» relates. The 
object of the "act" is a "merely intentional" one: it has to exist only in the 
intentio (as a real constituent o f it); only the intention, the "meaning" (Meinen) 
of an object with such and such qualities has to exist for the "act" to function 
properly.11
After we have seen some of the main elements of Husserl's Theory of 
Intentionality, I proceed now to the examination of the Husserlian Theory by 
Sartre, Sartre's own theory of Intentionality, and its Critical Evaluation.
11 For more on this and other issues related to Husserl's and Brentano's theories of 
Intentionality see Smith and McIntyre, ibid, pp. 1-145; the above mentioned works by 
Follesdall; Barry Smith "Frege and Husserl: The Ontology of Reference’', Journal o f 
the British Society for Phenomenology, 9 (1978), pp. 111-25; Herbert Spiegelberg, The 
Phenomenological Movement' A Historical Introduction. Vol.I, Martinus Nijhoff The 
Hague, 1960.
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III. Sartre’s Critique of Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality and Sartre’s 
own Theory.
There are three main critiques (as far as the philosophical corpus is 
concerned) that we have from Sartre on Husserl's thought.
The first comes in "La Transcendance de L'Ego: Esquisse d'une description 
phenomenologique" (translated in English as The Transcendence of the Eeo: An 
Existentialist Theory of Consciousness)12 ; the second comes in” Une Idee 
fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Husserl: Vintentionalite"
("Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology")13; the third 
comes in his "L’Etre et le Neant" (Being and Nothingness: An Essav on 
Phenomenological Ontology)14: Sartre also wrote critiques on Husserl’s 
Phenomenology in his writings on the Imagination and the Emotions, but since 
they just repeat or apply the ideas expressed in the above named works, we shall 
enlarge on them only when required (for the critique contained in Sartre’s work 
on the Emotions, see our relevant Section).
We shall deal in this section with all three main works, but we shall enlarge 
only on the first, since the first is the most definitive in the formulation of
Jean-Paul Sartre, nLa Transcendance de L’Ego: Esquisse d’une description 
phenomenologique" (translated in English as The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist 
Theory of Consciousness, by F. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick, Octagon Books, Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, N.Y., 1972), first published in Recherches Philosophiques, VI, 1936-37. My references 
on the original French text shall be from Jean-Paul Sartre, La Transcendance de I’Ego: 
Esquisse d’une Description Phenomenologique, Intr., notes et app. par Sylvie Le Bon, Librairie 
Philosophique J. Vrin, Sorbonne, Paris, 1965.
13 Jean-Paul Sartre, nUne Idee fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Husserl: 
Tintentionalitem (translated in English as "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's 
Phenomenology", by Joseph P. Fell, Journal o f the British Society for Phenomenology, 1, 1970, 
pp,4-5), first published in Nouvelle Revue Francaise, LU, January, 1939, also published in 
Situations I, Paris: Gallimard, 1947.
14 Jean-Paul Sartre, L * Etre et le Neant, first published in Gallimard, Paris, 1943; translated in 
English as Being and Nothingness: An Essav on Phenomenological Ontology, by Hazel E. 
Barnes, Methuen, 1958.
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Sartre’s own Theory of Intentionality. We shall refer however, to developments 
of Sartre's theory from the first to the third.
We shall close this section with a comparison to the work of Wittgenstein, 
and some proposed improvements on Sartre’s theory.
i) The Transcendence of Ego: The Negative Critique 
of the Husserlian Consciousness.
The Context and Outline.
In this early work, we find Sartre’s avowal of the basic Husserlian intuition 
that intentional objects, existent and non-existent, can and should be described 
in their own right. Any valid theory of knowledge thus can bypass questions of 
consciousness and deal directly with the intended objects of consciousness and 
principles governing them. Sartre also accepts Husserl's disregard for the 
"psychologists' confusions" that had turned the philosophy of mind into an 
endless battle of arguments concerning the distinction between "physical", and 
"psychical" or "mental" events. He follows Husserl in adopting the 
methodological principle of epoche to eliminate in reflection all evidence for 
one's own existence as a particular person. (We shall see that later on in Being 
and Nothingness he gives up on epoche, see m,ii,b)
However, Sartre finds a serious point of disagreement, in this essay, over the 
issue of whether, after the epoche, consciousness can be found to be presided 
over by a "transcendental ego" or not.
This disagreement occurs for two reasons: first, if the transcendental ego 
presides over consciousness, then objects are not encountered in their own 
right, but are altered somewhat by the ego; second, the importance of the
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essential characteristic of human consciousness, Intentionality, is lost, and the 
emphasis is turned from consciousness to the ego. Further elaboration is needed 
for these two disagreements to make sense, and it shall be given in the 
commentary of the work later on, but for now it should suffice to mention 
briefly Sartre's justification for having these two reasons for disagreeing with 
Husserl.
For the first, it is important to note that if such an ego exists, and if  as 
Husserl maintained, it is an intentional consciousness, then it must make contact 
with some reality different from itself. Otherwise it cannot escape its own 
subjectivity and thus cannot perceive things as they really are. The ego therefore 
needs a third reality of some kind, which will participate in the characteristics of 
both the ego and the objects. This third reality employed is the hybrid termed 
"hyle* by Husserl, which is contained in the consciousness but is able to 
represent or resemble the objects intended by the ego. The Intentional object 
thus becomes the product of the activity of the transcendental ego upon the 
directly given contents of consciousness, called "sense-data". Furthermore, the 
study of the Intentional object in phenomenology becomes the study of the 
principles of the transcendental ego's activity constituting intentional objects out 
of sense-data. The final result for the admission of the transcendental ego thus, 
is to make consciousness have contents, and refer the character of every object 
of consciousness to its activity. With many of the disciples of Husserl, Sartre 
argued here that the addition of the transcendental ego turns phenomenology 
into a version of Neo-Kantianism, which was in fact an original target of 
phenomenology's criticisms. Sartre proposed instead the only way 
phenomenology would be saved from such an ironic result: it has to deny the 
existence of a transcendental ego, empty consciousness from all contents, and 
make it a pure spontaneity, placing all content on the side of the object.
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With such a disagreement and proposal, Sartre elevates Intentionality from 
being one of the essential and necessary features for any (human) consciousness, 
to its sole characteristic. He also gives back to the object of consciousness its 
originally intended character, as analysable in its own right. The World is 
divided again into Consciousness and Objects, Intentionality and the Non- 
Intentional.
However, he also realises (we see the kernel of such a realisation in this 
essay), that one more element from the Husserlian corpus has to be disregarded: 
epoche. There is no need for it anymore, because consciousness is now empty of 
all contents. The being of objects (or of the "in-itself' of L'Etre et le Neant) is 
discovered without exception in every act of consciousness. This makes 
consciousness the "revealing intuition of things", and forces it to be involved in 
the existing world, contrary to the detached and neutral standpoint that Husserl 
intended for phenomenology. Phenomenology in Sartre becomes the study of 
the contact human consciousness has with Otherness and negation in the world.
The Essay15.
From the very first paragraph, Sartre outlines his endeavour in this essay.
He divides the believers in an ego into three camps:
a) Those who believe in the ego as an "empty" principle of unification, a 
formal presence at the heart of Erlebnisse (a technical term of phenomenology, 
indicating the event or occurrence of consciousness).
b) The psychologists who believe that they have discovered its material 
presence as tire centre of desires and acts, in each moment of our psychic life.
c) Philosophers like himself who believe that the ego is neither formally nor 
materially in consciousness, but can be found only outside in the world. This
15 It is important to note that in my exposition of the work, even though I followed to a great 
extent the Williams and Kirkpatrick text, I deviate from it on many occasions for reasons of 
obscurity, repetitiveness, errors in style and printing errors wljich exist in their text
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means that the ego is metaphysically of the same status as the status of any 
being of the world, including the ego of another.
Part I: The I  and the Me.
Section A. The Theory of the Formal Presence of the I.
Sartre starts this Section with a series of distinctions between, on the one 
hand, Kantian Critical Philosophy and, on the other, Husserlian Phenomenology 
concerning the Metaphysics of the Ego (and its correlates the and the ”men).
First he attacks the view that Kantian critical philosophy gives metaphysical 
justification to the existence of an "/" which in fact inhabits all our states of 
consciousness and actually effects the supreme synthesis of our experience. 
According to Sartre, the Kantian problem is concerned only with validity, and 
Kant was concerned with transcendental consciousness only in so far as this was 
relevant to the set of conditions that are necessary for the existence of an 
empirical consciousness. Kant's aphorism that "the /  Think must be able to 
accompany all our representations" indicates that not only had Kant no intention 
to make any claims about the nature of the "I", but he must also himself have 
seen that there are moments of consciousness without the "/". Otherwise he 
would not say "must be able to accompany".
These observations on Kantian Critical Philosophy leave unfounded 
Husserl's claims for the actual existence of a t ranscendentalwhich  inhabits 
all our states of consciousness, and actually effects the supreme synthesis of our 
experience. His thesis stands now in need o f a separate philosophical 
background and justification. Husserl tries to make the transcendental"/” into a 
reality, an inseparable companion o f each of our "consciousnesses". In so doing 
factual claims about the '7”'s existence are made, rather than claims about the 
validity of its theoretical use in certain conscious states. This endeavour of 
Husserl's has nothing to do with Kantian Critical Philosophy.
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The question therefore that needs an answer at this point is whether Husserl 
is justified from within the Phenomenological Movement to make such a 
metaphysical claim about the ego. Granted the Kantian claim that the "/" must 
be able to accompany all our representations, we stilt need to answer whether it 
does in fact accompany them.
Sartre here finds that an answer to this question leads on to a second' 
question: in the case of a certain representation which passes from a state in 
which it is unaccompanied by the 'T ', to a state in which it is accompanied by it, 
will the representation remain unchanged? This second question leads on to a 
third: should we understand here that it is the ”/" which (directly or indirectly) 
effects the unity of our representations, or that the representations of a 
consciousness are always so united and articulated that it is possible to discover 
a n "/” in them?
This third question is not a question of validity for Sartre, but a question of 
fact: whether the ”F  that we encounter in our consciousness is made possible by 
the synthetic unity of our representations or whether it is the "I" which in fact 
unites the representations to each other. This question, as a question of fa d  
cannot be answered by Kantians, but one of the main contenders for an answer 
is the Phenomenology of Husserl.
Phenomenology studies consciousness scientifically and not "critically”. 
According to Sartre its essential way of proceeding for Sartre is by "intuition”. 
The reason for the addition of quotation marks becomes evident in the following 
paragraph.
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Williams and Kirkpatrick in their annotation to their translation of Sartre's 
work16 give I think due importance to the point that the concept of "intuition" as 
employed by Sartre and the Phenomenologists is quite distinct and different 
from "intuition" as used in every day English and in British-Analytic Philosophy. 
An "intuition" in Phenomenology is an act of consciousness, by which the object 
under investigation is present rather than absent. An example of this may be 
imagining or seeing the Eiffel Tower with all its details, in distinction from just 
having it in mind or briefly referring to it. In this way, all cognitive inquiry must 
have intuition as its foundation, even if it includes other evidence (such as 
inductive reasoning, etc.).
The method of phenomenology thus becomes intuitive in the investigation of 
consciousness: for consciousness must regard itself in order to determine just 
what consciousness is, and what it does and does not include. When Sartre 
maintains that phenomenology is a "scientific" rather than a "critical" study of 
consciousness because its method is one of "intuition", he therefore means that 
its most important and fundamental requirement is to look at the subject matter. 
This is in contrast to Kantian philosophy, which begins with the nature of 
science and subsequently constructs an account of consciousness by inference.
By "intuition" thus, from now on, we shall not mean any of the following: 
mystical insight; identification with the object (in the Bergsonian17 sense); mere 
"sense-perception" (since it can also include introspection); a specific level of 
abstraction (since it can occur at any level of thought); knowledge of an object's 
existence (unless we "intuit" the present); or knowledge of everything that there 
is to know about the object, since we cannot know everything that there is to
16 Williams and Kirkpatrick, ibid, note 2, p. 109-113.
17 Henry Bergson, 1859-1941, influenced greatly Sartre on issues such as time and the 
metaphysics of emotions, the laughter and the comic, even though Sartre himself has not 
recognised this; some of his most important works include Essai sur les donates immtdiates de 
la conscience, 1889; Matitre el mtmoire, 1896; Le Rire, 1900; L ’Evolution crtatrice, 1907; 
Les Deux Sources de la morale etdela  religion, 1932.
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 26
know about the object through "intuition". Basically this is due to the 
inadequacy of sense-perception to tell us everything that there is to know about 
the object. It is characteristic of "intuition", that it forces us to know things only 
"in profile", and never in all their aspects. The last characteristic of the concept 
of "intuition" also gives us its uncertain nature as a form of knowledge of the 
object.
Phenomenology, by having "intuition" as its method of investigation, puts us 
in the presence of the object. It thereby transforms itself into a science of fact, 
and a descriptive science. The problems it must solve are specific problems of 
fact.18 One of these specific problems of fact is the relation of the /  to 
consciousness: Sartre classifies this as an existential problem. For both Kant 
and Husserl epochs leads to the transcendental consciousness; but, for Husserl it 
is not a set of logical conditions, nor any hypostatisation of it in the form of an 
unconscious. It is an absolute fact, a real consciousness, which constitutes our 
"empirical” consciousness with its psychic and psychophysical aspects.
Sartre finds Husserl's observations about the existence of a constituting 
consciousness (and its characteristic quality of constituting the world through its 
imprisonment in empirical consciousness), quite agreeable. He also finds quite 
agreeable Husserl's intuitions regarding die psychic and psychophysical me, and 
its fall as a transcendent object before the epochs. What he finds troublesome 
however, is Husserl’s doubling of the psychic and psychophysical me with a 
transcendental /, a structure of absolute consciousness. If one does not double 
the me in this way, his account of ego is benefited as follows: a) the 
transcendental field becomes "pre-personal", without an /; b) the I  appears only 
at the level o f humanity, and is only one aspect o f the me, the active aspect; c) 
the I  Think can accompany our representations, because it appears on a
18 Note here that the emphasis on "fact* rather than essences is Sartre's and not Husserl’s -see 
the William's and Kirkpatrick's Note 3, p. 113.
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foundation of unity which it did not help to create (rather this prior unity makes 
the /  Think possible); d) personality, including the abstract personality of an /, 
loses the importance it had before. Its necessity as an accompaniment of a 
consciousness becomes obsolete. This supports the conception of an absolutely 
impersonal ("pre-personal") consciousness.
Husserl dealt with this issue in the following manner: he first determined (in 
Logische Untersuchungeri) that the me is a synthetic and transcendent 
production of consciousness, and then he returned in Ideen Zu Einen Reinen 
Phanomenologie Und Phanomenologischen Philosophie to the classic position 
of a transcendental /. This I  is behind each consciousness as a necessary 
structure of consciousness whose rays (fchstrahlen) would light upon each 
phenomenon presenting itself in the field of attention. In this way transcendental 
consciousness becomes thoroughly personal.
Sartre maintains however that when we ask whether this notion of the I  is 
necessary and compatible with the definition of consciousness given by Husserl, 
we see that Husserl has created an unnecessary and quite problematic notion. 
The only justification that can be found to support Husserl's notion is the need 
that consciousness has for unity and individuality. According to Husserl, 
consciousness is necessarily unified, because all of one's perceptions and all of 
one's thoughts refer themselves back to it. It is also necessarily unified because 
one can distinguish his own consciousness from someone else's.
This need that consciousness has for unity and individuality is obsolete in 
Phenomenology. Intentionality, as it is used and elaborated by Phenomenology 
is a far better and more consistent notion than the Husserlian modification of the 
I. Consciousness, as defined by Intentionality, also transcends itself through 
Intentionality's help. The problem of unification of consciousness is solved with 
the help of Intentionality: consciousness unifies itself by escaping from itself. In
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every single conscious activity (such as adding two plus two) there is an 
enormous amount of active consciousnesses involved; these consciousnesses are 
unified not by yet another consciousness, but by and through the common object 
of consciousness.
Those who believe that the object of consciousness is the content of one's 
representation may need to posit in addition a transcendental and subjective 
principle of unification, such as an I. By contrast for Husserl and the 
Phenomenologists there is no need for such an /; the object is transcendent to
the consciousness which grasps it, and in this way the object itself becomes the
unifying principle of the consciousnesses involved.
The further problem of unity within duration can also be resolved through 
Intentionality. There is nothing to worry us in the positing of transcendental 
objects outside the flux of those consciousnesses whose objects they are. 
Consciousness unifies itself by a play of "transversal'' intentionalities, which are 
nothing else but the concrete and real retentions of past consciousnesses. In this 
way, consciousness refers perpetually to itself even in the continual flux of 
consciousness as it is engaged in the world. Both in Vorlesungen Zur
Phanomenologie Des Irmeren Zeitbewusstseins. and in Cartesicmische
Mechtationem. Husserl unifies consciousness through Intentionality in this way, 
and not through a synthetic I.
The individuality o f consciousness is guaranteed in the same way. By its 
nature, consciousness can be limited only by itself. It constitutes a synthetic and 
individual totality, entirely isolated from other similar totalities. The I  can only 
be an expression, and never a condition of this incommunicability and 
inwardness of consciousness, and it is only through this incommunicability and 
inwardness that the HIH can exist.
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In this way, the unity, the individuality, and the personality of consciousness 
are maintained and fully supported. The notion of the transcendental I  or ego 
put forward by Husserl is totally unnecessary.
However, it is not only its non-necessity that renders the transcendental I  
problematic in any valid theory of consciousness. The transcendental I is also a 
hindrance to the unity, and homogenous nature of consciousness.
Sartre argues that such a transcendental (and superfluous) I  would divide 
consciousness, sliding into every consciousness like an opaque blade. 
Consciousness exists because it is consciousness of itself. Consciousness is 
aware of itself (or is the consciousness of itself) only when and in so far as it is 
also the consciousness of a transcendent object. So the consciousness of a 
consciousness, or of . an /, which is itself out of consciousness as a 
transcendental existence, would mean the extinction of consciousness. This is 
what Sartre has in mind when he writes the aphorism "The transcendental /  is 
the death of consciousness" (p.40). In order for consciousness to be alive then, 
it needs to be clear and lucid through and through; and this for Sartre is "the law 
of its existence".
It is obvious however that the consciousness o f consciousness cannot be 
positional (except in the special case of reflective consciousness, which shall be 
discussed later on). That is to say, consciousness cannot be its own object: it 
can only be absolute inwardness. The object o f consciousness is by its nature 
outside consciousness, and that is why consciousness in its outward reach 
towards the object can posit and grasp it in the same act. Sartre describes this 
consciousness as absolute inwardness, consciousness in the first degree, or 
unreflected consciousness.
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If there was to be an /  or an ego of some sort in this sort of consciousness, it 
would neither be the object of consciousness (since by hypothesis it would be 
internal to consciousness), nor a product o f consciousness, since it can be only 
something for consciousness, i.e., one of the conditions for consciousness to 
occur). And if it is not a translucent quality of consciousness, then it has to be in 
some way an inhabitant in it. In this way, and continuing the same line of 
inquiry, such an /, no matter what level of formality and abstraction one is to 
give to it, would be a sort of centre of opacity. In fact, it would be an infinitely 
contracted psycho-physical me. And such a contraction of me would be totally 
opaque, obfuscating the lucidity of consciousness, and predetermining its 
spontaneity. In addition, if such an inhabitant were to be allowed in 
consciousness, the defining difference of the Husserlian Cogito from the 
Cartesian Cogito would be lost. The Husserlian Cogito takes pride in being a 
consciousness that is the non-substantial absolute: it remains a "phenomenon", 
in the sense in which "to be" and "to appear" become one. If such an infinitely 
contracted me were to be allowed to inhabit consciousness, such an I  would be 
raised to the rank of an absolute together with the surrounding consciousness, 
"loading down" the surrounding consciousness, making itself and it "heavy" and 
"ponderable", losing consciousness* characteristic of being the absolute existent 
by virtue of non-existence.
Thus, the only way such an /  can be thought of is not as a part of but as an 
object for consciousness.
t
Section B. The Cogito as Reflective Consciousness
Sartre proceeds now to the investigation o f consciousness as reflected upon 
by consciousness. He has investigated the metaphysics of consciousness in so
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far as it has an object out in the world, and has found that it consists in the 
clarity and lucidity of its existence as a non-substantial absolute.
He now begins by distinguishing the Kantian Cogito from the Cogito of 
Husserl and Descartes. The first is a condition of possibility, being concerned 
only with validity. The second is an apprehension of fact, the "factual necessity" 
of Cogito. According to both Husserl and Descartes the Cogito is necessarily 
true whenever is in fact thought without any choice of object or special 
operation.
However, according to Sartre, Husserl also recognises the fact that the 
Cogito is personal: in "/ Think", there is an /  that thinks, and this gives the basis 
for an "Egology". The apprehension of thought does not only involve thought, 
but also the /, which transcends thought. The remembrance of a certain 
landscape is connected to the memory of me perceiving the remembered 
landscape. Husserl calls this the possibility of reflecting in memory }9
In this way, Husserl achieves what he considers to be the factual guarantee of 
the Kantian claim concerning validity: all of one's consciousnesses that are 
apprehensible are provided with an /.
Sartre sees certain difficulties with such a position. He points out first that all 
the writers who have described the Cogito have dealt with it as a reflective 
operation, an operation of the second degree. Consciousness is directed upon 
consciousness as an object. According to Sartre however, when consciousness 
is directed upon consciousness, the certitude of the Cogito is absolute, and there 
is an indissoluble unity of the reflecting and the reflected consciousness. This 
unity is a synthesis of two consciousnesses, one of which is the consciousness of
19 In Vorlesuneen Zur Phanomenoloeie Des lnneren Zeitbewusstseins.
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the other. In this way, the essential principle of Phenomenology "all 
consciousness is consciousness o f something" is preserved.
The reflecting consciousness, however, does not take itself for an object 
when the Cogito is effected; it takes as its object the consciousness reflected on. 
So, insofar as the reflecting consciousness is consciousness of itself it is non- 
positional consciousness; it becomes positional only by directing itself upon the 
reflected consciousness that itself was not a positional consciousness of itself 
before being reflected. In this way, the /  that thinks becomes the I  o f the 
reflected consciousness, as an object of the thetic act. Indeed, all reflecting 
consciousness is in itself unreflected on, and a new act (of the third degree) is 
necessary in order to posit it. In this process there is no infinite regress, since 
there will always be a consciousness that does not posit itself as an object, and 
can serve thus as the consciousness reflected upon, the object of the thetic act. 
This reflecting consciousness also gives birth to the me in the reflected on 
consciousness, thus preserving the phenomenological truth that every thought 
apprehended by intuition possesses an /. Sartre at this point concludes that an 
unreflected thought, when it becomes reflected on, not only loses its nnaivete" 
(as Husserl believed), but also gives birth to the /, which was hidden in it.
Sartre supports his conclusions about the existence and non-existence of the 
/, by analysing an example of a "concrete experience". In every unreflected 
consciousness, being a non-thetic consciousness of itself, there is a non-thetic 
memory that one can consult. This memory can be consulted through the 
reconstitution of the complete moment in which this unreflected consciousness 
appeared, a process which for Sartre is by definition always possible. An 
example of such an unreflected consciousness is one's absorption in his reading 
of a novel. When we try to remember the circumstances of our reading with all 
their details, our attitude, the lines that we were reading and so on, we are 
reviving not only the external details but a certain depth of unreflected
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consciousness, since the objects could only have been perceived by that 
consciousness and since they remain relative to it. This unreflected 
consciousness is not to be posited as an object of reflection however; that would 
destroy our exercise and its purpose. We must direct our attention to the 
revived objects, but without losing sight o f the unreflected consciousness, by 
joining in a sort of co-operation with it, and making an inventory of its content 
in a non-positional manner. In such an inventory we shall find everything else 
but our I. In other words, the only things present in such an inventory are 
consciousness of objects and non-thetic consciousness of itself. Thus it is shown 
that there is no /  in the unreflected consciousness.
As a response to the objection that memory is of a questionable value 
because of its uncertainty, and that we should focus instead more on the 
certainty of the reflective act, Sartre argues that memory of the unreflected 
consciousness is not opposed to the data of the reflective consciousness. No one 
denies that the I  appears in a reflected consciousness. We simply have a choice 
between a reflective memory of our reading (for example) and a non-reflective 
one. But both memory and reflective act are suspect and uncertain. The validity 
of a present reflection, in fact, does not reach beyond the consciousness 
presently apprehended. Moreover, reflective memory, which we perform in 
order to reinstate elapsed consciousness, besides its uncertainty as memory, is 
also suspect, because (also according to Husserl) reflection modifies the 
spontaneous consciousness.
In this way, since all the non-reflective memories o f unreflected 
consciousness show us a consciousness without a me, and since theoretical 
considerations on the intuitions of essence regarding consciousness (Part I, 
Section A) have determined that the /  cannot be a part of the internal structure 
of Erlebnisse, the conclusion that there is no I  on the unreflected level for Sartre 
is unavoidable. When we are absorbed in a specific endeavour o f ours such as
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chasing after a car, contemplating a portrait, etc., there is no /. We are plunged 
in the world of objects. They, with their attractive and repellent qualities, are 
what exist for us; we have disappeared, we have annihilated ourselves. There is 
no place for me at this level. And this is not due to chance, but due to the very 
structure of consciousness.
Sartre arrives at the same conclusion (that the I  does not exist as 
consciousness, nor does it exist on the unreflected level of consciousness, and it ' 
exists only as an object, and at the reflected level of consciousness) also through 
a description of the Cogito. He utilises Husserl's conviction that the certitude of 
the reflective act comes from the apprehending consciousness without facets, 
without profiles, completely (without Abschattungen). On the other hand, the 
spatio-temporal object always manifests itself through an infinity of aspects, 
existing only as the ideal unity of this infinity. As for meanings and eternal 
truths, they affirm their transcendence in that the moment they appear they are 
given as independent of time, existing in a consciousness which apprehends 
them and is individuated through and through in duration.
What then is the mode of existence of the Cogito? One of the alternatives is 
that it might be a full and concrete consciousness gathered into a real moment of 
concrete duration. It can not be this however, because, if it were, it would be a 
perishable structure of actual consciousness. The Cogito affirms its permanence 
beyond this consciousness and all consciousnesses, making its type of existence 
to be nearer to that of eternal truths, than to that of consciousness.
The Cartesian idea of a thinking substance, according to the above analysis, 
was a mistake of making the I  and the Think of the Cogito be on the same level. 
Husserl, according to Sartre, was making the same mistake when he gave to the 
I  a special transcendence "from above", even though different from the 
transcendence of the object, based on metaphysical and Critical preoccupations,
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which have nothing to do with the epoche, and lead one to further problematic 
entities such as the distinction between "transcendent" and "immanent" 
essences, "transcendent" for the ego-loaded-consciousness, and "immanent" for 
the non-ego-loaded-consciousness.
According to Sartre, if the I in the I  Think affirms itself as transcendent, this 
is because the I  is not of the same nature as transcendental consciousness.
Sartre's further investigation into the nature of the Cogito reveals that it does 
not appear to reflection as the reflected consciousness: it is apprehended by 
intuition and thus as an object grasped with evidence (even though evidence of 
limited certainty- see our above comments on intuitive knowledge). But this 
evidence with which it is apprehended, is, if we use Husserlian terminology, 
neither apodeictic (as being necessarily so), nor adequate (grasped in its 
entirety); it is not apodeictic since by acknowledging the ego we claim more 
than we can know, and it is not adequate because the ego is presented as an 
opaque reality, whose content is not unfolded. The ego presents itself as the 
source of consciousness, and that is the reason why it appears veiled, indistinct 
through consciousness, as if it were itself consciousness being the source of 
consciousness.
If the I  was part of consciousness however, there would be two or even three 
Ts: the /  o f the reflective, the /  of the reflected, and even a third /, that of 
transcendental consciousness. For Sartre such a hypothesis is inadmissible: even 
if the / s  are real elements of consciousness, there should be no communication 
between them, even in the form of their identity in one unique I.
Sartre finishes this Section dedicated into the Metaphysics of the /, by 
summarising the main four points and conclusions that he has made in it:
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First the /, is an existent, of such a concrete type of existence, as 
mathematical truths, meanings, and spatio-temporal beings. The /, even though 
transcendental, has as much real existence as these other entities.
Second, the /  offers itself to an intuition of a kind different from the 
perceptual intuition of physical objects, which apprehends it, always 
inadequately, behind the reflected consciousness.
Third, the I  never appears except on the occasion of a reflective act. When 
such an act occurs, the complex structure of consciousness has as follows: there 
is an unreflected act of reflection, without an /, which is directed on a reflected 
consciousness. The reflected consciousness becomes the object of the reflecting 
consciousness without ceasing to affirm its own object (a chair, mathematical 
truth, etc.). At the same time, a new object appears which is affirmed by 
reflective consciousness, even though existing in a different level from both the 
object of the reflected consciousness (a chair, mathematical truth, etc.), and the 
reflective consciousness itself. This transcendent object of the reflective act is 
the/.
Fourth, the transcendent I  must fall before the stroke of the 
phenomenological reduction. The Cogito affirms too much: what it affirms is '7 
have consciousness of this chair", what it should affirm is "There is 
consciousness of this chair”. This content for Sartre is sufficient to constitute an 
infinite and absolute field of investigation for phenomenology.
Section C: The Theory of the Material Presence of the Me.
Up to this point, Sartre's focus was on Kant's and Husserl's shared position 
that the /  is a formal structure o f consciousness; he tried to show that an /  is 
never purely formal, and that it is always, even when conceived abstractly, an 
infinite contraction of the material me. At this point he wants to deal with the 
psychological theory which for a psychological reason wants to affirm the
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material presence of the me in all our consciousnesses. He names this theory 
«the Theory of the "Self-Love" Moralists». According to these theorists, the 
love of self- and thus the me- lies concealed within all emotions in a thousand 
different forms. The me, as a function of this love that it has for itself would 
desire for itself all the objects it desires. The essential structure of each of my 
acts that are caused by these self-centred desires would be a reference to myself 
The "return to me" would be constitutive of all consciousnesses.
If one was to raise the objection to such a theory that this return to one's self 
is not present to consciousness (when I am thirsty, it is a glass of water that is 
desirable), it would cause no alarm to them. They would respond in a manner 
similar to La Rochefoucauld that self-love conceals itself under the most diverse 
forms, and that the me, if it is not present to consciousness, is hidden behind 
consciousness and is the magnetic pole of all our representations and all our 
desires. In this way, the desire or, better, the desiring me is given as the end, and 
the desired object as the means.
Sartre notes that this thesis is confusing the essential structure of reflective 
acts with the essential structure of unreflected acts. It overlooks the fact that 
there are two forms of existence always possible for a consciousness.
When we see someone in pain or distress, immediately we pity him, and we 
run to his assistance. For our consciousness only one thing exists at that 
moment: him-having-to-be-helped. This quality of "having-to-be-helped" lies in 
him. It acts on us like a force. It conforms to the Aristoteleian "the desirable is 
that which moves the desiring". At this level, the desire is given to 
consciousness as centrifugal (transcending itself being a thetic consciousness of 
"having-to-be" and non-thetic consciousness of itself) and as impersonal (there 
is no me: actions come to adhere as qualities to the things which call for them, 
of the same kind as the colour of an inkstand).
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 38
This first desire that we have to help the distressed and helpless when we see 
them, for the "Self-Love" Moralists and Psychologists, is not a complete and 
autonomous moment: the origin for the desire to help is found in the 
disagreeable state into which the sight of his sufferings has put us and which 
remains in a half-light at the moment we have the desire to help. However, this 
disagreeable state can be known, and one suppresses it only following an act of 
reflection. The structure of both reflected and unreflected consciousness exists 
here in a similar way as with the /; a distaste on the unreflected level, transcends 
itself in the same way that the unreflected consciousness of pity transcends 
itself: it is the intuitive apprehension of a disagreeable quality of an object. The 
distaste is accompanied by a desire not to suppress itself but to suppress the 
unpleasant object. Thus the disagreeable state becomes an object and in order to 
be suppressed (and that is what the "Self-Love Theorists" claim when they 
believe that it can be hidden) it has to be reflected upon. Otherwise there would 
be no need for it as "hidden" and as a further cause; it would be "in the light" 
and obviously the only desire moving us.
In this way, Sartre renders useless the attempt to place behind the unreflected 
pitying consciousness an unpleasant state which is the underlying cause of the 
pitying act: unless this consciousness of unpleasantness turns back on itself in 
order to posit itself as an unpleasant state, we will remain indefinitely in the 
impersonal and unreflected.
Sartre in fact has made these psychologists and moralists to realise that in 
their thesis there is the absurd assumption, unknown up to this moment to them, 
that the reflected is first, original, and concealed in the unconscious. The 
absurdity for this assumption is evident when one considers the case that even if 
such a thing as the unconscious exists, who can claim that in it are contained 
spontaneities of a reflected sort? In order for such spontaneities to exist as
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reflected there has to be a consciousness reflecting them. If this is not the case, 
then one would have to believe that the reflected is first in relation to the 
unreflected. Such a belief conflicts with the ontology of the reflected and the 
unreflected: even in the cases where a consciousness appears immediately as 
reflected, the unreflected has the ontological priority over the reflected because 
the unreflected consciousness does not need to be reflected in order to exist, 
and because reflection presupposes the intervention of a second-degree 
consciousness.
The conclusion that unreflected consciousness must be considered 
autonomous then is unavoidable. Unreflected consciousness is a totality that 
needs no completing at all, and the character of unreflected desire is to 
transcend itself by apprehending on the subject the quality of desirability. 
Everything happens as if we lived in a world filled with things which in addition 
to their qualities of warmth, odour, shape, etc. they also have qualities such as 
being repulsive, attractive, useful, etc., and as if these qualities were forces 
having a certain power over us. Only after reflection these additional qualities of 
things are posited as desires, fears, etc. Only in the case of reflection can we 
think "we hate x, we pity y, etc.".
Contrary to these non-Sartrean theories, it is on the reflected level that the 
ego-life has its place, and on the unreflected level that the impersonal life has its 
place (a position which is completely different from the position that all 
reflected life is egoistic, or that all unreflected life is necessarily altruistic). 
Under such a metaphysics and ontology of the reflected and the unreflected 
consciousness, reflection "poisons" desire, since the previously unreflected 
quality of someone's "having to be helped" is transformed into a reflected state, 
where we watch ourselves act, and my helpfid consciousness of ourselves exists 
as having to be perpetuated. Even if we only think that we must pursue our 
action because "it is good" the good qualifies the me part of our conduct, our
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pity, etc. Desires are "pure" before being reflected, after they are reflected they 
are "poisoned" from the point of view we have taken toward them.
In this way, even a purely psychological examination of the "intra-mundane" 
consciousness leads us, according to Sartre, to the same conclusions as our 
phenomenological study : the me must not be sought in the states of unreflected 
consciousness, nor behind them. The me appears only with the reflective act, 
and as a noematic correlate (or noema) of a reflective intention, i.e., the 
terminus of an intention as given for a reflective consciousness. Under the light 
of this analysis, we apprehend the fact that the I  and the me are only one. In the 
next part Sartre shall attempt to show that this ego, of which I  and me are but 
two aspects, constitutes the ideal and indirect (noematic) unity of the infinite 
series of our reflected consciousness.
The I  is the ego as the unity of actions. The me is the ego as the unity of 
states and of qualities. In Sartrean theory, the distinction between these two 
aspects of one and the same reality seems simply functional, not to say 
grammatical.
Part II: The Constitution of the Ego.
According to Sartre, the ego is not directly the unity of reflected 
consciousnesses. By this he means that it is not perceived directly as such a 
unity, but it is conceived as such through reflection as a "noema" (see the 
paragraphs above).
For him there exist two kinds o f unities of reflected consciousnesses: an 
immanent unity, which is the flux of consciousness constituting itself as the 
unity of itself; and a transcendent unity, which is the states and actions. The ego
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is the unity of states and actions, and, optionally, of qualities. As such, it is the 
unity of transcendent unities, and itself transcendent. Appearing solely in the 
world of reflection, it is a transcendent pole of synthetic unity, in the same way 
as the object-pole of the unreflected attitude, the only difference between them 
being that the first appears only in reflection.
What Sartre intends to investigate now is the constitution of states, of 
actions, and of qualities, and the appearance of the me as the pole of these 
transcendences.
Section A. States as Transcendent Unities of Consciousness.
The state appears to reflective consciousness as a given, as the object o f a 
concrete intuition. Hatred for someone is a state that one apprehends by 
reflection. It is present to the gaze of reflective consciousness and real. 
However, the state is not immanent and certain. Reflection is not a mysterious 
and infallible power, nor are its products indubitable because they are produced 
by reflection. Reflection is limited both in validity and fret to the consciousness 
it posits. Everything that reflection affirms regarding the posited consciousness 
is certain and adequate. But the situation is not so when the reflected objects are 
not consciousnesses and appear to reflection through consciousness.
To illustrate the point, Sartre considers the reflective experience of hatred. 
When we see someone and feel profound convulsion of repugnance and anger at 
the sight of him (while being on the reflective level), this convulsion is 
consciousness. There is no mistake in saying that we feel at the moment a 
violent repugnance for him. But this experience is neither hatred nor given as 
such properly speaking. Hatred involves both past and future experiences. An 
instantaneous consciousness of repugnance could not be hatred then on this
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account. If we limit our claims to the proper ontology and use of the words 
employed, the instantaneous character of our experience destroys our claims 
that we hate him.
Hatred appears to our consciousness both as our experience of repugnance, 
and through this experience. Hatred is given in and by each movement of 
disgust, of repugnance, and of anger, but at the same time it is not any of them. 
It escapes from each one of these movements by affirming its permanence. In 
this way, it effects by itself a distinction between to be and to appear, since it 
gives itself as continuing to be even when we are absorbed in other endeavours 
and no consciousness reveals it. This proves that hatred is not o f consciousness, 
since it overflows the instantaneousness of consciousness and it does not follow 
the absolute law of consciousness for which no distinction is possible between 
appearance and being. Hatred then is a transcendent object: the transcendent 
unity of the infinity of consciousness. Each Erlebnis reveals it as a whole, but at 
the same time the Erlebnis is a profile, a projection (an Abschattung). The 
situation here resembles the one we have when we perceive an inkstand, the 
blue of the blotter.
What the situation allows us to claim is that this someone we perceive is 
repugnant to us. However, it is and will always remain doubtful that I  hate him. 
Such an affirmation infinitely exceeds the power of reflection. Hatred 
nevertheless remains a real object apprehended through the Erlebnis: the point 
is only that it is outside consciousness, and the very nature o f its existence 
implies its "dubitability".
In this way, there seem to be two reflections: one is pure, merely descriptive, 
with a certain domain and a sphere of adequate evidence, and which, by keeping 
to the given without making claims for the future, disarms the unreflected 
consciousness by granting its instantaneousness; the Other, impure and
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conniving, with a doubtful domain and a sphere of inadequate evidence, effects 
a passage to the infinite, and through the Erlebnis abruptly constitutes its 
transcendent object. These two reflections apprehend the same, certain data, but 
the one affirms more than it knows, directing itself through the reflected 
consciousness upon an object situated outside consciousness.
Once one departs from the domain of reflection and investigates the results 
o f reflection, the confusion between the transcendent character of Erlebnis with 
its character as immanent is easily arrived at. Through such a confusion the 
psychologist commits two types of error: the first is to believe that introspection 
is deceptive because of the frequent mistakes in identifying emotions (love when 
in hatred, complex emotions, etc.); in such a case the state is distinguished from 
its appearances, we assume a relation of causality between the emotion and its 
appearances, and we believe that a symbolic interpretation of all appearances is 
necessary in order to determine the emotion; in all this process the unconscious 
gains importance and function in human psychology. The other type of error has 
to do with the transfer of the certitude of introspection from the consciousness 
of repugnance (in which such a certitude is sound) to the emotion (in which 
such a certitude is not sound); in this way, we conclude that hatred can shut 
itself up in the immanence and adequation of an instantaneous consciousness.
By emphasising that emotions are states, and by investigating emotions as 
states, Sartre points out the passive character of emotions. There are theories of 
the emotions which claim that emotions are forces, irresistible drives etc., but an 
electric current or the fell of water are also forces, without losing their passivity 
and inertia o f their nature: they receive their energy from the outside (their 
energy has a different qualitatively ontological source: electric current from heat 
or magnetic fields, water falling from magnetic fields and gravity). Sartre relates 
passivity and existential relativity in this way: "The passivity o f a spatio- 
temporal thing is constituted by virtue of its existential relativity. A relative
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existence can only be passive, since the least activity would free it from the 
relative and would constitute it as absolute" (p.66). In such an ontology 
emotions are inert since their existence is relative to reflective consciousness. 
Emotions appear to consciousness both as inert states and as forces that create 
conflicts of the strength and independence of physical forces. For Sartre the 
whole psychology of states (including non-phenomenological psychology in 
general) is a psychology of the inert.
The state exists as a kind of intermediary between the body (which acts as 
the immediate "thing") and the Erlebnis, acting differently on the body and on 
the consciousness. Its relationship with the body is unmitigatedly and 
straightforwardly causal: it is the cause of my bodily behaviour. Its relationship 
with the consciousness is more complex; there are two exigencies to be 
accommodated here: from one hand we have hatred as being the first, and the 
origin; from the other we have the spontaneity of reflected consciousness of 
disgust. The consciousness of disgust appears to reflection as a spontaneous 
emanation from hatred.
The notion of emanation is extremely important for the relation of inert 
psychical states to the spontaneities of consciousness. Repugnance produces 
itself at the instance of hatred and at the expense of hatred. Hatred appears 
through the consciousness o f disgust as that from which the consciousness of 
disgust emanates. In this way the relation of hatred to the particular Erlebnis of 
repugnance is not logical, but rather it exists as a magical bond.
Sartre indicates here the point that he shall reveal later: that we can speak of 
the relations of me to consciousness exclusively in magical terms.
Section B. The Constitution o f Actions.
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From the start of this Section, Sartre makes dear that he shall not attempt to 
dissolve one of the most difficult problems of phenomenology in establishing the 
distinction between active and spontaneous consciousness.
What Sartre wants to achieve in this Section however, is a descriptive 
ontology of actions. Actions such as "playing the piano", "driving a car", 
"writing", due to their ontological commitment to the world of things, are 
obviously transcendent; but even actions of a purely psychical character like 
doubting, reasoning, meditating, making a hypothesis, should be conceived as 
transcendent as well.
The dual character of action as a noematic unity of a stream of 
consciousness, and as a concrete realisation, here may deceive us in granting to 
action the status of non-reflected consciousness, but we should be more careful: 
action requires time, moments, to be accomplished; to these moments 
correspond concrete, active consdousnesses, and the reflection which is 
directed on the consciousnesses apprehends the total action in an intuition which 
exhibits it as the transcendent unity of the active consdousnesses.
In this perspective, the spontaneous doubt that invades me when I glimpse an 
object in the shadows is a consciousness, but the methodological doubt of 
Descartes is an action, that is to say, a transcendent object o f reflective 
consdousness.
However, there is an ambiguity here: is the Cartesian "I doubt therefore I 
am" a matter of the spontaneous doubt that reflective consdousness apprehends 
in its instantaneousness, or is this precisely a matter of the enterprise of 
doubting?
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This ambiguity for Sartre is the origin for many serious errors that he has 
described in detail above.
Section C: Qualities as Optional Unities of States.
In Sartre's excursion in the Metaphysics of the Ego, the ego is not only, 
directly, the transcendental unity of states and of actions. Qualities also exist in 
it as an intermediary between actions and states. Through the experience of 
hatred and other emotions on repeated occasions, we unify these diverse 
manifestations by intending a psychic disposition for producing them; such a 
psychic disposition is a transcendent object. It represents the substratum of the 
states, as the states represent the substratum of the Erlebttisse. In such an 
account the stratification of the sort (from the foundation up) Psychic 
Disposition (Quality) -State- Erlebttisse emerges.
The relation of this disposition to the emotions however, is not a relation of 
emanation. Emanation only connects consciousnesses to psychic passivities. The 
relation of the quality to the state (or to the action) is a relation for 
actualisation. The quality is given as a potentiality which, under the influence of 
diverse factors, can pass into actuality in the state or the action. This account 
makes the state be completely different from the quality: the state is a noematic 
unity of spontaneities, while the quality is a unity of objective passivities. Even 
in the absence of any consciousness o f hatred, hatred (the state) is given as 
actually existing, while in the absence of any feeling of spite, the corresponding 
quality remains a potentiality. Potentiality here is not mere possibility however, 
it presents itself as something which really exists, but its mode of existence is 
potency; examples of such type of things are faults, virtues, tastes, talents, 
tendencies, instincts etc., with the unavoidable and important influence of 
preconceived ideas and social factors.
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Unifications such as qualities however, are never indispensable (and that is 
why they are optional), because states and actions find directly in the ego the 
unity that they demand.
Section D: The Constitution of the Ego as the Pole of Actions, States, and 
Qualities.
From the perspective that Sartre expounds in this work, "the psychic" is 
different from consciousness. The psychic is the transcendent object of reflective 
consciousness, and the object of the science called psychology. In an important 
Endnote (Endnote 24), Sartre points out that it should not alarm us that the 
psychic, being the object o f reflection, can also be aimed at and reached through 
perception of behaviour; for Sartre all psychological methods have a deep- 
seated identity.
The ego appears to reflection as a transcendent object effecting the 
permanent synthesis o f the psychic. In this way, for Sartre, the ego is on the side 
o f the psychic. This ego is psychic, not psycho-physical. The separation of the 
two aspects of the ego is valid here as well. The psycho-physical me is a 
synthetic enrichment of the psychic ego, which can very well (and without 
reduction) exist in a free state by itself and with no association to the psycho­
physical me. An example of such a free-state psychic ego is that when we say "I 
am undecided", we do not refer directly to the psycho-physical me.
At this stage of the investigation into the nature of the ego, it is easy to make 
of it a "subject-pole" like the *object-polem which Husserl places at the centre of 
the noematic nucleus supporting determinations and predicates. For Husserl, 
predicates are predicates of "something"; this "something" is their point of
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attachment and their support; it is distinguishable from its predicates, even 
though unseparable from them; its predicates are unthinkable without it and yet 
distinguishable from it. In this kind of relation, things for Husserl are syntheses 
which are at least ideally analyzable. Things become synthetic complexes of 
qualities, and their qualities are tied to each other by being tied to the same 
object. What is logically first are unilateral relations by which each quality 
belongs to the object like a predicate to a subject. In this way, an analysis here is 
always possible.
Sartre himself recognises that this notion is highly debatable. The notion of 
the object-pole suggests to us that an indissoluble synthetic totality, which could 
support itself, would have no need of a supporting object-pole or anything like 
it, provided of course that it were really and concretely unanalyzable. To 
illustrate this point Sartre uses an analogy from music: if we take a melody, 
there is no object-pole which serves as support for the different notes. The unity 
here comes from the absolute indissolubility of the elements which cannot be 
conceived as separated, save by abstraction. The subject o f the predicate is the 
concrete totality, and the predicate is a quality which is separated from the 
totality in abstraction, and becomes meaningful only when connected to the 
totality.
For these reasons (the relation of a pole to its predicates, and the 
analysability conditions) the ego should not be seen as a sort o f a pole which 
would be the support of psychic phenomena. Such a pole would be indifferent 
to the psychic qualities it would support; the ego however, is always 
"compromised' by them. The ego is nothing outside the concrete totality of 
states and actions it supports. It is transcendent to all the states it unifies, but 
not as an abstract pole whose mission is only to unify. The ego is the infinite 
totality of states and actions which is never reducible to an action or to a state. 
The ego is for consciousness o f the second degree (the reflective
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consciousness), what for unreflected consciousness is the World, conceived as 
the infinite synthetic totality of all things.
There are cases in our life where we apprehend the World beyond our 
immediate surroundings as a vast concrete existence; things surrounding us 
appear only as the extreme point of this World which surpasses them and 
envelops them. The ego is to psychical objects what the World is to things. The 
difference between them is that the World "reveals" itself very rarely, according 
to specified conditions (and here Sartre refers to Heidegger's specifications in 
Sein und Zeit20): on the contrary, the ego always appears at the horizon of 
states. Each state, each action is given as incapable of being separated from the 
ego without abstraction. And even abstraction separates them to bind them 
immediately back again. The result o f a more or less permanent separation 
would be emptiness and falseness in meaning. To preserve meaning such an 
operation o f abstraction has to be given as an incomplete process, which gains 
its completion in movement for a synthesis.
As a transcendent totality, this totality, participates in the dubious and 
uncertain character of all transcendence. Everything given to us by our intuitions 
of the ego is always given as capable of being contradicted by subsequent 
intuitions. Our intuition that we are clearly ill-tempered etc. may be mistaken. 
We may even deceive ourselves about our intuition, since the error in our 
intuitions may not be committed on the level of judgement, but on the level of 
pre-judgmental evidence. The latter is possible due to intuition being the 
fundamental source of evidence, and not explicit judgement. This uncertainty 
regarding the ego does not signify that there is a true me which I am uncertain 
about, or about which I make intuitional errors, but it only signifies that the ego 
has in itself the character o f dubitability (even in certain cases the character of
20 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. Max Niemeyer, Tubingen, 1953.
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falsehood). The malin genie of the ego for Sartre extends so far as to allow the 
metaphysical hypothesis that the ego's composition is of elements which never 
existed in reality, and o f elements which are nothing but false memories.
Even if the nature of the ego is a dubitable object however, it does not follow 
that the ego itself is hypothetical. The ego cannot be a hypothesis, because it is 
the spontaneous and transcendent unification of our states and our actions. We 
can say "perhaps we hate X", but we can never say "perhaps we have an ego" (if. 
its existence is taken for granted). The unification of our consciousnesses under 
the title of "hatred" adds a certain meaning to them, it qualifies them. The 
incorporation of states in the concrete totality me, adds nothing to them. The me 
exists almost independently. The relation of the ego to the qualities, states, and 
actions is neither a relation of emanation (like the relation of consciousness to 
emotion), nor a relation of actualisation (like the relation of the quality to the 
state); it is a relation of poetic production (in the sense of poiein), or a relation 
of creation.
If we examine the transcendent ego as it reveals itself in intuition, we arrive 
at the undeniable fact for Sartre, that each new state is fastened directly (or 
indirectly by the quality) to the ego, as to its origin. This form o f creation is a 
creation ex nihUo, in the sense that the state is not given as having formerly 
been in the me.
Even if we consider hatred as the actualisation of a certain power o f spite or 
hatred (in agreement to the above expounded theory), it still remains something 
new in relation to the power it actualises. The unifying act o f reflection not only 
attaches the new state to the concrete totality me, but also intends a relation 
which traverses time backwards and which gives the me as the source o f the 
state. The same conditions exist for actions in relation to the /. Qualities, 
although qualifying the me, are not given as something by virtue o f which the
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me exists; this would make the me an aggregate as the wall is the aggregate of 
bricks, which exist by themselves, and which make the wall exist as their 
aggregate only by virtue of each one of them. Qualities are maintained by the 
ego through a genuine, continuous creation, even if the ego cannot be 
apprehended as a pure creative source without the qualities. There is no skeletal 
pole of the ego which persists if we take away all its qualities. The ego appears 
as beyond all qualities because the ego is opaque like an object: we would have 
to perform an infinite plundering to take away all its powers. At the end of this 
plundering nothing of the ego would remain: it would have vanished in thin air. 
The ego in this way is the creator of its states and sustains its qualities in 
existence by a sort of preserving spontaneity. This creative or preserving 
spontaneity is not to be confused with Responsibility, which for Sartre is a 
special case o f creative production on the part of the ego.
The ego progresses to its states through means which are magical (most o f 
the time) and rational (in the case of reflective will), but there is always a 
ground of unintelligibility. The nuance of the creation involved varies according 
to the different consciousnesses involved (pre-logtcal, childish, schizophrenic, 
logical, etc.), but it always remains a poetic production. In the peculiar and 
interesting case of psychoses o f influence ("They make me have evil thoughts") 
meaning is irksome, and Sartre promises to investigate this further in 
L'Imaginaire. but what is certain for him is that the spontaneity of the ego is 
never negated: it is in some way spellbound, but it remains.
Sartre however, cautions us not to confuse the spontaneity o f the ego with 
the spontaneity o f consciousness. The spontaneity o f the ego is a pseudo­
spontaneity, a resemblance of a spontaneity since the ego itself is an object and 
passive. Genuine spontaneity must be perfectly clear for Sartre: it is what it 
produces and can be nothing else. If it were tied synthetically to something other 
than itself) it would become obscure, and even passive, in the transformation.
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There would be a necessary passage from itself to something else, as a result of 
spontaneity escaping from itself. Now, the spontaneity of the ego does escape 
from itself, since an emotion such as hatred, belonging to the ego, although 
unable to exist quite by itself) possesses in spite of everything a certain 
independence with respect to the ego. In this way, the ego is both surpassed by 
what it produces, and it is what it produces. That is how surprises regarding our 
behaviour come about; the concrete totality of me intuited up to this time 
weighs down the productive I  and holds it back a little from what the /  has just 
produced. Such a linkage of the ego to its states cannot but be an unintelligible 
spontaneity. Bergson in Essai sur les Donnees Immediates de la Conscience 
described such a spontaneity, and thought it was freedom, without realizing that 
this spontaneity is an object rather than a consciousness, and that the union 
posited is perfectly irrational because the producer is passive with respect to the 
created thing.
The meaning of this irrational union is that the ego is both an object 
apprehended, and an object constituted by reflective consciousness. The ego is a 
virtual locus of unity, constituted by consciousness in a direction contrary to 
that actually taken by the production: realty consciousnesses are first, states are 
constituted from consciousnesses, and then through states the ego is 
constituted; however, as consciousness imprisons itself in the world to flee from 
itself) consciousnesses are given as emanating from states, and states as 
produced by the ego. In this reversal o f the real process, the ego-object being 
totally passive needs the creative power that its new role in this falsification of 
reality necessitates; consciousness projects on the ego-object its own 
spontaneity, and gives to it in this way the needed creative power. However, 
this spontaneity of the ego becomes degraded and illusionary, since it is not real, 
but is only represented and hypostatized in an object, magically preserving its 
creative power even when it is passive. In this way, the notion of an ego is 
profoundly irrational.
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Sartre here breaks his probing into the metaphysics of the ego to note that 
this is not the only false and degraded aspects of conscious spontaneity. Clever 
and expressive mimes can present to us the Erlebnis o f others in all its meaning 
and freshness. No matter how hard they try however, they cannot conceal the 
degraded and passive nature of what they are trying to achieve. Magical objects 
surround us which retain a memory of the spontaneity of consciousness, yet 
continue to be objects of the world. Man is always a sorcerer for man, in the 
same way that we are sorcerers for ourselves each time we view our me, when 
we use sorcery in the fundamental meaning of "participation" or the poetic 
connection of two passivities in which one creates the other spontaneously.
By virtue of this passivity in its nature the ego is capable of being affected. 
Consciousness being spontaneous and a cause of itself cannot be acted upon.
The ego on the contrary is "compromised" by what it produces. The action and 
the state, produced by the ego, turn back and qualify it. There is a relation of 
"participation" taking place here: each new state produced by the ego colours 
and tinges the ego slightly the moment the ego produces it. The ego is in some 
way spellbound by this action, it "participates" in it. In the famous case of 
Raskolnikoff (in Dostoyefski’s Crime and Punishment! what was incorporated 
in his ego was not the crime in its real form, but in a condensed form, in the 
form o f a "killing bruise" in the ego. In this way the ego is affected by 
everything it produces, and only by what it produces. The me cannot be 
transformed by external events (catastrophe, change in social environment etc.), 
except only insofar as external events are for the me the occasion o f states or 
actions. The ego is protected by its phantom-like spontaneity from any direct 
contact with the outside; it communicates with the World only by the 
intermediary of states or actions. The reason for such an isolation is simply the 
metaphysics of the ego: the ego is an object which appears only to reflection, 
being thereby radically cut off from the World.
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The ego is not only an irrational synthesis of activity and passivity, it is also a 
synthesis of interiority and transcendence. The ego's "internal" nature, which is 
more "internal to" consciousness than states, is precisely the interiority of the 
reflected consciousness contemplated by the reflective consciousness. This 
interiority consists in the characteristic of consciousness that to be and to be 
aware of itself are one and the same thing for consciousness. This characteristic 
may be expressible in many ways, some of which are that for consciousness 
appearance is the absolute to the extent that it is appearance, or that 
consciousness is a being whose essence involves its existence. From the nature 
of this characteristic we can claim that one lives interiority (one "exists 
inward'), and that one does not contemplate it, since by its condition it is 
beyond contemplation.
At this point, Sartre explains one very significant aspect of his and the whole 
phenomenological movement's philosophy of the mind: why we are unable to 
apprehend others' consciousnesses. According to Sartre when reflection posits 
the reflected consciousness it cannot also posit its interiority, because the case is 
a very special one; reflection and reflected are only one, and the interiority of 
the one fuses with that o f the other. To posit interiority before oneself is 
necessary to load it down to the level of an object. Once this process starts 
interiority closes upon itself and shows us only its outside. In order to 
understand this interiority one has to "circle about" it. The ego gives itself to 
reflection in exactly the same way as this interiority. It is closed upon itself) it is 
inward for itself and not for consciousness. This constitutes a contradictory 
composite because absolute interiority never has an outside. It can be conceived 
only by itself) and that is why we cannot apprehend the consciousness o f others, 
which is an absolute interiority quite different from our own. For Sartre, this is 
the only reason for our disability in understanding the consciousness of others, 
and not because our bodies separate us.
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This degraded and irrational interiority can be analysed into two special 
structures: intimacy and indistinctness. The ego in relation to consciousness is 
given as intimate, it is as though the ego were o f consciousness. It cannot be o f 
consciousness however, because the ego is opaque to consciousness, and this 
opaqueness is apprehended as indistinctness, i.e., interiority seen from the 
outside, or the degraded projection of interiority. This indistinctness is what one 
may find in Bergson's "interpenetrative multiplicity", and in the God of many' 
mystics before the specifications o f natura naturata takes place. In some cases 
it may be interpreted as a primitive undifferentiation of all qualities, in some 
other as a pure form of being, anterior to all qualification. In Sartre's perspective 
both forms of indistinctness belong to the ego. Before the action the ego 
appears as a naked power which will specify itself and congeal itself in contact 
with events (this happens in the frequent cases where overwhelmed by passion 
we claim that "I am afraid of myself'). After action reabsorbs the accomplished 
act into an interpenetrative multiplicity. In both cases what is involved is a 
concrete totality, but the totalizing synthesis is effected by different intentions. A 
helpful, but also dangerous for Sartre, overschematization would be to say that 
the ego with respect to the past is interpenetrative multiplictty, and with respect 
to the future it is bare power.
Sartre points out at this stage o f the investigation into the nature o f the ego 
that the me remains unknown to us. The me is given as an object, and as such it 
should follow the usual epistemological methods o f observation, approximation, 
anticipation, and experience. These procedures however, even though well 
suited for all non-intimate transcendents, they are not suitable here because the 
me is too intimate. A truly external viewpoint and self-examination on it is 
impossible. When we take distance from it, it follows us; it is infinitely near and 
we cannot circle around it. The only way we can establish some frets about 
ourselves is by getting the opinion of those who know us, or by a collection of
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facts concerning ourselves, and an interpretation which should be as objective 
as if  it were a question about someone else. Our intimacy with it is no help here, 
but an obstacle, since it is the me which bars our way. In this way to really 
"know oneself" one has to take toward oneself the point of view of others, a 
viewpoint which is necessarily false. To really try to know oneself for Sartre 
seems to consist in an endless effort to reconstitute from detached pieces and 
isolated fragments what is originally given all at once, at a stroke.
In addition, the intuition of the ego is a constantly deceiving mirage, 
simultaneously yielding everything and nothing. This is so because of the nature 
of ego as the ideal unity of states and actions, and not the real totality of 
consciousness (such a totality for Sartre would be a contradiction). The ego, 
being an ideal unity, can embrace an infinity o f states. Intuition on the other 
hand becomes foil and concrete by apprehending this unity insofar as it 
incorporates the present state. An infinite number o f empty intentions are 
directed toward the past and toward the future from this concrete nucleus, and 
aim at the states and actions not presently given. The ego is at the same time an 
ideal unity o f states, the majority o f which are absent, and a concrete totality 
wholly giving itself to intuition, signifying in this way that it is a noematic rather 
than a noetic unity (unity as the object o f consciousness, rather than 
consciousness itself). The empty intentions o f both the past and the future can 
always be fulfilled, and any state or action whatsoever can always reappear to 
consciousness as produced or having been produced by the ego.
What prevents the acquisition of real cognitions of the ego is the way it 
appears to reflective consciousness (or better the way it does not appear to 
reflective consciousness). The ego appears only when one is not directing one’s 
attention to it. In order for the ego to appear, reflection must be fixed on the 
Erlebnis, insofar as it emanates from the state; then the ego appears in the 
horizon behind the state. In this way, the ego is never seen except "out of the
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comer of the eye". As soon as we try to have it as a direct object of reflection 
without passing through the Erlebttis and the state, it vanishes, since we fall 
onto the unreflected level, and the ego disappears together with the reflective 
act. Any attempt to base the tracking down of the ego on the fret that it is on 
the side of consciousness, and thus it should reveal itself in reflection, is futile, 
due to the fugitive nature of the ego.
What is certain however, is that the /  does appear on the unreflected level. It 
shows up in our responses to questions regarding our behaviour while we are 
preoccupied with what we are doing. If someone asks us what we are doing, 
while we are trying to solve a very difficult problem in geometry, or while we 
are trying to paint a picture of some fruit, we shall respond in the first person 
using the "I", without even thinking that it is we and* not anyone else who is 
trying to do something. This "/" for Sartre here is no mere syntactical form. It 
has a meaning, even though it is an empty concept which is destined to remain 
empty. Our ability to think of things in their absence, is extended to allow us to 
think of the /  in the absence of the /. Statements regarding our fixture or past 
behaviour refer to the /  in this kind of way. The /  however, by falling from the 
reflective to the unreflected level is not only making itself empty, it also 
degrades itself) and makes itself lose its intimacy.
The empty concept o f the /  can never be filled by data from intuition here, 
because now the /  is of different metaphysics than the metaphysics of the unity 
o f consciousness which was before. The I  here is the support of actions that we 
do, or have to do in the world insofar as these actions are qualities o f the world 
and not unities of consciousness. The I  becomes here of the same metaphysics 
as the wood that has to be broken in small pieces to light a fire. The /  in the 
same way has to be there otherwise the conditions in the world cannot be 
fulfilled, but this has nothing to do with the me as a unity o f consciousness. The 
/  in this way here provides only the objective ami empty support for the action
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at hand. At this point Sartre brings forward the role of the body in the 
consummation of the emptying of the I. The body and bodily images for him can 
consummate the total degradation of the concrete /  of reflection to the '7- 
concept" as its illusory fulfilment. In our behaviour in the world o f things the 
body serves as a visible and tangible symbol of the /. Sartre at this point 
summarises the series of refractions and degradations with which an "egology" 
that he has sketched in this Section would be concerned:
At the Reflective Level we have a) the Reflected Consciousness with its 
Immanence and Interiority, and b) the Intuited Ego with its Transcendence, and 
Intimacy (which exists in the domain of the psychical here).
At the Unreflected Level we have a) the /-concept which exists as 
Transcendent, Empty and Without "intimacy", and b) the Body as the Illusory 
Fulfilment o f the /-concept (existing in the domain of the psycho-physical).
E. The /  and Consciousness in the Cogito.
Sartre at this section deals with possible objections arising from Cartesian 
orientated phenomenologists.
One o f their objections may be that if the Cogito is correctly performed it is 
an apprehension of a pure consciousness, without any constitution of states or 
actions. In such an apprehension there is no /, since it cannot be a direct unity of 
consciousnesses. In this situation, consciousness might even perform a pure 
reflective act which delivers consciousness to itself as a non-personal 
spontaneity.
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 59
However, Sartre points out here one thing that all sound phenomenologists 
must have always in their mind: phenomenological reduction is never perfect. A 
host of psychological motivations intervene and make the phenomenological 
reduction incomplete. An example of how phenomenological reduction can be 
tampered with by human motivation is Descartes himself. When Descartes 
performs the Cogito, he performs it in conjunction with methodological doubt, 
with the ambition of "advancing science" etc., which are characteristic actions 
and states, or in other words, undertakings of an /. In this way, it is quite natural 
that the Cogito, which appears at the end o f these undertakings and which is 
given as logically hound to methodological doubt, sees an I  appear on its 
horizon. This /  is an affirmation that the doubt and the Cogito are of the same 
nature and thus both impure. The Cogito can be considered a spontaneous 
consciousness of some form, but it remains tied synthetically to a consciousness 
of states and actions. The proof o f this dual nature of the Cogito is the 
motivation for it: the Cogito is the logical result o f doubt, and the thing that 
puts an end to doubt. If the Cogito was a reflective apprehension of a 
spontaneous consciousness as non-personal spontaneity it would have to be 
accomplished without any antecedent motivation. By seeking a way out o f his 
doubts Descartes destroyed the value of his Cogito for a paradigmatic 
phenomenological reduction. In fret, according to Sartre, such a reduction is 
possible in principle but extremely rare in our human condition. What appears in 
the horizon of the Cogito is not an /  which produces a conscious spontaneity, 
but what is really the case is that consciousness produces itself facing the /  and 
goes toward it, to rejoin it. Sartre finishes this section by adding "That is all one 
can say".
Conclusions.
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To conclude his Essay, Sartre offers three remarks which are directly 
concerned with applications of the theory expounded to other areas such as 
moral psychology, solipsism, and Marxism.
1. He starts with an amplification of what his theory means for psychology, 
and moral psychology in particular.
For Sartre, one of the main aims that his theory really achieves is the ' 
purification and liberation of the Transcendental Field. The Transcendental Field 
purified of all egological structures, recovers its primary transparency as a 
nothing, since the me and all physical, psycho-physical, psychic objects and 
truths are outside it and not part of it. However, this nothing is all since it is the 
consciousness o f all these objects. Theories o f "inner life" (Brunschvicg's for 
example) become meaningless, since nothing can be an object and partake o f the 
intimacy of consciousness at the same time. In this way, doubts, remorse, 
"mental crises of consciousness" etc. (including the content of intimate diaries) 
become sheer performance, with unavoidable moral connotations.
In the same way however, one's emotions, states, even the ego itself) stop 
being one’s exclusive property, and become public. Any distinction between the 
objectivity of a spatio-temporal thing, or an external truth, and the subjectivity 
of psychical "states" becomes obsolete. The subject ceases to have a privileged 
access to his own states. Anyone's psychical state can be reached and intuitively 
apprehended by anyone, in the same way that the chair can be intuitively 
apprehended by anyone.
In psychology understanding occurred by analogy, since this "privileged 
status access" is of paramount importance. In phenomenology, as proposed 
here, states are objects, and an emotion as such (love or hatred) is a 
transcendent object, and cannot shrink into the interior unity of a
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"consciousness". One's thought about one’s own emotion is the same thing as 
someone else's thought o f it; both of them, when they speak about it, speak 
about the same thing; they apprehend it by different procedures, but these 
procedures can be equally intuitional, i.e., they can both confront directly the 
public object in question (the ego). If we allow phenomenology to maintain the 
me as an essential structure of consciousness, then we allow the emotion to be 
drawn into consciousness, since it is a part of the me. Sartre's proposal however 
does away with this. He posits the me as a transcendental object, and in this way 
makes the me accessible to two sorts of intuition: an intuitive apprehension by 
the consciousness whose me it is, and an intuitive apprehension less clear, but no 
less intuitive, by other consciousnesses.
In both cases the intuition provides inadequate evidence. Thus everything 
about one's ego is a public domain, or at least as much public as private. The 
only thing that is impenetrable is one's consciousness, which for Sartre's 
phenomenology is radically impenetrable. It is not only refractory to intuition, 
but even to thought itself. We cannot even conceive our own consciousness 
without making an object o f it ( and in so doing we do not conceive it as 
specifically ours). If we could do this, we would have to think of it as pure 
interiority and as transcendence at the same time, which is impossible, On the 
other hand, a consciousness cannot conceive of a consciousness other than 
itself. What Sartre's proposal thus allows us to distinguish, is a sphere accessible 
to psychology through external observation and introspection (both seen as 
equal in importance and usefulness), and a pure transcendental sphere accessible 
to phenomenology alone.
This transcendental sphere is a sphere o f absolute existence; in it exist pure 
spontaneities which can never be regarded as objects, and which determine their 
own existence. The ego can not be the owner o f this consciousness, it can only 
be its object. As such, it can not lead us to have a consciousness that is o f our 
me, except perhaps in a designative sense as in the case of indicating things or
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events as our possessions. We do spontaneously constitute our states and 
actions as productions of the ego, but they are also objects. The common 
thinking error that such a prospect is possible is due to the fact that when we 
investigate the ego and consciousness on the level of meanings and 
psychological hypotheses, we indicate them emptily. That is we do not try to 
verify them intuitively: we just have them in mind, like a thought of the sea 
when we are in our inland house.
With this mistaken perspective in mind, one is blind to the meaning of 
Rimbaud's NI is an other", where the ego appears on the horizon of spontaneity. 
This spontaneity of consciousness is individuated and impersonal, but nothing 
more.
A more "coarse and materialistic" version o f the same mistake is the thesis 
accepted by some psychologists that thoughts could arise from an impersonal 
unconscious and "personalise" themselves by becoming conscious. These 
psychologists had the correct intuition that consciousness does not "come out" 
of the /, but instead of acknowledging that spontaneity produces itself, they 
made up the unconscious, without realizing that any consciousness that comes 
out of the unconscious would necessarily be passive and thus not a 
consciousness (p.98 in the Essay; here Sartre most probably means the 
psychologists o f the psychoanalytic persuasion).
According to Sartre therefore, the only way to escape serious error in the 
metaphysics of consciousness is to acknowledge the fundamental fret that 
transcendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity. Once we hold this 
fact constantly in mind and try to work out the various consequences for the 
rest of the associated metaphysics we are in safe waters. We realise that this 
impersonal spontaneity determines its existence at each instant, without any 
possible preconceptions regarding its determination: at each instant it is a 
creation ex nihilo, a totally new existence, and not just a new arrangement. This
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revelation is distressing if not alarming, since our own selves and 
consciousnesses are being created and coming into existence tirelessly and quite 
independent from us. Man can see this as a continuous escape from himself, a 
continuous overflowing of himself, a continuous surprise from the unknown. He 
tries to find an account of himself in the me, an explanation of why 
consciousness always surpasses it; he rushes to the unconscious to make the 
unknown more known. But the me can not help him, since the will, 
encompassing the me in action, is an object which constitutes itself for and by 
this spontaneity. The will directs itself upon states, emotions, things, but it can 
not turn back on the consciousness; an example of this helplessness of the will is 
given in each occasion where we try to will a consciousness (for example to fell 
asleep, to stop thinking about something etc.). According to Sartre what is 
necessary in such cases is to maintain and preserve the will by the consciousness 
which is radically opposed to the one we want (if I will to fell asleep, 1 stay 
awake; if I will not to think about this or that, I think about it precisely on that 
account).
Sartre sees this "monstrous" spontaneity as the origin o f numerous 
psychasthenic ailments. As a result of its quite peculiar and complex 
metaphysics, consciousness is frightened by its own spontaneity: for this 
spontaneity is beyond freedom. To illustrate his theory, Sartre brings an example 
from Janet. A young bride was in terror, when her husband left her alone, of 
sitting at the window and summoning the passers-by like a prostitute. Nothing 
in her education, character and past could serve as an explanation for such a 
fear. Sartre explains her behaviour as a characteristic case o f a "vertigo of 
possibility", triggered by some unnoticed element in a conversation, reading 
etc. She found herself monstrously free, and this vertiginous freedom appeared 
to her as the opportunity for this action which she was afraid o f doing. This 
vertigo is comprehensible only if consciousness has suddenly appeared to itself 
as overflowing in its possibilities the /  which ordinarily serves as its unity.
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But then what is the use of ego in Sartre's perspective? It might seem to have 
no other role but as a source of error and an illusion. Sartre however, does not 
think so. He assigns to the ego a very essential practical function. Since it 
cannot account in theory for the unity in phenomena, its theoretical role is no 
more than that of an ideal unity, far from the concrete and real unity which is 
effected before the existence of the ego takes place. The ego's practical function 
then is to mask from consciousness its own spontaneity. When described 
phenomenologicaliy, spontaneity seems to render impossible any distinction 
between action and passion, or any conception of an autonomy of the will. 
These notions have meaning only when all activity is seen as emanating from a 
passivity which it transcends, i.e., when man views himself as both a subject and 
an object. In spontaneity there is no possible distinction between the voluntary 
and the involuntary.
It is as if consciousness sets up the ego as a false representation of itself) 
absorbing itself in the ego, to make the ego its guardian and law. Due to this 
existence of the ego, distinctions between the possible and the real, appearance 
and being, the willed and the undergone, can be drawn and thought about.
When consciousness suddenly produces itself on the pure reflective level 
however, as the ego, but escaping from the ego on all sides, dominating the ego 
and maintaining the ego outside the consciousness by a continued creation, 
there are no distinctions between possible and real structures o f consciousness 
since appearance is the absolute; there are no more limits, since there is nothing 
to hide consciousness from itself. Consciousness at such a moment notes that its 
own spontaneity is fatal to the ego and is suddenly profoundly anguished. This 
dread, undirected, absolute and without remedy, and the fear o f itself (both 
constitutive of pure consciousness) come to the fere holding the key to many 
psychasthenic ailments. By contrast, if the /  o f the Cogito (I Think) is
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considered as the primary structure of consciousness, and indeed as 
consciousness itself, this dread is impossible.
If we accept Sartre's proposal however, not only there is an explanation for 
such ailments, but we also have a permanent motivation for carrying out the 
phenomenological reduction. Sartre21 points out that this "natural" attitude 
makes the phenomenological reduction unnecessary, and without any 
motivation. This natural attitude can be perfectly coherent, without any« 
contradictions, but it unfortunately turns Husserl's epoche into a miracle.
Husserl himself in Cartesianische Meditationen made a vague allusion to 
certain psychological motives which would lead to undertaking reduction, but 
both the insufficiency of the motives provided there, and the fact that Husserlian 
reduction is a knowledgeable operation, needing of serious and lengthy study 
and commitment, make the reduction if not totally unjustified, at least 
gratuitous. On the other hand, in the Sartrean perspective, the ''natural attitude" 
appears wholly as consciousness1 attempt to escape from itself by projecting 
itself into the me and becoming absorbed there, an endeavour furthermore that 
is never completely rewarded. It is always able to self-destruct by a means of a 
simple act of reflection, tearing conscious spontaneity from the I  and giving it as 
independent. In this context the epoche is no longer a miracle or an 
intellectualistic endeavour and method: it is an unavoidable anxiety which is 
imposed on the human condition. The epoche here becomes both a pure event 
of transcendental origin, and an ever possible accident of our daily life.
2. For Sartre however, the usefulness of his approach does not end in the 
proper understanding of consciousness and the ego, and the raison d'etre for 
epoche. It also presents to him the only possible refutation of solipsism. 
According to Sartre, the refutation which Husserl presents in Formale ttnd
21 Agreeing here with Eugen Fink.
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Transzendentale Lozik  and in Cartesicmische Meditationen is insufficient to 
countenance the arguments of a determined and intelligent solipsist. In the 
Husserlian perspective the I  remains a structure of consciousness, and as such, it 
is always possible to oppose consciousness, with its /, to all other existents. In 
such a situation, the me produces the whole world. Relation to others may be 
necessitated in certain facets of this world by their very nature, true, but this 
relation can be easily transformed into a mere quality of the world, created by 
the me. And if so, we are in no way necessitated to accept the real existence of 
other /s .
If the /  however, is both transcendent and an object of consciousness it 
participates in all the changeable nature of the world. It is not an absolute, nor 
the creator of the universe: it falls like the other existences at the level of 
epoche. Solipsism becomes unthinkable here, since the /  has no privileged 
status, and there is no "inner" life. One's Its  no more certain for consciousness 
than the I  o f other men, the only difference being that of intimacy. Epoche has 
rendered statements such a "I alone exist as absolute" meaningless. It asserts 
only the statement "absolute consciousness alone exists as absolute". But the 
solipsist needs the ego with its personal nature, and not an impersonal and 
spontaneous consciousness, and therefore cannot but acknowledge defeat.
3. In this, the third remark, Sartre answers objections from the "extreme" 
Left, that phenomenology is a new version of idealism, transforming reality into 
a stream of ideas.
He points out, in opposition to theorists such as Brunschvicg, that 
phenomenology, properly construed, cannot fly away from external 
circumstances, cannot allow for suffering, hunger, and war to be diluted in a 
slow unification of ideas. Sartre's proposal on the contrary is committed to the 
investigation of reality. It attempts to throw man back into the world, to provide
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full acknowledgement of man's agonies, sufferings and rebellions. If the I  were 
to remain a structure of absolute consciousness (as the mainstream 
phenomenologists believe following Husserl) phenomenology is doomed to be 
transformed into an escapist doctrine, pulling us away from the world, turning 
our attention away from the real problems. In Sartre's proposal however, the nte 
is an existent strictly contemporaneous with the world, its existence having the 
same essential characteristics as the world.
Sartre is not afraid here to indicate his disagreement with the interpretation 
of historical materialism under the brand name of metaphysical materialism, 
although he considers historical materialism to be a fruitful working hypothesis. 
Metaphysical materialism is unacceptable for Sartre because it makes the object 
precede the subject, just in order to fight the establishment of spiritual pseudo­
values, and because it leads to a system of ethics which could not be further 
from reality. His version of phenomenology makes the me contemporaneous 
with the World, and allows the purely logical subject-object duality to 
disappear. The World has not created the me (as the metaphysical materialists 
would want to claim), and the me has not created the World (as the idealists 
would want to claim). Both the World and the me are objects for the absolute, 
impersonal, consciousness, and it is by virtue of this consciousness that they are 
connected.
This absolute consciousness, when it is purified of the /, no longer has 
anything of the subject, and is void from all representations. It is simply a first 
condition and an absolute source of existence. This absolute source of existence 
establishes the relation of interdependence between the me and the World. This 
relation is sufficient for the me to appear as "endangered" before the World, and 
(indirectly and through the medium of states) to draw the whole o f its content 
from the world. This comprises the foundation for a system of ethics and 
politics which is absolutely positive.
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ii) "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology": 
The Positive Critique of the Bursting Consciousness.
In this brief essay, Sartre communicates his excitement over the work of 
Husserl and the reason for such an excitement. He finds that both French 
Realism and French Idealism of his time have lost touch with ordinary 
experience even though they had as their purpose to bring their perspectives 
close to it. Both perspectives, instead of dealing with direct experience of 
things, just duplicated them in consciousness, based on an unexpressed and 
dubious correspondence theory, which provided them with surrogates for the 
real things, instead of the things themselves. Parallel to this emphasis on 
Husserl's contribution for a return to "the things themselves", we see Sartre's 
analytic skills at work on purging immediate experience from its deceptions.
He starts his essay with a metaphor from the animal kingdom. He makes an 
analogy to a spider which traps things in its web, covers them in white spit and 
then slowly swallows them, to refer to the view of consciousness "digesting" the 
reality of things, by reducing them into classes of "contents of consciousness”. 
Realism and Idealism for Sartre have in common the tendency to believe in the 
illusion that "to know is to eat": instead of reducing things such as tables, rocks, 
and houses, into assemblages of "contents of consciousness", and classes of 
such contents, we should focus on the things being the actual content o f our 
perceptions, and our perceptions being the present states of our consciousness. 
Realists and idealists failed to satisfy this drive towards the "solidity” of things, 
and instead provided through assimilation, unification, and identification the 
"soft and genteel" mentality of themselves.
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Sartre finds that Husserl’s theory, opposed to the empirico-criticism of the 
Neo-Kantians and all psychologism, retains the indissolubility of things, and 
keeps them distinguished from consciousness: a perception of a tree, does not 
reduce the tree to its perception, but keeps the perception and the tree distinct; 
the tree is in a specific place, "outside", existing in a specific way and relation to 
the perceiver (with a specific level of accuracy in perception, under specific 
weather conditions, to the right or the left, in front or behind). In such a 
description however, there is no room for Bergsonian or similar realisms: the 
particular existence of the tree is not an absolute which will subsequently enter 
into communication with us; consciousness and the world are so intertwined, 
that even though the world is essentially external to consciousness, it is 
essentially relative to it. Consciousness and the world thus become irreducible 
facts: to know something is to go out of one's self) to get out of his 
consciousness, to thrust one's consciousness towards something in the world, 
since the world cannot be dissolved within my consciousness.
Sartre describes such a possessionless description of consciousness as 
"purified", and "clear as a strong wind". Consciousness becomes nothing else 
but movement of fleeing itself) a "sliding beyond itself1. A refusal to being a 
substance, a being beyond itself an absolute flight, these are what comprise and 
constitute consciousness. Sartre at this point warns us of the danger in any 
committed attempt to enter "into" a consciousness: it would be like being 
"seized by a whirlwind and thrown back outside, in the thick of the dust". Such 
a violent reaction shall occurs within us due to the peculiar ontology of 
consciousness: it simply has no "inside".
It is important at this point to emphasise the extension of meaning and 
significance Sartre places on the Husserlian phrase "All consciousness is 
consciousness o f something". Consciousness for Sartre has the essentially tragic 
character of being "a connected series of bursts which tear us out o f ourselves,
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which do not even allow to an "ourselves" the leisure of composing ourselves 
behind them, but which instead throw us beyond them into the dry dust of the 
world, on to the plain earth, amidst things". The comprehension of such a 
consciousness becomes an extremely dramatic event in one's life: we become 
"rejected and abandoned by our own nature in an indifferent, hostile, and restive 
world".
Under the perspective of such a philosophy of transcendence, with all the 
dangers that it brings for us, and its "dazzling light", any philosophy of 
immanence, with its compromises, "protoplasmatic transformations", and its 
"tepid cellular chemistry" becomes obsolete, "effeminate".
And here is where a connection with Heidegger's version of phenomenology 
occurs: Heidegger's "being-in-the-world" indicates most successfully
consciousness' flight to the world, the springing out of the nothingness of the 
world and of consciousness, and the bursting out as consciousness-in-the-world.
Consciousness thus needs the world: it cannot exist without it, since it can 
only destroy itself when it tries to look back onto itself. This necessity for 
consciousness to exist as consciousness of something is what Husserl called 
"intentionality".
Intentionality is not only evidenced in the knowledge of things in the world; 
knowledge or "pure representation" is only one of the many forms of 
consciousness "off something in the world. Other such forms are love, hate, 
fear. Consciousness surpasses itself not only in knowing about things of the 
world, but also in engaging in a more emotional response to them.
Such "subjective" reactions to the world as the emotions are pulled out by 
the phenomenology that Sartre puts forward here, from the "malodorous brine
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of the mind” that the empirico-criticism of Neo-Kantians had them floating in, to 
the elevated realms of the "bursting" consciousness.
Emotions, on the other hand, do not become properties of our 
consciousness, but they are properties o f the things around us: "It is things 
which abruptly unveil themselves to us as hateful, sympathetic, horrible, 
loveable". The subjectivity with which empirico-critical philosophy had dressed 
the emotions is an inappropriate description for Sartre and the phenomenology 
he endorses. Emotions become as real and as objective as things in the world: 
"Being dreadful is a property of this Japanese mask, an inexhaustible and 
irreducible property which constitutes its very nature- and not the sum of our 
subjective reactions to a piece of sculptured wood".
No wonder Sartre gives a messianic character to Husserl's contribution: 
"Husserl has restored to things their horror and their charm. He has restored to 
us the world of artists and prophets: frightening, hostile, dangerous, with its 
heavens of mercy and love."
Sartre at this point informs us of his project in amplifying Husserl's insights 
on the emotions to a full blown treatise, whose kernel shall appear in his A 
Sketch for a Theory o f the Emotions (I shall refer to Sartre’s Esquisse d ’une 
theorie des emotions also as The Emotions: Outline of a Theory! This 
endeavour shall be based on the simple truth which all the other approaches 
(including Proust’s) have disregarded with contempt: "if we love a woman, it is 
because she is loveable". It will also deliver us from the fascination for the 
"internal life": everything is outside, "even ourselves". The discovery of our 
most intimate parts is disconnected from the investigation of our intimate 
thoughts, since it takes place "Outside, in the world, among others [...] on the 
road, in the town, in the midst of the crowd, a thing among things, a man among
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To summarise then, we see Sartre in this short essay to be engaged in two 
kinds of endeavours: in the first, he fights against his contemporary metaphysics 
of mind, rejecting Neo-Kantian and all empirico-critical theories as 
"psychologist" and as assimilating the properties of the world, turning them into 
properties of the mind; on the same line he opposes all idealism and realism, the 
first for making a too obvious conscession against the reality of the world, the 
second for making things in the real world absolutes which are in need of a 
special kind of communication with our mind. A variation of realism (or 
idealism, depending on which perspective you look at it), is also rejected: the 
philosophy of immanence cannot accommodate important truths about us and 
our relation to the world, and makes the same mistake of compromising our 
demands for reality with surrogates of reality, through "protoplasmic 
transformations", and "tepid cellular chemistry".
As a second endeavour, he tries to cleanse the philosophy of mind of his time 
from contaminations with confused and seriously wrong metaphysical theories; 
he rejects here all subjectivism regarding the emotions as compromising their 
Intentional content, and their objective existence as parts and properties o f their 
objects. He also rejects all innatism and intemalism regarding the mind: the mind 
does not exist isolated from the others' experience of it; it is "outside", in the 
world, together with the things of the world and the other minds.
In connection to the metaphysics of the mind and the emotions however, we 
have to observe here two important issues: first, Sartre does not favour any 
behaviourist account of the mind, where mental phenomena are reduced to 
behaviour. Secondly, when he rejects subjectivism it is not because he accepts 
objectivism (regarding the mind and the emotions); it is more because he seems 
to reject both. A woman shall not be loveable to all, not even objectively
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loveable to some. She is loveable, because she is loveable to one, and she is 
loveable to him, even though she may be distasteful to all the rest.
We shall see all these issues being rediscussed (often with minor additions 
and re-adjustments) in the later sections of our Thesis. One major change is his 
disillusionment with Husserl's theory and especially Husserl's insistence on the 
"epoche", and the Husserlian conviction that through it one can go "back to 
things themselves". We shall see the metaphysical side of this disillusionment in 
the next section (on Reality), and the practical side of it in the section on the 
Emotions, but first it would be useful to discuss and evaluate the ideas which 
are expressed mainly in the first (which is and the more important for our 
purposes) of these two early works on phenomenological ontology, the Essay 
on the Transcendental Ego.
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iii) Critical Evaluation and Analysis of the Essays:
The Superiority of Sartre’s Theory.
In this part of my review of Sartre's essays I shall endeavour to establish that 
Intentionality as primarily put forward by Husserl, and as modified and 
reconstructed by Sartre, is of primary importance for an adequate understanding 
of the metaphysics put forward in the essays, and of the metaphysics of mind 
and language that I shall develop in the substantial part of my argument. I shall 
divide my Evaluation in parts, dealing in each part with a specific aspect of the 
Essays22.
I shall focus mainly on the points made in the Essay on the Transcendental 
Ego, but some of my evaluation will refer to points made in the shorter work on 
Intentionality.
a) Intentionality: The Foundation for a proper Metaphysics of 
Consciousness.
The main purpose of the essay is to show the inadequacy of the Husserlian 
account of the Transcendental Ego. Husserl put forward such an ego to unify 
and individualise consciousness, which without this ego would be just a loose 
connection of states, actions, and qualities, with no causal relation between 
them, no time continuity, and no structure.
Sartre 23 gives in his own account an alternative to the Husserlian Ego by 
referring directly to the most important concept of Intentionality. For him, 
consciousness is defined by Intentionality. With the help of Intentionality
22 I am greatly indebted to Dr. Jim Edwards, Mr.Dudley Knowles, and Mr.David Campbell for 
suggestions and criticisms on ideas expressed in this sub-section.
23 In p.38 of his Essay.
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consciousness finds the means to escape from itself and transcend itself. The 
thousand distinct active consciousnesses by which I have added, do add, and 
shall add two and two to make four, is the transcendent object "two and two 
make four". Without the permanence of this eternal truth a real unity of 
consciousness would be impossible to conceive, and there would be irreducible 
operations as often as there were operative consciousnesses.
We must emphasise here two points which Sartre himself emphasises in* 
connection to consciousness and Intentionality. First, that making the 
transcendental object "two and two make four" (as a thought on numbers) be 
the content of one's representation is a very serious mistake: anyone who does 
this can be very easily fooled into conceptualising a transcendental and 
subjective principle of unification, which will then be the /. And by doing this 
one misses an important truth about the metaphysics of consciousness: the 
object is transcendent to the consciousness which grasps it, and it is in the 
object that the unity o f the consciousness is found.
The second point concerns unity within duration. The following objection 
might be raised against Sartre's theory having to do with the need for a principle 
of unity within duration : such a need, the objector would argue, is evident once 
one realises that the continual flux of consciousness has to be capable of 
positing transcendent objects outside the flux. Sartre acknowledges that 
consciousnesses must consist in perpetual syntheses of past consciousnesses and 
present consciousness. But he also points out that this subjective unification of 
consciousnesses belongs to consciousness itself and not to the synthetic power 
of a Transcendental /. (Unreflected) consciousness unifies itself, concretely, by a 
play of "transversal' intentionalities that are concrete and real retentions of past 
consciousnesses. In this way, consciousness refers perpetually to itself unifying 
itself in time. Whoever says "a consciousness" says "the whojf of 
consciousness”, and this singular property belongs to consciousne^ itseff, apart
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from whatever relations it may have to the I. In addition, since consciousness 
can be limited only by itself, it constitutes a synthetic and individual totality 
entirely isolated from other totalities of the same type, and the /  can be only an 
expression (and not a condition) of this incommunicability and inwardness of 
consciousness. (The /  cannot be a condition since, if it were so, it would 
interfere with the unification of consciousness in the object: the I  being now 
itself a subjective principle of unification.) Thus, the phenomenological 
conception of consciousness not only renders the unifying and individualising 
role of the /  totally redundant, but also makes the unity and the personality of 
the I  (as expressions of consciousness) totally dependent for their existence on 
consciousness.
It is important to note that as a support for both of these points (the rejection 
of the view that the transcendental object is the content of representation, and 
the assertion that consciousness itself accounts for the unity-within-duration 
characteristic of consciousness) the concept of Intentionality is one of 
paramount importance. This I want to claim is not by accident. Intentionality, if 
taken seriously as the fundamental characteristic of the metaphysics of 
consciousness, cannot accommodate the object of a representation (as a 
thought) being its (consciousness') content. This would make the idea of 
Intentionality redundant, since consciousness would not need to refer to 
anything outside itself. In such a case we would have two possible alternatives: 
on the one hand consciousness would remain locked into its own 
representations of a world, with no certain access to that world. This would 
allow solipsism and scepticism to poison consciousness itself by attacking 
respectively its spontaneity and certainty, making consciousness a mere chimera 
and an illusion. On the other hand, supposing that the object o f conscious 
representation is inside consciousness with no problems of solipsism and 
scepticism, then an infinite regress of intermediate stages of mental 
representations would be necessary if the content is to be appropriately dealt
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with. By this I mean that the object of conscious representation, being 
something certain (by hypothesis) cannot be accommodated in consciousness as 
an object o f consciousness: this would put it on the same footing as the ego and 
thus make it uncertain (a prospect which would make it a self-contradictory 
concept). But even if we do accept this prospect, to cope with this 
contradiction, consciousness would have to create infinite intermediary stages to 
form a bridge between itself (its spontaneity and certainty) and the object of 
conscious representation (which now has the hybrid nature of uncertainty and 
transcendence).
An example here would make things clearer. Consider the sun out-there, as a 
physical object, and in conscious representation, as a mental object. 
Intentionality cannot accommodate the sun as an object of conscious 
representation being merely its content: the sun out-there. It has to be more or 
less of an object (depending on your perspective) and definitely something 
different from the thing out-there: the sun. If the sun out-there was the content 
of conscious representation (for example in a form similar to that of "sense- 
data"), there would be no need for Intentionality, since consciousness would 
have direct and certain access to the physical object "sun" by just directing its 
attention to its retained perception or memory, whenever it is needed. However, 
in such a case, consciousness would have only direct and certain access to 
retained perceptions of the physical object "the sun" and not the physical object 
itself. This idealist standpoint would allow scepticism and solipsism to infiltrate 
consciousness and destroy its certainty and spontaneity. If  on the other hand, 
we proceed with the hypothesis and we grant to the retained perceptions and 
memories of the sun the certainty and spontaneity they require to make 
spontaneous consciousness immune to scepticism and solipsism, then the mental 
object "sun", being certain as the spontaneous consciousness is, but 
heterogeneous to it (since it is posited as an object, and it is not spontaneous), 
would need an infinite regress of intermediary stages of hybrid mental objects
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(e.g., sun-O-perceived-certain-but-heterogeneous, sun-1 -perceived-certain-but- 
less-heterogeneous-than-sun-O, ..., sun-N-certain-and-homogenous-to-
consciousness), if the content of this mental object is to come in contact with 
the spontaneous consciousness.
Here we see the radical difference between Sartre and Husserl in their 
philosophies of mind: Sartre had a clear commitment to the direct access of 
consciousness to the world (with the help of Intentionality); Husserl on the 
other hand, while he propounded the dogma of "back to things themselves", as 
we saw earlier, he nevertheless defeated his purpose by announcing that there is 
a mediating entity called the "noema" which is what our consciousness has a 
direct access to. That is why Sartre has no need for such an arbitrary notion as 
the "epoche" and why Husserl has a desperate need for this "purging" 
methodological item in his phenomenology: whoever has the notion of a 
"noema" or any other kind of mediating entity needs methodological assurances 
that there are no arbitrary relations and associations within this mediating 
structure or entity; Husserl found such assurances in his dogma of "epoche", 
only to increase the metaphysical problems in his theory, over what such an 
"epoche" entails.
In addition, if an object were a content of representations in consciousness, it 
would not only have intrinsic problems of storage in an entirely different 
environment, but also problems of recognition and identification as an object 
and not as consciousness itself. Divisions between consciousness-proper and 
consciousness-object-related would have to be devised, with an elaborate 
account of their relation and communication. Such an apparatus would be too 
cumbersome for any verification, and far too complex for any coherent 
comprehension, not mentioning problems of preservation of spontaneity in a 
consciousness far too complex to sustain any spontaneity.
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I cannot but wholeheartedly agree with Sartre here, that objects (even in the 
form similar to "sense-data" of the objects out-there) should never be regarded 
as contents of representations and that consciousness has no need for a unifying 
ego, since by itself through Intentionality is unified within duration. I can only 
add the following consequences for my and his theory of consciousness: neither 
Sartre nor I can accept the idea that representations are in consciousness.
The only place suitable for them as objects o f consciousness is in the Ego. 
They are incorporated in the Ego in a process such as the following: 
consciousness spontaneously, via Intentionality, becomes aware of an object 
external to it (e.g., sunset on 4th of November 1989); immediately it posits this 
as an object (sun in a set of circumstances /) and in this way it classifies it in the 
Ego, indistinguishably from itself together with other objects (representations 
of the object with other set of circumstances- e.g., sunset on 5th of June 1991). 
The physical object (sun) in this way is always unknowable (in its entirety) and 
known only in specific aspects or circumstances. Consciousness preserves its 
identity within duration because it can always maintain, transform or change the 
classification of past objects retaining them in or divesting them from their 
former meaning. This is done spontaneously, and independently from the Ego.
The Ego on the other hand can only react de facto and try hopelessly to keep 
up with the arbitrariness of the spontaneity of consciousness, through the 
making of regularities and laws of classification (found in the usual "comfy" 
ideas we have of ourselves and others).
Where Sartre and I seem to disagree however, is in his view that 
mathematical truths and meanings are not part of the /, but are existences as 
concrete and as real as the /  and spatio-temporal beings, but "undoubtedly 
different" (p.52 in the Essay): the /  is different from physical objects as a 
transcendental object of consciousness, and different from mathematical truths
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and meanings, due to the fact that truths and meanings are grasped and altered 
by "apodeictic" evidence, and the I  by intuitive evidence: thus truths and 
meanings are certain, and the I  always in doubt. Sartre here is extremely close to 
a naive Platonist position on Mathematics and meaning, undoubtedly influenced 
by the phenomenological tradition he inherited, but still liable to the same 
destructive sceptical criticisms that the phenomenological tradition and Frege 
have attracted 24 I would prefer to make mathematical truths and meanings 
mental states o f the /, classify and analyse them in the same way that Sartre 
classifies and analyses mental states of this kind. This I would prefer to do for 
two reasons: first, I do not believe that mathematical truths and meanings have 
an independent existence from the I. They are modified by, and depend for their 
existence within duration upon the /. Second, we would escape Fregean 
extremes where mathematical truths become contents of representations, the 
same as meanings (and Fregean "senses" of words), and where both exist in 
some form independently from the perceiver.25
Sartre and I would agree that consciousness unifies itself within duration. 
This accords with our shared notion of Intentionality and is a necessary 
consequence of it. However, I want to disengage myself from certain rather 
magical and mysterious aspects of his analysis. He first introduces Intentionality 
as a necessary condition of consciousness (p.38-39 in the Essay), only to make 
it a mystical fantasy later on in connection with the relation to the Other, and 
previous selves (I shall analyse my views on this later, in the section on the 
Emotions). I think that time is not independent of the /, being just an aspect of
24 For these criticisms one can see the later Wittgenstein, and especially his critique on what he 
sees as the Augustmean Tradition, see the first part of his Philosophical Investigations: also 
Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982; 
Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics. Duckworth, London, 1982; 
Crispin Wright, Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen University Press, 
Aberdeen, 1983; Michael Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. Duchworth, 
1981, esp. article on Realism, pp.428-472.
25 My position here is much closer to Wittgenstein's position (see the above mentioned 
bibliography and my analysis of Wittgenstein's views in the sections dealing with Realism and 
the Emotions).
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the unification of states, actions, and qualities in the /  and the me. Therefore, to 
speak about the unification of consciousness within duration or in time is to talk 
nonsense! (For more on Time see the section on Reality.)
Thus, my answer to certain critics of Sartre would differ from Sartre's own 
answer. I cannot think at present why Sartre himself did not see this answer and 
use it. It is by far more effective than the one he uses in the above mentioned 
passage. Perhaps it was out of place at this part of the Essay. Nevertheless, I 
think such an answer is essentially Sartrean both in its nature and its 
methodology.
Finally, any account of the Theory of Intentionality as found in this Essay 
would be deficient if there were no analysis of the significant phenomenon of the 
Intentionality of Desire.
Sartre (p.58-60 in the Essay)26 himself delineates such an Intentionality by 
claiming th a t"... we must acknowledge with no qualifications that the character 
of unreflected desire is to transcend itself by apprehending on the subject the 
quality of desirability." (p.58).
Unreflected desires, being unreflected consciousnesses, participate in the 
metaphysics of unreflected consciousness, and as such, they have Intentionality 
themselves, together with spontaneity and unity within duration.
The Intentionality of Desires, being a necessary consequence of Sartre's 
theory of the autonomy of unreflected consciousness, indicates that the 
metaphysics of the unreflected consciousness is not only epistemologically 
based, but it is teleologically based as well and serves the function to "know"
26 From now on whenever I indicate only page numbers I shall mean the page numbers of the 
Essay on the Transcendental Ego. Also, whenever I refer to the Essay, I shall mean the Essay 
on the Transcendental Ego.
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the world, in a varied, general, but equally important way. Feelings, desires, and 
intuition, not only augment perception, but become themselves equally 
important to perception in this drive of the unreflected consciousness to the 
world, which is Intentionality (more on this in the section on the Emotions).
b) The Two "Aspects” of the Ego ( /  and Me) and Body-Mind 
Distinctions: Analytic worries on the Sartrean theory of Consciousness.
Sartre's Essay puts forward the theory that consciousness is spontaneous and 
translucent. Consciousness exists as spontaneous and translucent whenever it 
does not reflect upon itself as something outside it. (At the moment of 
reflection, it divides itself into consciousness as an object -ego, i.e., me or /- and 
spontaneous consciousness.) We saw above that the innermost and fundamental 
characteristic of consciousness, which makes consciousness exist in this way, is 
its Intentionality: i.e., that it is a nothingness (with no objects or contents in it) 
and that it can not exist except as outwardness towards an object. Because of 
this characteristic, consciousness is determined to render itself alienated and 
posited as something not belonging to itself: this must occur sooner or later, 
when it has to view what it has performed as good or bad, effective or 
ineffective. The ego on the other hand is heavy and ponderable, because of its 
nature and metaphysics as an object.
When consciousness reflects upon itself as something outside of it, fulfilling 
its most important characteristic of Intentionality, it posits an ego. In the 
beginning of his Essay (p.31) Sartre makes clear his intentions regarding the 
ego: "We should like to show here that the ego is neither formally nor materially 
in consciousness: it is outside, in the world. It is a being in the world, like the 
ego of another." Such an ego, posited as an object by the unrefiected and
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translucent consciousness has two aspects: the I  is the ego as the unity of 
actions, and the me is the ego as the unity of states and qualities.
The I here is both the formal presence of consciousness in the posited and 
reflected upon consciousness (encompassing Kantian intuitions, but not the 
entire Kantian dogma), and the I  of the Cogito as reflective consciousness 
posited as an object (encompassing here Cartesian intuitions but again not the 
entire Cartesian dogma).
The me is the material presence of the ego in the form of states (emotions), 
and qualities of perceived objects in the world (such as attractiveness, 
repulsiveness, etc.) on the reflected level. (States and qualities have an 
unreflected counterpart, something which makes unreflected consciousness be 
autonomous.)
Now, what is important to note in Sartre's account is that he recognises from 
the first part of his Essay that "...the /  and the me are only one. ... this ego, of 
which I  and me are but two aspects constitutes the ideal and indirect (noematic) 
unity of the infinite series of our reflected consciousnesses. ... The distinction 
that one makes between these two aspects of one and the same reality seems to 
us simply functional, not to say grammatical." (p.60 in the Essay). From this 
quote we can see that the distinction between them is deemed to have no real 
importance. If one simply substitutes "mind" for what Sartre says about the 
immaterial presence of consciousness, and "body" for what he says for the 
material, we have what might be the most successful and effective solution of 
the body-mind problem in modem philosophy! According to the view put 
forward here, the metaphysical and epistemological problem (i.e., what is a 
mind, how do we know it exists, and what is its relationship with a specific 
body) does not exist, it is a pseudo-problem, arising out of confused thinking 
regarding the two "aspects" of the same reality. (Though Sartre himself uses
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the word "aspect" here, I am hesitant to use it in connection to Sartre’s theory 
because of the known associations of the word in "double-aspect" theories in 
the contemporary philosophy of mind; for lack of another suitable word I use 
this word. I have to note however that Sartre's philosophy of the mind has 
nothing to do with "double-aspect" theories.) The grammatical and functional 
distinction between these two aspects has taken an uncalled for metaphysical 
weight, confusing philosophers and driving them into arguing that we have here 
two substances or realities. This diagnosis of the Cartesian disease which has 
made philosophy ill for four centuries now, seems to work much better than 
traditional monist/dualist, behaviourist, and double aspect theories27. It also 
connects this problem with the metaphysical materialistic interpretations of 
Marx, something which Sartre has in focus even in this early work.
Sartre would deal in few words with problems such as that of AI (i.e., 
whether a computer has a mind or not), in the same way as problems having to 
do with our and other people's physiology of the nervous system. The 
"thought", that AI people claim computers can have, has in Sartre the same 
ontology as a Sartrean posited object would have (i.e., the same treatment as an 
arm or leg). And since, in the way that AI people talk about thought, thought 
can only be treated or regarded as an object (or an epiphenomenon of an object, 
and thus analysable to it), there would be no distinctions between thoughts, 
fingers, toes, micro-chips, chairs, tables. The only difference between human- 
things (bodies, looks, behaviour, language) and non-human-things (rocks, sea, 
air) would be one of our stance towards them. Note however, that in dealing 
with human beings as such (and not their "thingness"), the ontology of the Other 
(through the "look", etc.) transforms this stance into a lived ontological
27 The theory proposed here agrees not only with my own views, but with Wittgenstein’s as well 
(even though his was a different prescribed treatment and prognosis from mine and Sartre's); 
for more on this see the section on the Emotions. In addition, I haveto point out that the theory 
put forward here is not harmed in any way by the later Sartre’s views on the “lived experience” 
(le vecu), see Sartre’s Interview in Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Jean-Paul 
Sartre. Open Court, La Salle, ILL, 1981, pp.22-23.
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structure, so real and certain as to effect a radical transformation of one's whole 
entity even cause one's self-destruction. (The Sartrean stance here is not like 
Dennett's view, since the Sartrean perspective is based on a metaphysics which 
for Dennett cannot be acceptable; in short, Dennett tries to "explain away" 
consciousness and Intentionality as some sort of chosen theoretical tools to 
explain what goes on at the neurochemical level, or as some kind of heuristic 
devices that we employ when we have to deal with objects that resemble us; 
Sartre on the contrary analyses the phenomenon on an ontological basis: we can' 
not chose not to have this stance we have towards human beings and what ever 
is in their realm. When we confront a human being for Sartre there is no choice 
on the matter: we recognise him/her as such pre-reflectively; for Dennett it 
becomes a reflective behaviour facilitating social interaction.)2*
It would be useful here to discuss reactions that philosophers in the Analytic 
tradition may have to Sartre's theory of consciousness. In this way, not only will 
Sartre's theory be further clarified, but the comparison will show more clearly 
any virtues it may have.
Let us start with the most fundamental. Analytic philosophers can see the 
point of the Husserlian Ego and "noema" more clearly than Sartre, and actually 
find the Theory of Unreflective Consciousness irksome if not problematic: 
common usage treats unreflected consciousness as an object. (A proof that 
common usage treats unreflected consciousness as an object is found in the fact 
that grammatically it is a noun. The concept described by the noun can be easily 
transformed in the Hussserlian tradition into the Transcendental Ego, and in this 
way into an object which is an as "objectified" -through universalization- object
28 See Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained. Penguin, 1991; The Intentional Stance. 
MIT Press, Cambridge Mass., 1987.
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as possible.) If one were to regard unreflected consciousness as not an object, 
one would have to use a different syntax and language.291 think the best answer 
to this criticism is that unreflected consciousness is treated as an object due to 
.the employed realistic presuppositions in common language. The situation 
differs once one considers language with non-realist pre-suppositions (see the 
section on Realism). Sartre's own views on Language are analysed in the section 
on the Emotions; but to put it briefly the Sartrean view is that common use is 
not (and can not be) an objective criterion for the meaning of an expression. If, 
for the purposes of a given task, we differ from common use on the meaning of 
our expressions, this is no serious problem, once we acknowledge the 
irksomeness and difficulty involved in explaining our own use (irksomeness and 
difficulty are not philosophical mistakes per se).
An associated problem is the determination of the reflected consciousness 
that objects are objects for. To answer this I think we need to distinguish two 
problems here. Firstly, what unifies bits of reflected consciousness? One may 
answer for example, as Strawson did, that these bits are just aspects of a specific 
body30. Secondly, how are these unifications themselves unified in time? One 
may inquire how in Strawson's theory bodies are themselves unified.
One can answer these questions in the Sartrean perspective like this: bits of 
reflected consciousness are just "aspects" (I put the word in quotation marks 
because I do not think such a word here, with its known philosophical
29 I think A  J. Ayer, Mary Wamock, and Alvin Plantinga in their critiques of Sartrean theory 
have a similar line of attack: see AJ.Ayer, "Jean-Paul Sartre", Horizon, VoLXII, No.67/68, 
July/August 1945, pp. 12-26/101-110; AJ.Ayer, "Some Aspects of Existentialism", The 
Rationalist Annual, 1948, ed. by Frederick Watts, Watts & Co, London, 1948; AJ.Ayer, 
"Reflections on Existentialism", in AJ.Ayer, Metaphysics and Common Sense. Macmillan, 
London, 1969, pp.203-218; Mary Wamock, The Philosophy of Sartre. Hutchinson, London, 
1965; Alvin Plantinga, "An Existentialist's Ethics", Review o f Metaphysics, Vol. 12, 1958-1959, 
pp.235-256. I discuss and attempt to give an answer to these critiques in my Unpublished 
Dissertation Constantinos Athanasopoulos, "Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontological Theory of Freedom: 
A Critical Analysis", University of St Andrews, 30th of September 1991, pp.63-70.
30 See P.F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essav in Descriptive Metaphysics. Methuen &Co, 
London, 1959.
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associations, is very successful; I use it for lack of another word) of a specific 
entity: Mr.Berkeley, Mrs.Hobbes, etc. What makes these entities different is the 
unreflected consciousness, which is different from one to the other; unreflected 
consciousness makes different the entity which it is an "aspect" of, defining and 
distinguishing it from all other items in the surrounding world, and distinguishes 
the other aspects of this same entity from similar "aspects" of other entities. In 
this way, one entity (Mr.Berkeley) has three "aspects": reflected consciousness, 
unreflected consciousness, and body. Intentionality, to work fully, needs only 
reflected and unreflected consciousness. The body is not necessary for 
unreflected consciousness to work; it is only useful in social interaction, and in 
our relation to the Other. (The body in Sartre’s theory of unreflective 
consciousness and Intentionality is not as necessary as it is in Merleau-Ponty's, 
Phenomenologie de la perception (1945). The phenomenological conceptions 
of Intentionality in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty differ mainly on this: their 
emphasis on the body and the World; a difference that Merleau-Ponty did not 
notice with care.)
Actually, both the issue of one's identification with a specific entity (one's 
own) and one's differentiation from other entities in the environment is discussed 
in detail and with I think great depth in Part Three of Sartre's Being and 
Nothingness, entitled "Being-for-Others", especially in the two chapters leading 
to the chapter "Concrete relations With Others" (Third Chapter) in which the 
Attitudes Toward Others are analysed, and in which emotions and language are 
discussed. These two chapters31 the first entitled "The Existence of Others" and 
the second entitled "The Body", contain what in contemporary British Analytic 
terms can be described as criteria of identity. They deal with the metaphysics 
which determine how one entity (in Sartre's words a "totality") is distinct from 
another. In the first chapter the problem of the existence of others is described 
more or less like this: Am I by myself in the world? Are all others automata and
31 Being and Nothingness (from now on BN followed by page numbers) BN 221-359.
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things in the world? What can guarantee the existence of Others? The problem 
as outlined in the form of these questions becomes rather serious, since it has 
received solutions from many influential modem philosophers who have formed 
traditions with great philosophical output. Solipsists believe that we can only be 
certain of the existence of ourselves; idealists "objectify" the existence of others 
and turn them to an abstract idea; realists in their turn "objectify" and turn our 
(unreflective) consciousness into an abstract idea, running between the two 
extremes of behaviourism and physicalism (for the materialistically bent) and of 
critical realism (for the immaterialistically bent, since in effect it is an idealism in 
disguise). In the Sartrean frame of mind, both idealism (including Hegelian 
idealism and dialectics) and realism are just modes of solipsism. (For more see 
the section on Realism.)
Sartre dismisses all these solutions as unacceptable since they either choose 
to ignore the existence of others, or choose to ignore what is not body in their 
totality. Using ideas from Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger, but rejecting all three 
accounts of the Other as problematic, he formulates his own theory of the Other 
which guarantees both the existence of one's totality and the existence of the 
external world and the Other. In sum, what Sartre claims is that we start to 
think about ourselves as belonging to a specific entity (Mr.Jones, or Mrs. Smith) 
after we are confronted with the Other at the pre-reflective level of 
consciousness in the form of one of the emotions, perceptions (e.g. of someone 
looking at me), or other modes of awareness. That is, through Intentionality our 
(unreflected) consciousness starts to think about this body as our body, this 
structure of consciousness as our consciousness, etc., only after it recognises 
through emotions (fear, shame, etc.) and other non-reflective modes of 
awarenesses of the world and the Other, that the Other is treating this body or 
this structure of consciousness as an object: as this or that entity or totality 
(even items used or created by the Other can work in the same way as our 
confrontation with the Other).
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Without Intentionality, i.e., without the direct and non-reflective involvement 
of our consciousness with the world and the Other, we would not even know or 
come into any contact with our own body: our body is as different from our 
consciousness as the Other is different to our consciousness. Without 
Intentionality, in any of our actions having to do with the Other we would have 
four entities instead of two (the other, his/her body, our consciousness, our 
body, instead of the Other and us). Through Intentionality, the Body (as a 
posited object) not only appears to us as a structure of our consciousness, but it 
is also lived in a direct and unreflected way (evidenced in all our actions where 
we do not have time nor any desire to think).
Both the knowledge we have of ourselves and the knowledge of the Other 
depend on these non-reflective modes of awareness of the Other's existence. In 
this way, both the knowledge of ourselves and the knowledge we have of the 
Other do not become "objective principles of subjectivity or objectivity" (as in 
Kantian realism), nor dialectical phases in the comprehension of a universal self- 
consciousness (as in Hegelianism). In short, they are not knowledge in the 
idealist nor the realist conceptions of it; they are knowledge in the Sartrean 
sense of a lived experience in the presence of absolute Being32. Actually, in BN, 
Sartre even goes to the point of acknowledging the fact that he was mistaken in 
thinking that the Husserlian corpus could be saved by the rejection of the 
Transcendental Ego. In BN he maintains that the Husserlian corpus needs to be 
seriously revised and re-organised if one is to be saved from its idealistic and 
realistic solipsisms. In this we can see Sartre's rejection of the "epoche" as able 
to guarantee our knowledge of the world and the Other; however, we do not 
see the rejection of the Husserlian idea of Intentionality which is maintained in a 
most rigorous way throughout BN. What is Sartre merely pointing out here is 
that the theory of Intentionality which Husserl first systematically propounded
32 See BN 171-218 and our section on Realism.
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can be maintained without serious contradiction only if one rejects "epoche", 
and the Husserlian idealist and realist presuppositions (together with the 
Transcendental Ego)33.
To summarise, both our identification with this or that entity, and the 
differentiation of one (reflected) consciousness from another, and our 
identification of this (unreflected) consciousness as belonging to this entity 
(Mr.Jones, or Mrs.Berkeley) emerge non-reflectively in each of our non-, 
reflective involvements with the environment. In addition, these emerge not as 
forms of knowledge in the traditional sense, but as lived experiences.
To illustrate this further, consider the case of R. Louis Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr.Hyde: can the Sartrean theory explain the phenomenon of multiple 
personalities, and even of multiple personalities having as their source altered 
states of the same body? I think that Sartrean theory can give an answer: in the 
cases of Dr.Jekyl and Mr.Hyde we have two different bodies, giving rise to two 
different "me"s {me as the body structure in the more encompassing structure of 
the I). All these are structures and components in a single entity. Intentionality 
and the choice to follow self-deception or not in one's (and the Other's) 
apprehension of one's entity as one or two entities (or unfree pseudo-entities), 
will determine what the entity itself will give as self-report on its situation, and 
what we will accept. But the phenomenological analysis of the specific example 
will be that it is one entity with two altered states in its body, and possible 
altered states in its structure of the /. Without Intentionality we would have two 
entities inhabiting the same body something extremely problematic in itself.
However, Analytic philosophers may not fyel comfortable with Sartre's 
treatment of solipsism. Some may see in S$^%<^(ifusion of the two separable
33 See mainly BN 235.
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notions of immediacy and involuntariness: a solipsist while accepting 
involuntariness (we accept perceptions of the external world and of others that 
we cannot totally control), does not accept immediacy (we do not have direct 
perceptions and evidence of the external world). Both the solipsist and the 
scepticist may unite on this: we have no direct and immediate (and thus certain) 
evidence of the external world. Sartre does not distinguish clearly between the 
two, being open thus to a second attack: the Sartrean Theory of Intentionality 
does not support the view that there has to be an external world. In this way, a 
Solipsist can accept the Sartrean theory of Intentionality and still not believe in 
the existence of the external world.
Taking into account Sartre's theory of Freedom however, I do not think that 
Sartre would accept involuntariness even at the level of perception. For Sartre, 
our contact with the external world is "filtered" and transformed by unreflected 
consciousness. What guarantees the existence of the external world is the 
existence of unreflected consciousness as translucent and as a nothingness and 
the existence of Intentionality as its fundamental characteristic. Since the 
unreflective consciousness is a nothingness and a translucency, it needs the 
external world for raw materials with which it can build the reflected (posited) 
consciousness (the I). Without Intentionality, i.e., without the fundamental 
characteristic of relating directly to the environment in each of its moments, 
unreflected consciousness would be a nothingness with no prospect of being 
anything, and thus it would not exist; because of the heaviness, opaqueness and 
solidness of the external Being, unreflected consciousness gains being with the 
help of Intentionality, and becomes the /: what can be and is reflected from the 
unreflected consciousness. In this way, the unreflected consciousness as 
nothingness and translucency, and Intentionality as its fundamental characteristic 
guarantees the existence of the external world, and the existence of the I  proves 
that there is external world. Of course, even though we can be certain that the 
external world and its structures (the Other, etc.) exist and provide the raw
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material for the unreflected consciousness, we cannot be certain about the way 
this world exists (in its mode of existence); for this, one needs the Sartrean 
phenomenological ontology (sis both an ontology and a discipline and 
methodology), and, even there, some things have to be left more or less 
undecided and uncertain; for example our in-itself, the relation of the for-itself 
to the in-itself, etc.
Another associated worry for Analytic philosophers is that the Sartrean 
theory of consciousness is a hybrid mixture of representationalism and an 
adverbial account of consciousness. A Sartrean response to such a worry might 
be the following: Representationalism cannot exist in the Sartrean theory of 
consciousness since the Sartrean Ego (the I) is always "outside" unreflected 
consciousness, and exists on the same ontological level as the physical objects of 
our awareness. In addition, unreflective consciousness does not depend on ideas 
or representations of perceptions for its awareness of the external world, it is 
"hooked" onto the external world continuously and without an intermission. 
This is due to the existence of Intentionality as the condition without which 
unreflective consciousness cannot exist. Unreflective consciousness cannot 
accommodate any ideas or perceptions in it, since it is translucent; the ego (or I) 
however can accommodate them, and that is where we can find them in the 
form of memories, etc. The adverbial account of consciousness, having as its 
origin Ryle’s account of consciousness in The Concept of Mind 34, cannot be 
acceptable in a Sartrean theory of consciousness because first it uses an idea of 
language that is alien to Sartre's theory; and second, and most importantly, 
because the Verb/Adverb account cannot accept the separate existence of the 
ego (/), and turns consciousness into a disposition of sorts. Sartre and
34 Gilbert Rvle. The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson, London, 1949; a clear overview of Ryle’s 
thought on this point exists in Ryle’s own essay “Adverbial Verbs and Verbs of Thinking”, in 
K. Kolenda, ed., Gilbert Rvle: On Thinking. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982 (1979), pp. 17-32.
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Wittgenstein35 were both opposed to dispositionalismas a theory of the mind 
and consciousness: for Sartre it becomes just another version of behaviourism 
and attributism36. And the ego is such an important concept in the Sartrean 
theory of consciousness that without it human entities would have no existence: 
since by definition the unreflective consciousness is a nothingness, what makes 
the entity a something- with the help of Intentionality- is the posited 
consciousness. Dispositions for Sartre must exist in the I  and the me, and they 
cannot incorporate the I  in its totality (see for more discussion on these points in 
our sub-section on self-deception).
Related to the above is the worry regarding the unity of consciousness in the 
object and the impossibility of the object of representation being the content of 
consciousness in Sartre’s theory of Intentionality.
I think we need to discuss here Sartre's views on Representation and 
Presentation, the Content of Representation, and the Object as Content of 
Representation.
In Hazel Barnes’ key to her translation of BN (p.634) we find: 
"Presentation. That which is present to the mind as an object of consciousness. 
Sometimes distinguished from Representation. When this distinction is 
observed, Presentation refers to actual objects of which the mind is conscious, 
Representation to imaginary ones."
In the Essay, when Sartre refers to the problem of making the transcendent 
object of consciousness the content of representation37, he refers to
35 On some of the reasons why Wittgenstein was opposed to dispositionalism, see Saul A. 
Kripke, Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language. Blackwell, Oxford, 1982.
36 See BN 82-4 and 294-5.
37 See p.38 in Williams and Kirkpatrick text, and p.21-22 in Sylvie Le Bon text.
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 94
representation and not to presentation. In his text he refers to the danger38 of 
appealing to a transcendental and subjective principle of unification which will 
then be the /, once we accept that the object of consciousness is the content of 
representation. Taking the Barnes explanation of the words "presentation" and 
"representation", Sartre's whole idea seems rather obscure, but I think it can be 
clarified once we get rid of the metaphysics that is rather alien to Sartre.
Unreflected consciousness is not passive: it is pure activity and it is a locus of 
origin for all the activity and outwardness that is evidenced in Intentionality. It is 
not a cupboard for items labelled "ideas", "impressions", "images": quite the 
contrary, all these items are foreign to unreflected consciousness, and have as 
their storage facility the Ego. With this metaphysics in mind, the text is 
illuminated to a great extent. What Sartre seems to say here is just that in the 
unreflected consciousness there is no object-subject differentiation. The object 
"out-there" ("out" meaning an external locus of awareness, even if this locus is 
part of the Ego) is what exists in awareness, and (unreflected) consciousness 
preserves its ontology as nothingness. When a representation appears as a 
representation o f something (an object of sorts) the object "out-there" becomes 
something "in-here" (content of representation or not), and as such, in need of a 
subjective principle of unification (the Ego). At the level where the object out- 
there exists in awareness there is no need for such a unifying principle. The 
object "out-there" is all that is needed for awareness to be unified. Unreflected 
consciousness is unified (at its autonomous emotive and other parts) just by 
having this object in awareness.
Again, this has nothing to do with passivity. That is what Sartre means when 
he writes in the Essay "It [consciousness] unifies itself by escaping from itself': 
this escape with the help of Intentionality is what unifies consciousness, with no 
need for anything else. When Sartre says in the Essay that "The unity of a
38 His actual phrase is: "...may be obliged...".
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thousand active consciousnesses by which I have added, do add, and shall add 
two and two to make four, is the transcendent object "two and two make 
four"", what he means is just that all these parts of unreflected consciousness 
which make it autonomous are acting in unison and together, in a single 
instantaneous and spontaneous moment, "dressing" the object out-there and 
making it the locus of all this unreflected totality (i.e., unreflected 
consciousness).
It is also clear why the object "out-there" cannot be merely the content of the 
representation, i.e., it cannot exist "by itself1 as mere "sense-data" in 
consciousness. At the moment of being aware of the object, there is no 
distinction between unreflected consciousness and the object, as something 
which is a content of something else.
To the Analytically oriented the thesis of the unification of consciousness in 
the object may sound like a confusion between the problem of unity of content 
and the problem of personal identity. We have to note however, that the two 
problems are related: if we solve the problem of personal identity over time, 
then the problem regarding the unity of content over time and different 
circumstances in the meaning of words is solved as well. There is also a 
hierarchy of solutions here: once the problem of personal identity is solved then 
the problem of meaning can be solved, for the simple reason that once we 
accept Sartre's theory regarding meaning and consciousness (see later) meaning 
and consciousness cannot exist without each other. In a Fregean theory of 
meaning, perhaps, the two problems may have different and unrelated solutions; 
but in the Sartrean theory the two problems become inseparable since meanings, 
etc. exist in (reflected) consciousness, and since both Intentionality and the 
ontology of (unreflected) consciousness require that consciousness cannot exist 
except as giving meaning to the world. (See also the section on Emotions and 
especially the sub-section on Language.)
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Before we close the discussion of possible problems regarding the Sartrean 
theory of the Ego, the me and the body-mind relationship, it would be useful to 
sum up the Sartrean theory related to Unreflected Consciousness, the I  (or Ego, 
or Reflected Consciousness) and their relation to a specific body.
The picture is somewhat like this. Unreflected consciousness becomes I  after 
reflection; the body through the me, which for all practical considerations is the 
body for the I, comes into contact with the I. The me in this way is the part of 
the I, which is totally uncontrolled by the unreflective consciousness: 
Intentionality in consequence has no access to it. This may sound like 
anomalous monism but it is not: in Sartreanism we do not know and we cannot 
know the body and the me, because they are out-there with the physical things 
and the I. In anomalous monism what we have are problems in epistemological 
justification; we know some things with certainty (physical laws) but we cannot 
fit the mental into this classification and explanation; that is all. In Sartreanism 
we have epistemological difficulties in everything except unreflected 
consciousness, and there is nothing like it for us in the entire universe! (Only for 
the Sartrean theists can God provide an exception here; otherwise this principle 
of epistemological certainty is exceptionless.)
Now the Physicalist maintains that the me/body control the /; however, he 
falls into problems when the parts of the /  which are not controlled by the 
me/body, are what is influencing the I  and the behaviour emanating from it. 
These relations emanate new forms of, and more complex relations with the 
body, which for a physicalist theory are the source of extreme theoretical (and 
not only) difficulties. (Such difficulties are serious for all physicalists who want 
to be honest scientists as well, and do not want to choose the extreme position 
of ignoring adverse data or falsifying observations.)
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An illustration of this account could be depression, as seen from the Sartrean 
ontology of consciousness and the me, and as seen from the physicalist 
perspective. While the physicalist would claim that a properly prepared bio­
chemical substance, administered appropriately to the depressed, can cure 
him/her from the problem of depression (which in some cases reaches the 
extremes of suicidal depression and manic-depression), the Sartrean claims that 
we can cure the problem only with a combination of bio-chemicals (properly 
prepared and administered) and a radical interpretation.
Generated by the body, depression affects the I. We are aware that we have 
depression only upon reflection on our /. Depression in this way can be cured 
only if we always change the /  so that no established relation exists between the 
body and the me. We can either have the /  change the body with different 
relations between the I  and the me and the me and the body, or make the I  
totally independent from the body by changing the connections between me and 
the body or even the I  and the me (even though the latter case is much more 
difficult).
The physicalist here may accuse us of having some kind of double aspect 
theory like Spinoza’s, but if we suppose this regarding the me and the entity 
then what controls what? Does the body aspect control the consciousness 
aspect, or vice versa? Either way is the wrong way for Sartreanism, which 
accepts absolute freedom39 as one of its most fundamental beliefs. In addition, 
such "aspects" seem only theoretical constructs, to explain the phenomena at 
hand, whereas Sartre's "aspects" are so much immersed in metaphysics and 
ontology as for all humans to literally live them. And not as "aspects", but real- 
life experiences: unreflected consciousness does not see them as "aspects"; it is
39 Freedom for Sartre has not the traditional common sense meaning of «no impediments to 
action», but it is ontological freedom, i.e., freedom as a defining characteristic of our 
consciousness: the lived experience of having the choice to go either way and not having the 
choice not to choose. For more details see my Unpublished St Andrews Dissertation, on Sartre’s 
Theory of Freedom.
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only with reflection that they can be termed as such. And Sartre’s discussion 
invokes not two “aspects” but three: Unreflected Consciousness, Reflected 
Consciousness and the me, and the body; and when we pass to the autonomy of 
the emotions as consciousnesses the Sartrean theory is transformed into a multi­
aspect theory40. Such consequences make the relation of Sartre’s to Spinoza's 
theory a failure.
Other accusations may be that the /  has not the power which it is portrayed 
as having, or that we support the theory with a posteriori empirical data (like 
the dopamine effect). One can see however that these accusations fail, since the 
whole methodology of Sartrean phenomenological ontology is totally alien to 
that of the empirical sciences: its findings cannot therefore be falsified/verified 
with empirical data (see our section on the Emotions).
The physicalist may still accuse us here again of a more straightforward 
double aspect and a physicalist feedback loop theory. This accusation also fails 
however, since, as we showed above, Sartre's theory cannot be an "aspect" 
theory in the traditional sense, and no physicalist empirical data can give 
substantial support to or destroy its credibility.
c) States, acts, and qualities.
It is important to enlarge on a point of clarification regarding Sartre's 
classifications. For Sartre there is no distinction between mental and physical 
actions, in the way for example that theorists such as Searle think there is. John 
Searle in Intentionality: An Essav in the Philosophy of Mind 41. maintains that 
beliefs, desires, and fears should be classified as mental states, reserving the
40 See the section on the Emotions.
41 John R Searle, Intentionality: An Essav in the Philosoohv of Mind. Cambridge University 
Press, 1983, p.3, and Chap.3.
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term mental acts for things such as forming a mental image of the Eiffel Tower 
after an order to do so42 . Searle’s and other contemporary theorists’ (mainly 
from the British-American Analytic tradition) observations about the mental 
states and actions are quite alien to Sartre's classification of the two aspects of 
the ego in his Essay (the I  as the unity of actions, and the me as the unity of 
states and qualities; see Sartre’s Essay, p.60), and his entirely different 
metaphysics of states (see for more discussion on this point the section on the 
Critiques on Sartre’s Theory). This point of clarification is extremely important 
in any discussion of Sartre's Theory on States, Actions, and Qualities.43
As I maintained above in my note on the two aspects of the ego and body- 
mind distinctions, no distinction between the mental and the physical can survive 
long in Sartrean metaphysics. It has to be diffused into talk about aspects of the 
same reality. However, the difference between theorists such as Searle and 
Sartre is not only in the morphology of the classification of states and action, it 
is also in their employed metaphysics.
To give a somewhat simplistic account of their role in Sartrean metaphysics, 
states and qualities exist at two levels: the unreflected and the reflected. Their 
unreflected existence is due to the autonomy of the unreflected, spontaneous, 
and translucent consciousness (p. 58), while for their reflected existence one has 
only to look in the ego as an object. States at the unreflected level are wants or 
desires which can only be recognised as such (i.e., as wants or desires) on the 
reflected level. States at the reflected level are emotions, which are more 
solidified or permanent wants and desires. Qualities are properties of things 
which satisfy our wants and desires: aspects of things as related to the ego. 
Qualities are therefore hybrid mixtures of states and actions: they are the 
psychic dispositions attached to objects for producing states. Actions, whether
42 Searle, ibid, p. 103.
43 The reservations expressed here serve as an explanation of why I disagreed earlier with the 
Brentano’s school’s emphasis on mental acts. See also VL, i, iii.
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physical such as driving a car, or psychical such as doubting are transcendences 
of the same sort as states and qualities. They are posited by consciousness as its 
objects, since the many active consciousnesses of their moments of actualisation 
need to be unified into concrete parts of the ego. In this schema, the necessary 
elements of the ego are states and actions. A separate category of qualities is 
optional, since states and actions can find directly in the ego the unity they 
demand.
In this perspective (which I endorse), actions, states, and qualities are all 
parts of the ego, thus participating in its metaphysics and leaving consciousness 
undetermined by them. In this way, consciousness remains spontaneous and 
translucent44.
Thus for Sartre and his metaphysics there are and can be no distinctions 
between mental and bodily actions, even when mental actions are as subtle as a 
doubt. This seriously disagrees with Searle's and other accounts; but it is 
nevertheless a consequence of Intentionality as the essential characteristic of 
consciousness. (I shall enlarge on this later, in the section on the Emotions; see 
also above for the diffusion of body-mind distinctions, and for self-reflection.)
d) Meaning and Consciousness.
The first time Sartre refers to meaning is to compare the type (or mode) of 
existence of the I  to the type of existence exhibited by the existence of 
mathematical truths, of meanings, and of spatio-temporal beings (p. 52). There is 
no doubt here that the existence of meanings and mathematical truths as such is 
considered an indisputable point. It is taken for real existence and as real as 
that of spatio-temporal beings. But is Sartre here propounding some sort of
44 Note however that Sartre's position here escapes Idealism; see the section on Realism.
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Fregean and Platonistic view regarding the metaphysics of meaning and 
mathematical truths (in the way of senses or forms)? I think not. Even though 
their existence is not disputed, it remains debatable whether the existence 
proposed here by Sartre is of things or entities such as Platonic forms and 
Fregean senses. One would be nearer to Sartre's own view, I think, if one were 
to claim that meaning is something concrete, though not in the way a chair is. 
There is no claim from Sartre here regarding the origin, metaphysical nature and 
qualities of such meaning45. Undoubtedly, consciousness and the ego have a 
major part to play in Sartre's account, but nothing explicit regarding them is 
stated here.
The second time Sartre refers to meaning is in connection with cases where a 
specific quality's fullness o f meaning cannot be apprehended till it is connected 
again to the totality it was abstracted from (pp.73-74). Sartre refers here to the 
ego seen in the Husserlian perspective as a sort of an X-pole which would be 
the support of psychic phenomena, and as such, indifferent to the psychic 
qualities it would support. In this Husserlian perspective there are unilateral 
logical relations by which each quality belongs to this X like a predicate to a 
subject, making an analysis always possible. Sartre claims on the other hand that 
the ego is more like an indissoluble synthetic totality which can support itself 
and has no need of a supporting X. Sartre illustrates his point by using an 
analogy from music: in a melody it is useless to presuppose an X which would 
serve as a support for the different notes. The unity here comes from the 
indissoluble order of the notes, which when separated by abstraction lose their 
meaning and significance for the melody. The subject of the predicate here is the 
concrete totality, and the predicate is a quality abstractly separated from the
45 And any hasty parallels between Sartre’s and Husserl’s thoughts on this point (beyond their 
common background in Phenomenology) are unfounded. Sartre does not even claim here a pure 
epistemological existence for meaning, such as some might think Husserl was trying to put 
forward with his Transcendental Ego.
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 102
totality, a quality which has its full meaning only when connected again to the 
totality.
Sartre acknowledges the fact that the separation of the quality/predicate from 
the totality/subject is possible by judgement, as in the case of states being 
separated from the /  to which they belong (p.75). However, he points out that 
such a movement of separation would end in an empty and false meaning if it 
were not given as incomplete, and if it did not complete itself by a movement of 
synthesis. Moreover, this synthesis as a transcendent entity participates in the 
fallibility and dubitability of all transcendence: we can always be wrong or 
deceive ourselves in our synthesis of ourselves, and the error would not be here 
on the judgmental but on the pre-judgmental level (pp.75-76). (For more 
analysis of the phenomena of self-deception and "emptiness" of meaning and 
their connection to intuition see next sub-section.)
In a few more places in the Essay Sartre gives a clearer picture of what he 
considers meaning to be. In p.76 he shows that meaning is some qualification 
we add on things, as when one unifies one's consciousness under the title 
"hatred". In pp.89-91, Sartre refers to the meaning of the pronoun "I", in such 
replies to the question "What are you doing?" as "I am trying to hang this 
picture" or "I am repairing the rear tyre" while we are still engaged fully in what 
we are doing. Sartre writes that this "I" is no mere syntactical form, it has a 
meaning, it is quite simply an empty concept which is destined to remain empty. 
It has the same status as the word "chair" in the absence of any chair. In our use 
we employ the corresponding concept without the present existence of the item 
being described. In pp.93-95 Sartre maintains that Sartrean phenomenology 
will not allow one to have privileged status towards one's own psychical states. 
(This claim is one of his arguments against the claim that the me part of the ego 
is not a transcendent object, but an essential structure of consciousness.) 
Psychical states are as public as chairs and tables. Furthermore, they have both
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the certainty and the meaning qualifications as a chair and a table, i.e., two men 
speaking of the same state are not only talking of the same thing, but are as 
certain about it as if it were a chair or a table.
From this short exposition of what Sartre writes regarding meaning in this 
Essay we can claim the following: a) meaning has concrete and definite real 
existence, but not as concrete and as definite as that of a chair and a table; b) 
meaning has degrees of fullness (less or more) and its fullness depends upon the 
necessity for a connection to a larger whole (if the meaning of a thing cannot 
properly be apprehended but by a connection to the larger whole of which it is a 
part, then its fullness shall be reached only through such a connection); c) 
meaning is some qualification we add to things: things first exist and then they 
acquire meaning through our unifications of them, and in this way meaning 
comes after things; d) meaning can exist even for "empty" concepts, i.e., 
concepts which are not properly used in a specific case, but which still have 
meaning out of their association to previous usages.
It is important to note that Intentionality as put forward by Sartre in this 
Essay explains and gives a raison d'etre for claims (c) and (a) above (why things 
in the world are as real as meanings but more concrete and more definite, and 
why things exist first and meanings come after); while claims (b) and (d) make 
sense because of Intentionality. There is no sense in talking about the degrees of 
fullness in meaning if meaning does not depend for its existence on 
consciousness as Intentionality (which allows for variation in degrees of direct 
acquaintance with things), and there is no sense in "empty" concepts if 
Intentionality does not make recompense for it (through its multi-applicability 
and its close relationship to consciousness). This also explains why certain 
structures of the ego are related to it in the way they do only through 
Intentionality. (For more on this see the section on Emotions, subsection on 
Language).
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e) Self-Deception and Intentionality.
In this section, I think it is a good idea to differentiate between two forms of 
self-deception: Epistemological Self-Deception, having to do with deceiving 
oneself in the investigation of one's consciousness; and Metaphysical Self- 
Deception, having to do with the metaphysics of the things one is investigating. 
Of course, this differentiation is a fairly trivial one: an epistemological self- 
deception has to do with acquiring the wrong metaphysical point of view, and a 
metaphysical self-deception has to do with wrongly acquired habits of 
investigation. I think however, that it would aid our analysis of the phenomenon 
of self-deception as depicted in this Essay.
I shall finish this Section by adding a case where according to Sartre there is 
no self-deception involved, even though one would expect it to be a 
paradigmatic case of self-deception.
Epistemological Self-Deception
Sartre gives a very important role to types of evidence regarding the 
metaphysics and the relationship of our consciousness to our ego, in his 
explanation of the common phenomenon of self-deception.
The first time he achieves the connection is in pp. 51-52 of the Essay, where 
h$ discusses the peculiar metaphysics of the Cogito. He observes that the I  
Jbink does not appear to reflection as the reflected consciousness but is given 
through reflected consciousness. It is apprehended by intuition and is an object 
jpasped by means of evidence. The I  is apprehended, always inadequately,
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behind the reflected consciousness (p.53). There are two things to be clarified 
here in order to comprehend Sartre's thought: intuition and evidence.
By intuition is meant that essential way of proceeding which makes 
Phenomenology distinct from other approaches to philosophising. According to 
Husserl it is what puts us in the presence of the thing (p.35). ''Intuition" here is 
a technical term used to indicate that an act of consciousness occurs by which 
the object under investigation is confronted, rather than merely indicated in- 
absentia. A word (such as a name for example) when used in a phrase quite 
casually, in an indicative way, is quite "empty". It awaits to be "filled in" by the 
use of the exact same word in a careful observation of the object under 
description in an act of imagination or perception. The indicative act is "empty", 
the intuitive act is "filled in". In this way, and in accordance with the orthodox 
phenomenological pursuit every cognitive inquiry must ultimately base its claims 
upon acts of intuition, even if supplementary modes of evidence (such as 
inductive reasoning, etc.) must be invoked to develop the inquiry. In 
phenomenology, since consciousness is what is under investigation, 
consciousness must regard itself in order to determine what consciousness is 
and what it is not. It is important to note with regard to intuition as a method of 
investigation that its conclusions cannot provide certainty with respect to the 
existence of the thing under investigation, nor everything there is to know about 
it: for it appears, even intuitively, "in profile". In the specific context of p.51, 
Sartre simply means that the I  is apprehended by directly confronting it with 
consciousness.
When the /  is described as an object grasped by means of evidence, what is 
meant is just that it is grasped by intuitive evidence. Sartre clearly opposes any 
view that such evidence is apodeictic (i.e., necessarily so), since by saying /  in "/ 
Think' (the Cogito) we affirm far more than we know (p.51). fie also denies
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 106
that such evidence is adequate (i.e., can be grasped in its entirety), since the I  is 
presented as an opaque reality whose content has to be unfolded (ibid).
The connection with self-deception arises from the fact that the /  manifests 
itself (misleadingly) as the source of consciousness sometimes apodeictically 
(i.e., necessarily so) due to preconceptions and prejudices regarding the 
metaphysics involved, and sometimes adequately (i.e., as if it is grasped in its 
entirety) committing thus the fallacy of Converse Accident or hasty 
generalisation46 , even though we know that nothing but unreflected 
consciousness can be the source of consciousness (p.52). We know this because 
if it were not so, there would have to be two Fs (the one of the reflective and 
the one of the reflected consciousness); or even three if we are to follow Fink, 
and his postulated /  of the transcendental consciousness, disengaged by the 
epoche. 47
The impossibility of any communication between these two or even three Fs 
and of any identification of them in one unique I  makes such a proliferation of 
Fs a chimera (p.52). It is important to note that this sort of self-deception is not 
something that humans have any choice over: it occurs due to the metaphysics 
existent in the spontaneous consciousness, the ego, and their relationship. Even 
when a consciousness appears immediately as reflected, its ontology as reflected 
betrays the ontological priority of the unreflected, which does not need to be 
reflected in order to exist. Reflection presupposes the intervention of a second 
degree consciousness (p. 58). This ontological priority of the unreflected is a 
consequence of its autonomy (p. 58). The unreflected is a totality which needs 
no completing at all, and it is one of the characteristics of its ontology that it has 
to transcend itself by "apprehending on" the subject the quality of the reflected.
46 Irving Copi, Introduction to Logic. 7th ed., Macmillan, N.Y., 1986, p. 100.
47 Eugen Fink, "Die Phanomenologische Philosophic Edmund Husserls In Der Gegenwartigen 
Kritik. Mit Einem Vorwort Von Edmund Husserl", Kcmtstudien, XXXVIII (1933), pp.356ff., 
38 Iff.
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Deception can also occur at this stage, when someone deceives himself by 
thinking that he is not watching himself act while he does watch. The reflected 
states, as reasons for some specific behaviour; are posited as such through 
our reflection on them. Reflected states are not independent from our choice of 
them as reasons. For example, suppose that I describe the reason of my action 
by the name of a reflected state (states can exist both at the unreflected and the 
reflected level, preserving thus the autonomy of the unreflected): by taking it 
from the unreflected to the reflected existence, I "poison" this state, I deceive 
myself in giving it the reflected existence it did not have as an impetus for my 
action (Sartre here uses the example of "Peter having to be helped", and Peter’s 
attractiveness, as our unreflected state upon the sight of Peter in trouble, and "It 
is good to help Peter" out of pity as the reflected state, p. 59).
Deception occurs at the pre-judgmental level as well. An example of such 
deception is brought forward by Sartre when he points out the questionable 
character of the Transcendental Ego (p.75). The constitution of the ego as given 
to us by our intuitions of it, is given in a way which may always be contradicted 
by subsequent intuitions. Clear intuitions regarding the states o f our ego, as of 
ill-temper, jealousy, etc., may be self-deceptive attempts to convince ourselves 
that we have such states. Moreover, according to Sartre, these self-deceptive 
errors occur on the level of pre-judgmental evidence. Such an occurrence is 
possible due to the most important ability o f intuition to allow evidential 
experiences prior to explicit judgement. This questionable character of our 
intuitions regarding our ego does not indicate the existence of an ego which is 
the true ego, apart from what the actual intuitions reveal to us, nor that the ego 
is a hypothetical notion which never exists in reality, but only that the intended 
ego has in itself the character of dubitability (p.76), always making deception 
look the most natural and easy, almost unnoticed, process in our metaphysics of 
consciousness.
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One more case of self-deception is observed in the purported law-like and 
"guarded" behaviour o f "normal", "healthy", "upright citizens" and human 
beings. Sometimes we think that our psychological make-up, and the social 
behaviour that it gives rise to, are lawlike, always guarded by strict rules which 
quarantee distinctions between "normality" and "abnormality", "sanity" and 
"insanity", "morality" and "immorality".
According to Sartre, this happens due to the false representation of 
consciousness, and the self-inflicted absorption of its spontaneity in the ego 
which it postulates (p. 101). Such an atrophic consciousness gives rise to 
naturalism, the "natural" attitude, which according to Sartre makes epoche 
into a purposeless endeavour, and a wild-goose chase. This is because the 
"natural" attitude is perfectly coherent, involving no contradictions from within 
the system of beliefs that the ego constitutes, giving rise to no problems, and 
thus providing no reasons for involving oneself in the epoche. In this way the 
occurrence of epoche appears as a miracle. (For the same reason the 
Kierkegaardian absolute dread is also a mystery; I shall enlarge on this 
phenomenon later, in the section on the Emotions.)
This lack of serious justification for the exercising of epoche in Husserlian 
Phenomenology, transforms epoche into an intellectualistic endeavour far 
removed from common grasp and far too "knowledgeable4' to be anything else 
but gratuitous (p. 102-103). Sartre, on the other hand, by making consciousness 
realise the false spontaneity of its postulated ego through a simple act of 
reflection provides a full justification both for the epoche, which now becomes 
both a pure event of transcendental origin and an ever possible and unavoidable 
accident of every day life, and for the absolute and irremediable dread and fear 
of consciousness for itself and what it can become.
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It is important to indicate here that Intentionality is of paramount importance 
in understanding the Epistemological kind of Self-Deception. Because 
unreflected consciousness cannot have an ego-structure in it, and it has to be 
translucent to have Intentionality as one of its main characteristics, that is why 
we deceive ourselves by making this unbearable fact about our metaphysics less 
unbearable by "discovering" ego-structures where there can be none. The very 
need for such "discoveries" is modified according to the extent we grant 
Intentionality its proper role in consciousness.
Metaphysical Self-Deception
One would have a deficient account of Sartre's discussion of self-deception in 
this Essay, if one left unmentioned the more subtle and thus more serious forms 
of self-deception: those having to do with errors in the metaphysics of our states 
and actions. These errors for Sartre have to do with the confusion of the 
transcendent meaning of Erlebrtis (the translation of the term is problematic; it 
most probably means "intentionally lived moment")48 with its character as 
immanent (p.65). This confusion leads the psychologically inclined theorists to 
commit two types of error: either they conclude that introspection is deceptive 
because they are often mistaken about what their emotions are at some instance 
or another, or because they are often good at identifying states at the 
consciousness level (e.g., of a repugnance against someone, etc.) for as long as 
they have them, they think that the certitude applies with no problems to the 
emotion itself (emotions at their reflected level, are parts of the ego). And since 
these theorists are psychologically inclined, they resolve (in the first case) to 
separate the state completely from its appearances, and hold that a symbolic 
interpretation of all appearances (considered as symbols) is necessary. This 
symbolic interpretation is necessary not only in order to determine the nature of
48 See p.47, n.48, in Jecm-Paul Sartre. La Transcendcmce de I’Evo: Esquisse d'une Description 
Phenomenoloeiaue. Intr., notes et app. par Sylvie Le Bon, Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. 
Vrin, Sorbonne, 1965.
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the emotion, but also to make the relation between the emotion and its now 
symbolic appearances a causal one. In this case, the unconscious re-emerges as 
the source of meaning for these symbols. In the second case (where certitude is 
transferred from introspection to the emotion), psychologists see no need for 
symbols, and they convince themselves that the emotion is not only immanent 
in instantaneous consciousness but that instantaneous consciousness provides 
adequate evidence for its presence. Now, these two types of error are both 
types of the same error: the psychologists try desperately to find certainty 
somewhere where there is no certainty to be found. In one way, this error is a 
different form of the previously investigated self-deception: that of "law-like" or 
"normal" behaviour. Both take the ego and its structures as having a certainty 
that they do not have.
One other type of self-deception has to do with the metaphysics of our 
actions (p.69). For Sartre, it is clear from the start that actions (both of the 
physical kind such as manipulation of objects, bodies, etc., and of the 
psychical/mental kind such as doubting, reasoning, meditating, etc.) should be 
considered as transcendences, and thus as structures of the ego. Actions 
however deceive us by covering up their transcendent metaphysics (as noematic 
unities of streams of consciousnesses) beneath their nature as concrete 
realisations. If they only looked like noematic unities we would have them 
immediately classified as structures of the ego. Actions however occur.; and 
even though some actions look instantaneous, they are not such instantaneous 
phenomena as the active consciousnesses which produce them. Actions require 
time to be accomplished, they have articulations, and moments. To these 
moments correspond concrete, active consciousnesses, and the reflection which 
is directed onto these consciousnesses apprehends the total action, in an 
intuition which exhibits it as the transcendental unity of the active 
consciousnesses. For example, an "action" such as the spontaneous doubt that 
invades us when we glimpse an object in the shadows is merely a consciousness,
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while the methodological doubt of Descartes is a proper action: that is to say it 
is a transcendent object of reflective consciousness. There is an intrinsic 
ambiguity in cases such as Descartes' declaration: "I doubt therefore I am" (and 
in any such declarations), since it is not clear whether this refers to the 
spontaneous doubt that reflective consciousness apprehends in its 
instantaneousness and thus not to a proper action, or to the enterprise of 
doubting, which is a proper action. Sartre is the first to recognise this ambiguity 
(p.69), and also the first to mark it as "the origin of serious errors" (ibid).
In this kind of Self-Deception, the significance of Intentionality is also quite 
evident: both emotions and actions are liable to be items of deception in our 
accounts of consciousness; this is due to the inability of Intentionality to move 
backward onto itself at the same time that is directed outward. The time that is 
needed to make Intentionality move back onto itself, and the unreflected 
consciousness that it emanates from, is the time needed to make an unreflected 
consciousness into a reflected one.
A Case of No Self-Deception (?)
To illustrate the determinate nature of what Sartre had in his mind when he 
was elaborating his theory in this Essay, here is a case where no self-deception 
seems to be involved.
In pp.98-99, Sartre identifies transcendental consciousness as impersonal 
spontaneity, and proceeds to describe at full length the extent to which this 
spontaneity is impersonal. The first characteristic he brings forward in support 
of this identification is the fact that each instant of our conscious life is without 
anything before it: it is a creation ex nihilo. This characteristic brings us to the 
second one: confronted with a conscious existence that is always new, and not 
merely a new arrangement, we are always distressed, caught unwillingly in a
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continuous creation of which we are not the creators. The third characteristic 
has to do with the metaphysics of the human will. The will for Sartre is an 
object which constitutes itself for and by the spontaneity of consciousness. 
Therefore it directs itself upon states, upon emotions, or upon things, but it 
never turns back upon consciousness. Now this for Sartre is an undeniable truth 
of human consciousness; so much so, that we do not even dare to conceal it in 
the form of a self-deception of sorts, when we have to will a consciousness. 
When there is no other way to effect a change in one of our consciousnesses, 
except simply to will it, it is by essence necessary that the will be maintained and 
preserved by that consciousness which is radically opposed to the 
consciousness it wants to give rise to. For example, if I will not to think about 
this or that, I think about it precisely on that account; if I will to fall asleep I 
stay awake.
In order to fully comprehend Sartre’s thought here we have to make a 
distinction of two levels: At the level of simply having to effect a change in one 
o f our consciousnesses there is no self-deception, and there can be none: we 
simply have to deal with the metaphysics of our own consciousness, and if we 
want to effect a change, willing  the opposite consciousness from the one we 
want to "maintain" or "produce" is the way par excellence this change is going 
to come about. We can deceive ourselves however, once we decide not to effect 
such a change for one or another reason (we do not want to will it, we are 
afraid to will it, etc.). This level is different from the first one, where we just 
have to w ill a change. And that is why we can deceive ourselves in the last but 
not in the first.
An analysis of an example might make things clearer here. Suppose we want 
to go to bed and sleep but we are not sleepy. There are two possibilities open 
for us: either we decide we do not want to go to bed and see a Marx Brothers 
or Monty Python movie and keep awake, or we try to read a very difficult book
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and feel sleepy. Both may be self-deceptions or not depending on the 
justification we gave to our decision to keep awake or fall asleep. There are two 
levels of justification: on the one we convince ourselves that we have a choice 
in deciding to maintain ourselves awake or asleep, on the other we convince 
ourselves that we have a choice to maintain ourselves awake or asleep. No self- 
deception is involved when we not only convince ourselves we have a choice to 
decide to maintain ourselves awake or asleep, but also when we convince 
ourselves we have a choice to maintain ourselves awake or asleep. Sartre here 
seems to refer to the often repeated excuse "the spirit is ready, but the flesh is 
weak". Once we realise that this is an excuse and that even the "flesh" part of 
the me is controllable by spontaneous consciousness we are liberated from self- 
deception. And we can have no other choice but to liberate ourselves from self- 
deception when we have to accept by the circumstances that the "flesh" has to 
be strong.
Here the calculation of costs over benefits requires that self-deception be 
unveiled, and lose its grip on our consciousness. The costs involved (e.g. loss of 
life if that is what is valued highly, or other highly valued item) make the 
benefits of having self-deception seem miniscule, and create thus the situation in 
which self-deception not only does not exist, but it cannot exist, taking the 
individual's total plan of life into consideration. The disability to unveil and 
liberate consciousness from the unwanted now self-deception, or, even worse, 
the disability to get rid of self-deception at this critical point of time49, and the 
promptness to deceive oneself with some other mask of reality marks the 
coming of serious psychasthenic illnesses of the sort that Sartre only hints at 
page 99.
Here Intentionality is meeting an unexplored territory of consciousness: the 
realm of Will. Some of this uncharted territory shall be discussed in the
49 For example in cases where the pain is too great to bear and be alive one has to ignore it.
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following sections (especially the section on the Emotions). But first it would be 
useful to discuss the metaphysical presuppositions and commitments of Sartre's 
theory of consciousness, and especially his commitment to Realism.
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IV. INTENTIONALITY AND REALISM.
i) Introduction.
In my investigation into the Sartrean Theory of Intentionality and 
Consciousness I touched occasionally on one of the most important and 
fundamental issues in metaphysics and ontology: the reality of the world, and in 
particular whether Sartre believed that with his theory he was propounding' 
realism regarding the external world and the Other, imagination, meaning, time, 
and the knowledge we have of them.
This section focuses on this issue (or group of issues)50. I consider this 
section to be extremely important for any Theory of Intentionality and 
Consciousness, since: if one were to acquire the Realist or the Idealist 
standpoint one would have no specific need for Intentionality. For the Idealist, 
there would be no need to appeal to Intentionality to guarantee and make 
certain his contact with the world, and for the Realist (or at least for some kinds 
of Realists- the so-called Naive Realists) the directedness of Intentionality 
would be trivial, since access to the world is guaranteed metaphysically. On the 
other hand, Intentionality has to have some reference to an existence 
independent of the awareness concerned, and thus is committed to some form of 
realism, even of a very limited one, due to its ontology as reaching out of the
50 I shall not investigate in detail Sartre’s views on Imagination and Reality, even though I 
know that I leave out a very important topic in my exposition of Sartre’s views on Realism 
and Idealism. Unfortunately, the limited space I have here does not permit me to enlarge on 
Sartre’s theory of Imagination, and that is why I avoid doing so. And any brief discussion of 
this important topic would do nothing but damage to the Sartreanism that is discussed (and 
supported) here. For Sartre’s theory of Imagination one can see L ’Imagination, etude 
critique, Felix Alcan, 1936; in Engl.: Imagination: A Psychological Critique, transl. by 
F. Williams, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1962; L ’Imaginaire: 
psychologie phenomenologique de I ’imagination, Gallimard, 1940; in Engl.: The Psychology 
of Imagination, transl. by Bernard Frechtman, Rider, London, 1949; Anthony Manser has 
discussed Sartre’s views on Imagination in length in Anthony Manser, Sartre: A Philosophic 
Study. University of London, The Athlone Press, London, 1966; I have discussed some aspects 
of Sartre’s views on Imagination in work presented to the Postgraduate Seminar in Aesthetics 
under the direction of Dr. Berrys Gaut, U. of St. Andrews, Spring 1991.
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consciousness concerned. Idealism, on the other hand, is always a danger, since 
Intentionality again due to its Ontology is a characteristic of consciousness, and 
the danger always exists of making all physical (non-consciousness related) 
reality an illusion, a falsity or a fantasy.
Any discussion on Realism and Idealism would not be sufficient if Meaning, 
Language, Self-Deception and the Emotions, as applications of our views on 
Realism and Idealism, are not discussed as well. In Sartre’s theory this is even 
more so, since they are just aspects of relating reflectively and non-reflectively 
with the Environment and our or the Other's Reflected Consciousness and 
Body.
From these, Emotions and Language shall be studied in detail in the next 
section, since Sartre's Theory on the Emotions is by far the most influential 
application of Sartre's Theory of Intentionality not only in Contemporary 
Philosophy of Mind, but also in the psychotherapeutic fields of Existential 
Psychoanalysis, Logotherapy, and Psychodynamics.
This section of the Thesis brings together ideas from other works of Sartre, 
that support, illustrate, or even modify in some way the ideas expressed in the 
Essay on the Transcendence of the Ego.
li) Is Sartre a Realist or an Idealist?51 
What do we mean by Realism?
51 The argumentation in this sub-section, has been influenced greatly by questions and 
comments from Ms.Mary Haight, Dr.Jim Edwards, Mr.Dudley Knowles, and Dr.David 
Campbell. I thank them all. For the stubbornness, and the sometimes extreme philosophical 
positions expressed here I am solely responsible.
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A definition of the word "Realism" in General Metaphysics could run as 
follows: Realism is the belief that the things or objects in the world have an 
independent existence from the subject for whom they are objects/things. 
According to this definition, a Platonic Realist about the meaning of words we 
use in our language or about our concepts claims that this meaning and these 
concepts are copies or representations of certain abstract forms. These abstract 
forms exist independently of their copies/representations (both in the sense that 
they cannot be influenced by the copies/representations, and in the sense that 
they cannot be known directly from a "shallow” investigation of their copies or 
representations). A Naive Realist about perception wpuld claim that we 
perceive ordinary objects of the world as they are, by a direct relation without 
the need for interpretations, sense data, and other theoretical equipment. To 
take another example, the Realists regarding both Epistemology and sense- 
perception, are not only committed to the view that things-out-there exist 
independently of our perceiving them, but they are also committed to the view 
that either at least one conscious entity (which can communicate with us) can 
"see" them as they really are out-there, or that they can at least infer their true 
existence out-there through certain principles of rationality.
Now, is Sartre a Realist?
The best work to start from is Being and Nothingness52.
From the start, Sartre rejects all dualisms: dualism of being and appearance, 
potency and act, appearance and essence95. He replaces these dualisms with the 
opposition of infinite/finite54. What appears (the finite) is only an aspect of what 
could appear (the infinite), and never what it really is. Sartre here could be 
considered a realist of sorts, in the way for example that Kant can be considered
52 Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Etre et le Necmt: Essai d'ontobgie phenomenologique, NRF/Gallimard, 
Paris, 1947; in English, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. 
transl.by Hazel Barnes, Routledge, London, 1969.
53 Ibid, Sartre’s Introduction (The Pursuit of Being: I. The Phenomenon, pp.xxi-xxii).
54 Ibid.
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a Realist. But Sartre rejects all reference to Kantian realistic aspirations: "... the 
first consequence of the "theory of the phenomenon" is that the appearance does 
not refer to being as Kant's phenomenon refers to the noumenon. Since there is 
nothing behind the appearance, and since it indicates only itself (and the total 
series of appearances), its being cannot be supported by any being other than its 
own”.55
It would be wrong however, to claim that Sartre has no realistic aspirations 
whatsoever: he belongs to the tradition of phenomenology. His ontological 
descriptive enquiry of the phenomenon of appearance has to pay its dues to 
Realism as an heir of the name "phenomenology" coined by such realists as 
Husserl and Heidegger. Through the "eidetic reduction" of Husserl and the 
ontic-ontological status of the human reality, granted by Heidegger, Sartre 
believes that we can pass beyond the phenomenon toward the being of the 
phenomenon. We can pass from the particular object, its qualities and the 
meaning which they imply, to its essence, and this passage is from an 
homogenous category (meaning of qualities) to another homogenous category 
(the meaning of the object as its essence, i.e., as the principle of the series of 
appearances which disclose it).56
Note that in Sartre's account regarding the essence of man-made artifacts as 
put forward in the written form of a lecture of his with the title Existentialism 
and Humanism.57 we see an apparent difference of opinion: there the artefact 
refers to its function, given almost a priori by the maker. I have to point out 
that the two Sartrean views are not in a great disagreement: the function in the 
case of the artifacts is not ontologicatfy different from the meaning of the object 
as its essence, the principle o f the series o f appearances which disclose ity the
55 Ibid, p.xxiv.
56 Ibid, pp.xxiv-xxv.
57 Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, Les Editions Nagel, Paris, 1946; in 
English: Existentialism and Humanism. Methuen, 1989 (1948), pp.26-27.
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function is the meaning of the artifact, or at least a main part of its meaning. 
Besides, Sartre himself in one of his Interviews, among other places, has said 
emphatically that we should not pay particular attention in his Existentialism is a 
Humanism, since many of his ideas there are either underdeveloped or over­
simplified and the source of much confusion in the minds of his commentators 
and critics.58
However, we cannot come into direct contact with the being of the object 
whose phenomenon we have in front of us; we can only "see" the essence of the 
object, i.e., the meaning of the object, the principle of the series of appearances 
which disclose it. The object does not refer to being as to a signification; it does 
not possess being, its existence is not a participation in being, nor any other kind 
of relation: "It is"59
The existent60 is a phenomenon. As such it designates itself as an organised 
totality of qualities. It does not designate its being. Being61 for Sartre becomes 
in this way, simply and only, the condition of all revelation (being-for-revealing, 
etre-pour-devoiler) and not revealed-being (etre devoile). This is the only 
description that he can give about the being of the object.62
58 Mainly see Sartre, texte du filme realise par Alexandre Astruc et Michel Contaty Gallimard, 
Paris, 1977; in English, Sartre bv Himself, Tr. by Richard Seaver, Urizen Books, New York, 
1978; also see Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, Les Ecrits de Sartre, Paris, 
NRF/Gallimard, 1970; in English, The Writings of Jean-Paul Sartre, tr. by Richard C. 
McCleary, I-H Vol., Northwestern University Press, Evanston, DL, 1974, 1st Vol., p. 133; I 
discuss this point at great length in my unpublished St Andrews monography on the work 
entitled "Sartre's Existentialism and Humanism".
59 BN, p.xxv.
60 For Barnes "Existence" signifies a concrete, individual being here and now, having a 
subjective quality when applied to human reality, see her Key, ibid, p.631.
61 For Barnes Being (etre) includes both Being-in-itself and Being-for-itselt but the latter is 
the nihilation of tbs former, Existence is individual and subjective, Being is all-embracing 
and objective, see her Key, ibid, p.630.
62 Ibid, pp.xxiv-xxv.
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From all this we see that Sartre, regarding the being of the object, is an 
agnostic of sorts: no one can get hold of the true, real, ontological description 
of the being of the object; we can only claim that the Being in relation to this 
object is the condition of all revelation regarding this object: its essence, 
meaning, qualities. We have no epistemological justification in our claims that 
this essence, meaning and quality are more "real", or "true" than any other, and 
this is so, not because there is something which can be considered as "real" or 
"true" and which we do not and can never attain, but because there is no reality' 
or truth independently from the essence, meaning, and qualities which are in the 
series of the appearances or phenomena of the object.
Unfortunately, major works in philosophy only provide two major 
alternatives to Realism: Idealism and Phenomenalism.63 From such a treatment 
of the world around us as the one found in Sartrean Metaphysics, and this 
tendency of major works in philosophy, one can easily think that Sartre is an 
Idealist or a Phenomenalist of sorts.
However, if one was to brand Sartre's Metaphysics as Phenomenalism (i.e., 
that material objects exist only as groups or sequences of sensa, actual or 
possible) this could not be more incorrect: Sartre's whole theory of 
consciousness as translucent with its characteristic of Intentionality as directly 
relating to the world is a refutation of any kind of mediation and is fully 
committed to the existence of the material world.
There is no better way to refute Phenomenalism than to refute idealism and 
any kind of mediation, all in one move. Sartre's Metaphysics is just doing this; 
with the addition that he also destroys a major part of the realist dogma as well. 
Instead of jumping into unwarranted conclusions and making hasty
63 See Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol.7-8, McMillan, London, 
1967, Article on Realism by RJ.Hirst, p.77.
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generalisations we would do well to pay an even more special attention to the 
Sartrean corpus.
But can one claim that Sartre is an Idealist of sorts? Idealism claims that 
material objects and in general physical realities do not exist apart from our 
knowledge or our consciousness of them. Versions of Idealism can claim that a 
material object is nothing else but ideas in our or someone else's mind; or they 
can claim that the existence of the external world can be considered only a 
priori and the objects of our experience, in the sense of things existing in space 
and enduring through time are nothing but appearances, having no independent 
existence outside our thoughts; or they can claim that all that exists is but forms 
in one’s mind; or they can claim that all that can be known of objects is 
contributed by the human beings who perceive them, in all these versions of 
Idealism we see the following characteristics: a) the reality of the external world 
is denied or at least the impossibility of knowing it (of "how it really is" and of 
"whether it is or it is not"), is emphasised; b) talk about objects of the external 
world is avoided and is replaced by discussions and investigations of 
appearances, ideas and sensations.
Now, it may be that Sartre is an agnosticist of sorts regarding the "how" of 
Being, but he is more than certain that Being exists (in the sense of physical and 
other realities existing in themselves, with no need of human or other subjects' 
interference for their subsistence), and it has a place of paramount importance in 
his Metaphysics, since it becomes a condition of all revelation (being-for- 
revealing). In addition, his whole theory of Consciousness and Intentionality is 
geared towards accommodating this paramount importance of Being as 
condition of all revelation (being-for-revealing). From these reasons we can 
understand why Sartre cannot be regarded an Idealist o f sorts.
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We shall return to the investigation of Being however, later on when we 
investigate in more detail the issue of realism and idealism in connection with 
the Being-In-Itself.
We shall try to see now what happens to the being of the appearance, or 
phenomenon, which even though in a different ontological status from that of 
the Being in general, is related at least epistemologically to it. Could it not be 
viewed with some kind of realist aspirations in mind?
Sartre claims that it cannot. Appearance or phenomenon for Sartre has no 
being: i.e., it has no being of the same description as being-for-revealing, but it 
has a being as a phenomenon. An example here may make things clearer. 
Suppose we see a table in a room: we may distinguish the table, the being of the 
table, the phenomenon of the table, and the being of the phenomenon of the 
table. For Sartre, being-for-revealing is only the being of the table, and this is 
the condition of all revelation. The meaning/essence of the table is the principle 
of its series of appearance which disclose it. The phenomenon of the table or 
better the phenomena of the table are constituents of the series o f appearances 
which provide this essence/meaning. The phenomenon of the table has no being 
itself (qua phenomenon), since then it would not be a phenomenon of 
something, but a being which reveals other phenomena (a being-for-revealing). 
Thus we are at a puzzle when someone asks us what is the being o f the 
phenomenon df the table. This is what Sartre means by "the phenomenon of 
being requires the transphenomenality of being".64 In order to describe the 
phenomenon of being as a phenomenon, you must not treat it as a being. 
Because then, you treat it not as a phenomenon, but as a being-for-revealing, 
and thus at the end you will not reach any conclusions about it as a 
phenomenon, but as a being-for-revealing.
64 BN, p.xxvi.
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In this way, we can safely conclude that Sartre has no realist aspirations for 
the being of the phenomenon, since all realist considerations about the being of 
the phenomenon are treating the phenomenon of being as a being of sorts, thus 
claiming something that goes beyond what his descriptive phenomenological 
ontology allows us to claim.
But what about the being of being? We saw above that Sartre is an 
agnosticist about it. However, it is conceivable that one can be both an 
agnosticist and a realist about Being. Such a person claims that we cannot know 
Being directly, and thus we should not claim that it is this or that, but we should 
only claim that it exists on pure inference from what we can know. For example, 
philosophers and theologians in the Augustinean Tradition have been 
agnosticists and realists about God claiming that even though we cannot know 
God directly, since His attributes and qualities are infinite, we nevertheless can 
know that He exists, because IBs existence is a necessary consequence of the 
metaphysics employed in our language, and certain principles of our rationality.
In addition, epistemological realism (i.e., that we can know Being directly) is 
not reducible to ontological realism (i.e., that Being exists) so proving that 
Sartre is not an epistemological realist says nothing on Whether Sartre is an 
ontological realist. In other words, that we can have a direct knowledge of 
Being (with no mediation of appearances, etc.) does not mean, nor guarantee, 
the real existence of the Being (we may have a direct knowledge o f a false 
Being- a chimera-, or something different from a full-fledged Being, perhaps 
even of parts o f ourselves misconstrued as real Being!).
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Sartre himself recognises the validity of all these questions.65 He answers 
these questions by firstly recognising that consciousness, as positional and self- 
transcendent, has to be self-conscious consciousness (because otherwise it 
would be some sort of unconscious consciousness, a claim that is absurd); based 
on this recognition he claims that the only thing which we can be certain of is 
that things, while they appear in consciousness, exist for us, and not that things 
(in their being) exist in themselves.66
But, should we proceed from this conclusion (that we cannot be certain 
whether things-in-themselves exist in themselves) to the conclusion that things- 
in-themselves and their existence are unreal, cut off from any ontological 
commitments? Sartre accuses Husserl here of deceiving himself when he 
chooses to make this inference, since even as unreal the things-in-themselves 
have to exist. Sartre draws on the paradox of ontological commitments to guard 
off any irrealist aberrations: any claim in ontology, even the claim that there is 
no ontology, has to assume certain ontological considerations 6768
Sartre answers this difficult problem by choosing to place himself in the 
Augustinean Tradition and claim that as God for Augustine so Being for Sartre 
cannot have any other but an Ontological Proof: the certainty that there is a 
being of the perceived object, independent from the perceived object as 
perceived, is derived for Sartre from the pre-refleedve being o f the percipiens 
(and not by perceiving directly Being).
65 Ibid, pp.xxiv-xxvi.
66 Ibid, p.xxviii.
67 Ibid, p.xxxv.
68 Even consciousness as nothingness (and thus with no ontology) depends on being (and its 
ontology) for its existence: without Being-for-revealing there would be no revealed-Being. Our 
discussion here may sound to philosophers brought up with the known (and rather simplistic) 
distinction between Metaphysics and Ontology as rather strange and foreign, but it is not 
always true that what sounds strange and foreign is in addition false...
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Sartre's reasoning is as follows: if we take as our basic premise that all 
consciousness is consciousness o f something, to be confronted with something 
is to be confronted with a concrete and full presence which is not 
consciousness.69
However, this does not mean that the being of the object is a lack of 
something: a lack of something is parasitic on what exists; consciousness is bom 
supported by a being which is not itself. If anything is "parasitic", it is - 
consciousness on the being of the object.70
Here Sartre distances himself radically from all Idealists and this is where 
Sartre and Husserl actually differ in their concepts and ontology of 
Intentionality: Husserl misunderstood and did not recognise the realist 
commitments that his theory of Intentionality was forcing him to 
acknowledge, while Sartre’s theory of Intentionality is fully and 
wholeheartedly incorporating these commitments, and gives them a 
functional role in his general theory of consciousness of paramount 
importance.71
Husserl, according to Sartre here, tried to acquire a realist flavour through 
the notion of "pure subjectivity" (i.e., the Ego) which somehow transcends itself 
as subjectivity and posits an objective perspective. Sartre believes not only that 
it is impossible for such a notion to transcend itself as subjective and reach 
something objective, but also that the very notion of "pure subjectivity" is 
problematic.72 What can properly be called subjective for Sartre is 
"consciousness (of) consciousness". This consciousness of being consciousness 
can only be qualified as revealing intuition, and as such it implies something
69 Ibid, pp.xxxvi-xxxvii.
70 Ibid, p.xxxvii.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
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revealed. Subjectivity can be established as absolute only in the face of 
something revealed, and immanence can be defined only within the apprehension 
of a transcendent.
This analysis, far from the epistemologicai purposes of Kant in refuting 
idealism, aspires to the ontological endeavours of Descartes. The question 
involved is not of whether inner sense implies the existence o f objective spatial 
phenomena, but of whether consciousness ontologically implies a non-conscious 
and transphenomenal being. In this way we have just moved from the 
epistemologicai considerations mentioned above to a more holistic and complete 
view of the question of Being and its reality by addressing directly the 
ontological issues involved.
Referring to "pure subjectivity" i.e., to a consciousness which is void of 
something that it is consciousness o f is pointless in such an ontology, since 
even in the form of a subjectivity such a consciousness cannot constitute itself 
by constituting the objective. In fret, if consciousness is consciousness of 
something (as Husserl himself admits), then the objective as a revealed- 
revelation of a being which is not consciousness has to already exist when 
consciousness reveals it. In such a schema o f things, to bring subjectivity first 
and then base objectivity on it is not only inconsistent in the tradition of 
Husserlian Phenomenology, but also clearly flawed.73
But what about Consciousness itself? Could not someone claim that 
consciousness has a being which is different from the being related to the 
phenomena (i.e., the being of the in-itself), but which is a being of sorts in the 
sense that the phenomena of being relate to it and its being, and not to the being 
of which they are phenomena? To be more clear, we need not only to refute the 
Husserlian Ego as it exists in the Husserlian corpus, but we also need to secure
73 Ibid, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii.
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 127
Sartrean intuitions regarding Consciousness from an existence of a similar ego 
arising from some kind o f noumenal being that Consciousness in Sartre's theory 
may have.
Sartre, to escape such a scenario, defines Consciousness as "a being suck 
that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being 
other than itself V74 This Heideggerian formulation has no other purpose but to 
make even more evident that the being of consciousness can be none other than 
the transphenomenal being of phenomena. This transphenomenal being is not a 
noumenal being which is hidden behind the phenomena, but it is the being of the 
world which is implied by the ontology of consciousness; it is the being of this 
table and chair that I see now in front of me. Such a transphenomenal being 
requires only that the being of that which appears does not exist only in so far 
as it appears. For Sartre "the transphenomenal being of what exists for 
consciousness is itself in itself {lui-meme en soi)".
Such a quite minimalistic realist commitment keeps Sartre's Theory of 
Intentionality from losing contact with the world and is thus more plausible than 
Husserl's account, in relation to the transphenomenal being of phenomena.
On the other hand, the primary characteristic of the being of an existent is 
never to reveal itself completely to consciousness. This being however, refers to 
a certain mode of being, since "[t]here is no being which is not the being of a 
certain mode of being75 none which cannot be apprehended through the mode of 
being which manifests being and veils it at the same time".76 In this way, the 
epistemologicai account of being (of knowing this mode of being) and the 
ontological account (the entirety of modes and the impossibility of our knowing
74 Ibid, p.xxxviii.
75 Sartre’s own expression is “‘maniere d'etre”> Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Etre et le Neant: Essai 
d'ontoloeie vhenomeloeiaue. Gallimard 1943, Renouvele en 1970, p.29.
76 BN, pp.xxxviii-xxxix.
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it) safeguard the differentiation between the existent and its being: "[a]n existent 
cannot be stripped of its being; being is the ever present foundation of the 
existent; it is everywhere in it and nowhere".77
This limited apprehension of the being of the existent by Consciousness is not 
an apprehension of its being itself but of the meaning of this being; Sartre 
calls this relation between Consciousness and the being of the existent ontic- 
ontological since "a fundamental characteristic of its transcendence is to 
transcend the ontic toward the ontological" (ibid, p.xxxix).
Someone may suspect an anti-realist or irrealist turn at this level of the 
Sartrean Metaphysics of Being. Note however that for Sartre even Meaning, an 
intrinsicaly cumbersome notion for the realist perspective in Metaphysics, is 
treated with what one can clearly characterize as a "realist" attitude: "The 
meaning of the being of the existent in so far as it reveals itself to consciousness 
is the phenomenon of being. This meaning has itself a being, based on which it 
manifests itself*.78
Of course, Sartre here has no intention of claiming that being is a sort of 
meaning, nor that the being of the meaning has itself a meaning. Sartre does not 
want to make the first move because he has already stated that (i) meaning is the 
epistemologicai relation of consciousness with the being-in4tsel£ (ii) being-in- 
itself is ontologically necessitated by consciousness, but totally independent 
from it, (iii) the meaning of the being of the phenomenon79 is not necessitated in 
the same way as the being-in-itselfby consciousness.
In addition, Sartre does not want to make the second move as well (i.e., 
claim that the being of the meaning has itself meaning). He refers in the text to
77 Ibid, p.xxxviii.
78 Ibid.
79 Being-in-itselt here; see Catalano, ibid, p,4I, footnote 14.
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the distance his metaphysics here have from the scholastic argument according 
to which there is a vicious circle in every proposition which concerns being, 
since any judgement about being already implies being. Sartre's position is far 
from an implication of a vicious circle, since for him it is not necessary again to 
pass beyond the being of this meaning toward its meaning: "the meaning of 
being is valid for the being of every phenomenon, including its own being" 
[ibid]. To elucidate what Sartre has here in mind one has only to think that 
Sartre's "meaning of being" is working like the phenomenon of being, which 
does not have being but indicates and requires it universally. Sartre's 
ontological proof which from the phenomenon of being proves the being of the 
phenomenon is not applied especially and uniquely for every single 
phenomenon. There is one ontological proof for the whole domain of 
consciousness: "this proof is sufficient to justify all the information which we 
can derive from the phenomenon of being...[which] like every primary 
phenomenon, is immediately disclosed to consciousness".80 In a similar way, the 
meaning of being is "valid for the being of every phenomenon, including its own 
being", i.e., it gives us a universal ontological perspective on being.
At this point, however, Sartre hastens to remind us that this universality of 
meaning of the being of the phenomenon is valid only for the realm of the being 
of the phenomenon (of the revealed-revelation of the being-in-itsel£ I'etre-en- 
soi); it cannot extend its applicability to the realm which is opposed to the realm 
of the being-in-itseli; that of the being-for-itself (of the revealed-revelation of 
the being-for-itself lretre-pour-soi); that for Sartre is o f a totally different type81 
o f being.
At this level of analysis (in his Introduction of Being and Nothingness). 
Sartre wants only to indicate that the concept of Being forces upon us
80 Ibid.
81 A better expression might be “mode” here; Sartre’s own is autre type d'etre, L'Etre et le 
Neant, p.30.
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phenomenologically the division of Being into two completely separate types 
and regions of Being, that of the in-itself and that of the for-itself. The meaning 
of either of the two cannot be fixed according to Sartre until he has fixed their 
true connection with the Being in general (i.e., how these two regions of being 
can be placed under the same heading), and until the relations which unite them 
are investigated and analysed thoroughly. Sartre proceeds to investigate and 
analyse these relations in the main corpus of Being and Nothingness. We are not 
going to accompany him in these specific investigations however, since what - 
concerns us here is his alleged realism, idealism or phenomenalism, insofar as 
these have consequences upon his (and any) theory of Intentionality and 
Consciousness.
We continue with Sartre's views in the Introduction, by citing his conviction 
that his Metaphysics escape any realistic or idealistic characterisations.82
He rules out a realistic conception of the relations of the phenomenon with 
consciousness based on his examination of non-positional self-consciousness; he 
found that the being of the phenomenon can on no account act upon 
consciousness: consciousness is spontaneous and relates directly to the 
environment through Intentionality, and cannot accommodate a schema in
82 Ibid, p.xl. Also see Anthony Manser, ibid, p.71 where there is a clear disassociation of 
Sartre’s theory from all Idealisms, even Kant’s Transcendental Idealism; Manser refers to and 
analyses the BN Chapter on Transcendence, the one which is by far the closest to Kant (with 
the famous aphorism “the world is human” EN, 270); Manser and I see here a great 
difference from Kant and the Idealists (which is seen more clearly once the aphorism is put in 
the context of the ontology of the for-itself and the in-itself In this we differ from one of the 
interpretations Timothy Sprigge gives on the philosophy of Sartre (esp. on the early, in 
connection to Sartre’s critique of the Transcendental Ego), in T.L.S. Sprigge, Theories of 
Existence. Penguin, 1990 (1985), pp.59-60, 65-66; Sprigge in ibid, p.130, gives a direct 
Realist interpretation of Sartre (esp. on the theory in BN); in a later consultation I had with 
Prof.Sprigge he explained that Sartre’s theory (together with Heidegger’s) could be 
characterised as Idealist in the way that for example scientists’s view of nature is different 
(more idealistic) from the one we have in our daily life; Sartre’s theory could also be classified 
as a direct realist because he followed the Husserlian tradition (even though Prof. Sprigge 
thinks that Sartre is more of an idealist than a realist); I will discuss the Realist intepretation 
of Sartre in the sub-section on McCulloch.
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which objects perceived cause the emergence of ideas or representations of 
sorts in consciousness. We would hasten to add that the term "the being of the 
phenomenon", as a term, would be non-sensical if what we have in mind is ideas 
and representations of sorts. Now, if we take into consideration that realism in 
its traditional sense depends on the belief that there exists a mind- independent 
environment and that we have access to that environment through perception or 
thought based on this perception, we understand Sartre's conviction that he is 
not a realist. It is impossible in his schema to have access to that mind- 
independent environment except through the extremely partial and limited path 
of the appearance, which due to its phenomenology is far from both 
guaranteeing the nature of the environment and its details. Such a contact with 
this environment is far too limited for any realist (in the traditional sense) 
aspirations.
Sartre however, also rules out any association with idealism; his reason for 
doing this is his conviction that he has proved (with the examination of the 
spontaneity of the non-reflective Cogito) that consciousness cannot get out of 
its subjectivity once subjectivity is granted, and that there is no epistemologicai 
possibility of objectivity. In addition, and once subjectivity for the realm of 
consciousness is granted, consciousness cannot act upon transcendent being 
(because it would be radically cut off from it) nor can it without contradiction 
admit of the passive elements necessary in order to constitute a transcended 
being arising from them (because it would then appropriate them, and divest 
them of their objective transcendental characteristics, thus making the 
endeavour futile and self-defeating). Idealism, finally, is radically refuted by the 
Sartrean endeavour to show that being is not meaning.
The only possible route open for Sartre is to "show that the problem allows 
a solution other than realism or idealism".83
83 My italics; ibid, p.xl.
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However, we have to note that this route cannot be the one of 
phenomenalism nor for that matter of epiphenomenalism (the view that physical 
objects cause mental images but the mental life of the subject is not connected in 
a strict causal way with the objects he/she perceives nor his mental life 
influenced from the environment), since the additional factor of Intentionality as 
the paramount characteristic of consciousness makes such alternatives self- 
defeating. Once we accept that Idealism and talk about physical objects as 
unknowable (even in Sartre's limited sense) is rejected by Sartre's own 
metaphysics (who claims that we can know an object's finite appearance of now 
and here but never its infinite number of appearances) any claim that he falls into 
the charms and pitfalls phenomenalism can be nothing but illfounded aberration 
(together with any other associations to other branches of idealism such as 
epiphenomenalism).
An idealist move towards Creationism (the belief that God as a divine 
subjectivity gave being to the world granting it a certain passivity) in relation to 
Being is also rejected as inadequate by Sartre. His reason is that if being is 
conceived in a subjectivity, even a  divine subjectivity, it remains a mode of intra- 
subjective being with no possibility of even the representation of an objectivity, 
let alone the possibility of actually creating an objectivity itself. Even when 
being is suddenly placed outside the subjective (through moves such as Leibniz's 
fiilguration), it affirms itself only as distinct from and opposed to its Creator, 
otherwise it could be dissolved in Him. In the theory of perpetual creation, 
being disappears in the divine subjectivity. God cannot give it independence, 
since it would then be so limited that it still would not be enough to admit an 
objectivity. If being exists as over against God, it has to have its own 
ontological support, it has to lose the least trace of divine creation. In this way 
even if it had been created by God, being-in-itself would be inexplicable in 
terms of creation (i.e., it would not admit an objectivity, nor a relation between
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the subjective and the objective), since it assumes its being beyond the creation. 
Sartre here concludes that, ontologically and for the purposes of our 
phenomenological endeavour, we would do better to treat being as uncreated.
This conclusion does not however support the additional idealist claim (and 
realist claim- depending on the explanation) that being creates itself, and is prior 
to itself This claim would make being a causa sui, and would give it the same 
ontological status as consciousness. What this conclusion and the previous 
investigation allows us to claim is only that being is itself.
This investigation also enlightens us on how to deal with the rest of the 
realist/idealist ontological equipment. The ontology of being presented here has 
to do with a metaphysics which goes beyond the characterisations akin to 
realist/idealist terminology.
The distinction between activity and passivity, and the characterisation 
"active" or "passive", are alien to the proper phenomenology o f being and 
cannot describe it. Such distinctions are akin more to the phenomenology of 
man, since things can be active or passive in relation to him. Being on the other 
hand is self-consistent, comes even before this distinction, and does not and 
cannot depend on the phenomenology of man and characterisations akin to it.84
Another distinction and characterisation that Sartre rejects is the one of 
affirmation and negation. Sartre finds that these characterisations, as acts, are 
distinguished from the things that are acted upon. In this way, the act of 
affirming is distinguished from the thing affirmed, and the act of negating 
distinguished from the thing negated. But even in the case where the thing acted 
upon comes to fulfil the act and is thus confused with it, this act cannot itself be 
characterised as "affirmation" or "negation" due to too much plenitude and the
84 Ibid, pp.xl-xli.
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immediate inherence of the noema in the noesis. (I.e., it is impossible to say 
what is affirmed/negated since the thing acted upon is affirmed/negated in its 
fullness of being.) In such a plenitude only consciousness can find being, which 
becomes now the noema in the noesis, or the inherence in itself without the least 
distance from itself. The term "immanence" for being is also rejected by Sartre, 
since immanence, in spite of all connection with self is still that very slight 
withdrawal which can be realised away from itself. Being however, as Sartre 
indicates, is glued to itself .85 Being for Sartre cannot even be an 
undifferentiated self-affirmation, nor even an infinity of self-affirmations: it 
would escape such characterisations through an infinity of modes of self- 
affirmation. According to Sartre we can only say about Being that it is in 
itselfI96
Advancing his critique on Idealism, Sartre attacks here even the form of 
Absolutism which claims that being refers to itself in the way that self- 
consciousness refers to itself (and of which himself may be accused, since he 
makes Being refer in at least a very superficial way to itself). Being is itself so 
completely that the perpetual reflection which constitutes the self is dissolved in 
an identity. In the final analysis, being is beyond the self being is opaque to 
itself precisely because it is filled with itself Being for Sartre is what it is, but 
with no analytic/idealistic commitments: analytical statements are based on the 
principle of identity and as such may be considered idealist. Sartre wanting to 
escape even this possibility of being accused of Kantian idealism, delineates the 
nature of his statement (Being is what it is) as that of a regional principle: it 
designates a particular region of being, that of the in-itself, and differentiates 
this region, from the region of for-itself. The latter is dominated by the 
principle of "being what it is not and not being what it is". As such the 
statement "Being is what it is" has the nature of a synthetical statement and not
85 Ibid, p.xli.
86 Ibid.
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analytical. In addition, wanting to distance himself even more from Kant and 
also now from Hegel, Sartre claims that only being in-itself is what it is for 
consciousness; being for-itself has to be what it is, but as it is, is what it is not, 
and it is not what it is.
To clearly preclude any associations with Idealism, even in epistemologicai 
terms, Sartre maintains that the statement “being is what it is”, which is purely 
ontological in character, has consequences for general epistemology and for the 
philosophy of language: in the region of being-in-itself beings who exist have to 
be what they are and as such their being is no longer a purely axiomatic 
characteristic, but becomes a contingent principle of being in-itself. The 
principle of identity as the principle of all analytical judgements thus becomes a 
regional synthetical principle of being as well However, the opacity of being-in- 
itself as well as its syntheticity, has nothing to do with realistic, idealistic or 
phenomenalistic concessions: being-in-itself is opaque not because we observe 
and apprehend it from "without", but because it has no "within". (In this way it 
escapes characterisations and connections in laws, judgements, and 
consciousnesses of itself) And even though it is a synthesis, it is the most 
indissoluble of all. For Sartre the in-itself has nothing secret and it is the 
synthesis of itself with itself: it is solid (massif).97 This syntheticity of being is 
far from any connection with what it is not it, and it is also far from any theories 
of transition and becoming: its frill positivity is far from any relation to any 
negativity, even in the form of transition or time. Temporality assumes a state in 
which one can say of something that it is now and it is not later. Being can never 
be subjected to such characterisations: consciousness can perceive o f it that it 
no longer is, only because consciousness itself is temporal. Being however does 
not and cannot exist as a lack, even o f what it is not: "the full positivity of being
87 Ibid, p.xlii
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is re-formed on its giving away. It was and at present other beings are: that is 
all”.88
It is important to note that this disassociation of being from time and 
temporality is part of Sartre's project to distance himself from all forms of 
Idealism/Phenomenalism and Realism, since any association of being with time 
has to solve the problem of the reality of time from the start. But to associate 
time and temporality in general with consciousness, protects being and its 
metaphysics from an undue realistic or idealistic stress. Of course the problem 
of time and temporality and its reality has to be dealt with even with regard to 
consciousness. But note that the metaphysics of consciousness as "being what it 
is not and not being what it is" is a more manoeuvrable position in relation to 
realistic/idealistic commitments (or no commitments) when we come to 
associate it with time.
As a continuation of the discussion regarding being and the philosophy of 
time, Sartre discusses being in connection to this other great area in 
metaphysics, modality or the metaphysics of the possible and the necessary. 
Sartre believes that being cannot be reduced to the necessary, nor derived from 
the possible. Necessity for Sartre concerns "the connection between ideal 
propositions but not that of existents".89 It is important to explain why Sartre 
thinks so. He attempts yet again not only to distance himself from the Idealist's 
presuppositions but also from the Realist's hasty and inappropriate 
generalisations. He would nurture idealistic presuppositions if he were to claim 
that necessity concerns those ideal propositions which are the expression or 
inner structure of "existents"; such a claim would not only force him to support 
the distinction between ideal and real, but also put in addition an undue 
emphasis on the ideal since it is the less problematic o f the two, the more
88 My italics, ibid.
89 Ibid.
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dependable and more apt for classifications and categorisations. He would be 
generalising hastily and inappropriately, if (driven by the realist's zeal) he 
claimed that necessity rules over the realm of existents. For if he claimed this, 
he would be able to formulate laws, etc. regarding existents and thus merge 
human classifications with the metaphysics of the being-in-itself which is alien 
(ontologically) to human affairs.
Far from all this, Sartre not only claims that necessity concerns the 
connection between ideal propositions and not those concerning existents, but 
also that an existing phenomenon can never be derived from another existent 
qua existent (i.e., for such a derivation further additions by a human 
consciousness are needed which are unrelated to the metaphysics of the being- 
in-itself) making thus the being-in-itself contingent and thus unexplainable. 
However, this does not mean that being in-itself is or can be derived from a 
possibility.90 For Sartre, the possible and the impossible are structures of the 
for-itself, and as such they cannot give origin to nor be incorporated in nor be 
equated to the being-in-itself. In terms of a metaphysics of modality, 
consciousness tries to categorise being-in-itself in anthropomorphic terms, by 
saying that it is superfluous (de trap). The consciousness which comes into 
terms with this being-in-itself disengaged now from all anthropomorphism 
(realist and idealist) finds itself in a rather tragic situation. Sartre summarises 
this tragical character of such a consciousness by: "Uncreated, without reason 
for being, without any connection with another being, being-in-itself is de trop 
for eternity".91
At the close of his preliminary examination of the phenomenon of being in 
the Introduction to Being and Nothingness, Sartre not only summarises the
90 Sartre in the original writes "C'est oe qu'on appelle la condngence de l’etre-en-soi. Mais 
l’etre-en-soi ne peut pas non plus etre derive d'un possible.!...] L'etre-en-soi n’est jamais ni 
possible ni impossible, il est", in L'etre et le neant. Gallimard, 1943 (ren.1970), p.33.
91 BN, p.xlii.
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three main characteristics which his examination allowed him to assign to the 
being of the phenomena (Being is, Being is in-itself, Being is what it is); he 
also charts the area he is going to investigate in the main corpus of his book, the 
questions he is trying to answer, and the problems he is trying to solve. One of 
the problems he will be trying to solve is that of a more appropriate 
characterisation and explanation of those relations which in fact (and not in 
theory) unite the two regions of Being (in-itself and for-itself) with each-other 
and with Being: "If idealism and realism both fail to explain the relations which 
m fact unite these regions which in theory are without communication, what 
other solution can we find for this problem?"92
From our investigation into the Introduction of Being and Nothingness we 
saw how carefully Sartre sets out his Phenomenological Ontology, and with 
what caution he distances himself from all known kinds of realism and idealism 
in traditional philosophy.
Two questions however have to be answered before we end this part of our 
investigation into this aspect of Sartre's Theory of Intentionality and the 
conclusions we can derive from it for a valid theory of Intentionality.
The first has to do with Sartre's theory. Even if we do find that Sartre's 
theory is distanced from any realist and idealist theory in traditional philosophy, 
should we nevertheless characterise his philosophy as realist or idealist for 
purposes of understanding his thought better? We shall try to answer this 
question by examining briefly the claims of Gregory McCulloch in his book 
Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Eariv Sartrean Themes93.
92 Ibid, p.xliii.
93 Gregory McCulloch, Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes. 
Routledge, London, 1994.
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The second question has to do with the very purpose of investigating 
whether Sartre's Theory is Realist or Idealist: What is at stake when someone 
claims that Sartre's or any other theory of Intentionality is (or is connected with) 
a Realist/Idealist Theory of Knowledge, Perception, or Ontology?
I want to claim that not only Sartre’s but any valid Theory of Intentionality 
has to distance itself from all Realistic and Idealistic presuppositions if it is to be 
a valid Theory of Intentionality, i.e., if its purpose is to explain how 
Consciousness relates to the environment (Inner -in the form of the ego//, and 
Outer -in the form of objects and Being in general) and how Consciousness is 
pre-reflectively certain for the existence and the way of existence (as real or 
illusory) of what it relates to. Choosing sides (the Realist or the Idealist) for the 
reality of the environment not only does not solve the problem of the relation of 
consciousness to a  reality of a different from it ontology, but also creates two 
more areas for debate and criticism: What exactly is the nature of consciousness 
that comes in contact with such an environment (or what is the nature of the 
intermediate stages)? And how exactly does this two way relation work so that 
realist or idealist presuppositions can be sustained even in the face of evidence 
which goes against them? The Sartrean way of resolving the ontological 
impasse, with its shift o f emphasis from the environment to consciousness, 
apparently cuts the problems by half. The onus is now on the Sartrean 
metaphysicians to prove that this solution escapes the criticisms that Idealists 
and Phenomenalists have attracted from the Realist camp. However, even from 
the brief examination here, we can clearly see that Sartre himself was aware of 
the shortcomings of the Idealist position, and tried to distance himself equally 
from both the Realists and the Idealists.
•
It may be that Sartre maintained realist aspirations (mainly regarding the 
Being), and in this way making the task of defending his views from realistic 
attacks easier, but his stand on Realism as a metaphysical position, and
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especially traditional Realism is more than clearly negative.94 More on this issue 
in our examination of McCulloch and other subsequent sections. In addition, his 
clear differentiation from the Husserlian idealist apparatus (in connection to the 
“epoche”, the “hyle”, and the Transcendental Ego), and his clear opposition to 
traditional Idealism, make any accusations that his theory is Idealist totally 
unfounded.
It would be useful at this point to see Sartre’s views on Time, Qualities, 
Meaning, and Ethics, and in this way see whether Applied Ontology can also 
support my claims. It will also be useful for the understanding of the 
importance of Intentionality in any investigation into the field of Applied 
Ontology95.
Sartre's Applied Ontology: Time, Qualities, Meaning, and Ethics.
Sartre investigates the connected issues of time and temporality in Being and 
Nothingness. Part Two, Chapter Two (entitled "Temporality", and in Chapter 
Three (entitled "Transcendence")96, Section IV (entitled The Time of the 
World). For any proper treatment of the issues he discusses in these passages, 
the short summary of his views presented here is extremely inadequate: it is 
useful however, for the connection of time to the Sartrean theory of 
consciousness and Intentionality, to discuss his theory briefly.
94 See for Sartre's own views on his aspousal of realism and the "bad realism" of BN, in Paul 
Arthur Scilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Jean-Panl Sartre. Open Court, La Salle, 111., 1981, pp.9- 
11,13.
951 use the term “Applied Ontology", knowing very well that there is currently a great debate 
over the terms of Metaphysics and Ontology, and their applicability, I define the field of 
Applied Ontology as the field of Ontology which has to do with the being of specific areas of 
Being, such as Meaning, Time, etc. An investigation into the Being itself is (pure, 
unadulterated) Ontology. Metaphysics in my view is the more general investigation into what 
mayor may not exist, does or does not exist, and in any case far more general than Ontology 
(which studies only what exists).
96 BN pp. 107-170; pp.204-216.
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In these passages Sartre propounds a view of time that is far from the 
traditional realist and irrealist conceptions of time.97 It is obvious from the start 
that Descartes, Husserl and Bergson are the main influences on his theory, even 
though he hastens to criticise them for isolationist tendencies (Descartes and 
Bergson), and for turning into an in-itself and an object something which is a 
for-itself.98 In addition, we see Sartre from the start oppose the fragmentation of 
time into the three temporal dimensions of past, present, future, and claim that 
we have to see time and temporality as a totality which dominates its secondary 
structures and which confers on them their meaning autonomously.99 And, even 
though he acknowledges Heidegger's account as the most correct ontologically, 
he chooses to accent the present ekstasis instead of Heidegger's accent on the 
future.100 Even in this accentuation of the present however, he believes that the 
present is "not ontologically "prior"" to the past and the future, and that the 
present is conditioned by them as much as it conditions them.101 It is just the 
"mould of indispensable non-being for the total synthetic form of 
temporality".102
He sees temporality and time (Present, Past, Future) as subjective processes 
and structures of the For-itself with which the For-itself continuously lives its 
project of nihilating the In-itself. Time and Temporality have the same ontology 
as the For-itself (they are nothingnesses), and they are the ways with which the 
For-itself sets up its own measure for the duration and self-identity of things.
97 See Robin Le Poidevin, and Murray MacBeath, ed, The Philosophy of Time. Oxford 
University Press, 1993; esp. Introduction, pp. 1-24; Michael Dummett, Tmth and Other 
Enigmas, Duckworth, London, 1978, articles entitled: "A Defence of McTaggart’s Proof of the 
Unreality of Time", pp.351-357, "The Reality of the Past", pp.358-374; D.W. Hamtyn, 
Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 127-160; George N. Schlesinger, 
Metaphysics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, pp.97-121.
98 BN pp. 109-142.
"BN, p. 107.
100 BN p. 142.
101 Ibid.
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Things do not have time independently of the For-itself; time "flows" over 
things and transforms them in such a way as to make them appear to 
unreflective consciousness as having an objective mode of being, what Sartre 
terms as "universal temporality".103 Unreflective consciousness in its continuous 
relation to the world through Intentionality can not be a consciousness o f time; 
for that it needs to become reflected consciousness; the world appears temporal 
and as having time to unreflected consciousness through Intentionality and 
because of Intentionality.104 This theory of time however, should not be 
regarded as a disregard for the importance of the notion of time in the Sartrean 
metaphysics and ontology; one should see time as gaining more importance than 
in other theories, because of this association to consciousness. In fact, one can 
define the For-itself in Sartrean Metaphysics and Ontology in terms of what has 
been (Past) as a flight (Present) toward what it projects to be (Future).105 And 
for Sartre, the For-itself can not be except in temporal form.
To the worries of Analytic philosophers that the Sartrean Theory of Time is 
the worst private language argument that a philosophy of time has ever 
produced, one can respond that the Sartrean Theory of Time distinguishes two 
main conceptions of time: time as a non-dynamic phenomenon (in the form of 
Past, Present, Future) and time as a dynamic phenomenon (as duration). In the 
second conception of time we see Kant's refutation of Berkeley's idealism, and 
the Leibnizian argument that change by itself implies permanence. Sartre is not 
an idealist; to disengage himself equally from both realism and idealism he 
describes the "several errors" of these theorists who reduce temporality to the 
status of a measure and order of change. For Sartre duration or the time of 
consciousness is "human reality which temporalizes itself as a totality which is
103 BN p.204.
104 In Sartre's own words, BN ibid: "Universal time comes into the world through the For- 
itself. The In-itself is not adapted to temporality precisely because it is in-itself and because 
temporality is the mode of unitary being in a being which is perpetually at a distance from 
itself for itself."
105 See Barnes’ Key to Special Terminology, BN p.634.
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to itself its own incompletion".106 This totality is not consciousness however; the 
for-itself cannot be (is a nothingness); temporality as the totality we mentioned 
above (as a human reality) temporalizes itself entirely as the refusal of the 
instant, and thus has an objective being (to oppose the being of the instant). In 
this peculiar form of dialectics, Sartre escapes idealistic conceptions of time, and 
provides the foundations for the guarantee of the existence of time in the public 
domain: "public time" becomes the "outsideness" which unreflective 
consciousness "sees" when it communicates with the Other and sees the Other 
having the objective temporality of universal time.107 This Sartrean conception 
of what Analytic philosophers call "public time", is a central notion in Sartrean 
metaphysics; so central as to lead Sartre to engage in Marxist Dialectics in his 
later philosophy to investigate fully how his theory of consciousness can be 
applied in such communicativeness of time in the social domain.108
We saw, in the Critical Evaluation of the Essay, Sartre's position on the 
issue of Qualities. Qualities are another greatly discussed issue in all major 
theories dealing with the reality of the world.109
As we saw, qualities in the Essay belonged to the ego (reflected 
consciousness) and were reflected upon structures of the world based on our 
wants and desires. It is important to note from the start that Sartre did not
106 BN p. 149.
107 BN pp.204-216, and pp. 150-170.
108 See Critique de la raison dialectiaue. Gallimard, 1960; in English: Critique of Dialectical 
Reason. Vol, I, Theory of Practical Ensembles, tr. by Alan Sheridan-Smith, Verso, London, 
1982; Critique of Dialectical Reason. Vol.II, The Intelligibility of History, ed by Arlette 
Elkaim-Sartre, transL by Quentin Hoare, Verso, New york, 1991; "The Ambivalence of 
History and the Ambiguity of the Historical Fact", in Jean-Paul Sartre, Cahiers pour une 
morale. ed. by Arlette Elkaim-Sartre, Gallimard, 1983; in English Notebooks for an Ethics. 
transl. by David Pellauer, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, pp.20-68; also see 
Hazel E. Barnes, Sartre. Quartet Books, London, 1974, pp.46-53
109 See D.W.Hamlyn, Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 11-33; 
C.S.Whiteley, An Introduction to Metaphysics. Methuen, London, 1950, pp.77-78.
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engage in the discussion of primary and secondary qualities in the way Berkeley 
and Locke did.110 Sartre's way of dealing with them is not and cannot be termed 
"idealist”111 and Sartre most definitely rejects realism as equally inadequate to 
idealism in the explanation of the relations which unite consciousness with the 
being-in-itself112.
In Part Two, Chapter Three (entitled Transcendence) of his Being and 
Nothingness. Sartre attempts to describe phenomenologically the being of 
qualities like this: "Quality is nothing other than the being of the this when it is 
considered apart from all external relation with the world or with other 
thises"lu. In simpler words quality for Sartre is the being of any object in the 
world when it is reflected apart from any evidence from the world. This theory 
may sound like extreme subjectivism, but it has nothing to do with "the 
subjectivity of the psychic"114. Sartre knowing too well that if quality is 
conceived as a simple subjective determination one is led to the rejection of the 
objectivity of the quality-of-being in the quality.
To offer an example, for Sartre the yellow of the lemon is not a subjective 
mode of apprehending the lemon; it is the lemon. The quality of being yellow 
that the lemon has, is not distinct from the essence of the lemon. The lemon and 
its being yellow are one and the same thing. We cannot think of a lemon that is 
not yellow (as long as we do not engage in fictional discourse). And here we 
should not think that an object X (e.g., a lemon) appears as the empty form 
which holds together disparate qualities. The object (a lemon) is extended 
throughout its qualities, and each of its qualities is extended throughout each of 
the others: it is the sourness of the lemon which is yellow, it is the yellow of the
110 See John Locke, An Essav Concerning Human Understanding. 1690; (Bishop) George 
Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge. 1710.
111 See Sartre's critique of Berkeley BN, pp.xxvi-xxxvi.
1,2 BN, p.xi-xliii.
1,3BNp.l86.
114 Ibid.
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lemon which is sour. Sartre goes against theorists such as Husserl who unite 
only colour and form in the object due to an "unconditional synthetic necessity"; 
Sartre believes that all qualities change with any change even in one of them.
In this way, every quality of being is all of being; with the direction of our 
consciousness and Intentionality upon a quality of an object, the presence of the 
absolute contingency of being and its indifferent irreducibility strikes us directly 
and unavoidably. Even though the apprehension of a quality does not add. 
anything to being, except the fact that being is there as this, qualities do not 
exist as "outside" of being; there is no "inside" and no "outside" in being. They 
exist and have being as ontological relations to the For-itself115. The intuition of 
a quality is not the passive contemplation of a given, since the For-itself makes 
known to itself what it is by means of quality: for the For-itself to perceive red 
as the colour of this notebook is to reflect on itself as the internal negation of 
that quality116. In each of the qualities we perceive on objects we intuit our 
emptiness and distance from them. In each of our perceptions of the totalities of 
the undifferentiated and united Being, the For-itself using its Freedom 
constitutes itself by negating the total revelation of being "in profile"117. Quality 
as co-present to the for-itself-to-come (the For-itself which always creates 
itself), has a specific meaning, revealed by abstraction, a phenomenon of 
presence of the for-itself to being, since abstract being preserves the for-itself s 
transcendence118.
Some may accuse Sartre again here for Abstractionism and Idealism, but as 
Sartre himself notes, they do that because they can not distinguish the 
constitution of the "this" and the act of abstraction. The for-itself is an 
"abstractor" not because it realises the psychological operation of the
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abstraction, but because it rises as the for-itself s presence to being with a future, 
i.e., beyond being. Abstraction in this way does not enrich being, it is only the 
revelation of a nothingness of being beyond being. And it is not liable thus to the 
classical objections to abstraction, since the Sartrean conception of abstraction 
is far removed from any considerations of being as a this.
The relation of the thises to one another can be neither be based on 
interactionism, nor on the upsurge on the same ground of the world. Our 
perception of this constitutes the other thises as the ground on which the this 
confronted is raised in relief. In this way, the original relation of this to that is an 
external negation: that appears as not being this. This external negation is 
revealed to the for-itself as a transcendent, since the for-itself is determined en 
bloc to not-be the totality of "this-that" on the ground of the world119.
Thus, Sartre clearly cannot be accused of Idealism nor Realism in his views 
on the Qualities. But we need to further discuss some of his points to investigate 
whether his theory is not suspect of logical flaws. Some philosophers may see in 
the reduction of all qualities to the same ontology a serious threat to the 
Aristotelian (and Platonic in a way) tradition of distinction of causes (e.g., final, 
material, etc.) from which some may also be qualities. One however, may 
respond that these differentiations are not incompatible with the Sartrean 
theory: Sartre would accept that qualities have the outlined above ontological 
relation to consciousness, and that consciousness adds other relations to these, 
which can be the study of the empirical sciences and so on.
To the much deeper common-sense worry that in this way we wipe out all 
mind-independent qualities from our metaphysics, I would propose that this 
common-sense insistence on the mind-independence of qualities is problematic 
in itself. Wittgenstein among others investigates and censures some of the
119 BN pp. 189-190.
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fallacies of the common-sense view in his book On Certainty120. But I think 
Sartre would accept the intuitions of common-sense in his ontology more or less 
like this: the unperceived qualities, and the mind-independent qualities that the 
common-sense view propounds are the ontological substrata on which we base 
our descriptions of what we see when we perceive objects with specific 
qualities. In other words, when we perceive a red balloon the redness of the 
balloon existed before we perceive it: in the presence of the light conditions in 
which it is a balloon (and not a head), in the presence of the chemical producing 
this shade and the other material characteristics of both the balloon and our bio- 
neurological make up producing the perception "red"; but also the redness of 
the balloon did not exist before we perceive it: the redness did not exist as our 
recognition of "red"; "red" as the same colour as our favourite shirt, with the 
same shade, etc.; before we see the balloon clearly and with adequate light 
conditions, it was but a thing in the sky; when we perceived it more clearly we 
felt more familiar with it: the balloon is red, as my favourite shirt is red. Our 
previous feeling of nothingness in the presence of the fullness of being of this 
colour, is brought up and we gain again the familiarity which we strive to 
maintain in the confrontation with the hostile domain of the Being.
Before I associate the redness of the balloon to my shirt's, the balloon was 
not a balloon, it was a disturbingly unknown flying thing. In this way it did not 
exist as a balloon (and even more as red balloon). Sartre would never deny that 
objects do not exist independently of our perceptions of them, only that they 
have this or that quality. And that is why our perceptions do not disappear in 
thin air when we have to change our judgement regarding the qualities we 
perceive (e.g. we decide later that the balloon was yellow). The substratum 
remains, the quality changes. The relation between the substratum and the 
perceived quality however depends on the for-itself: from any substratum one
120 L.Wittgenstein, On Certainty, transl. and ed. by Anscombe and von Wright, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1969.
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can perceive anything he likes (something that occurs frequently in 
hallucinations, etc.). On the other hand without this substratum there would be 
no perception (or at least no perception that could be shared with others).
Intentionality here guarantees both the communicability of our perceptions 
and our success in establishing causal relations between the substrata and the 
qualities we perceive; with Intentionality also we can distinguish between 
hallucinations and real perceptions. In short, Intentionality guarantees the reality 
of the substrata without guaranteeing the reality of the qualities.
It is evident from the above what the ontology of meaning is for Sartre. Like 
the qualities of objects, meaning is not in the object, as its ontological 
component, nor does it exist in an abstract world of ideas. That is the reason 
why there can be "empty meanings" in Sartrean metaphysics. They are uses of 
words with no meaning as in the phrase: "I am fixing the car", the "I" here is 
empty; on the contrary, the "I" in "I am here" is full of meaning. In addition, this 
"fullness" of meaning is not given to objects and words from an entity such as 
the Husserlian Transcendental Ego. In Sartrean metaphysics what decides the 
meaning of things is firstly the unreflected consciousness, with its determinate 
fixation made by the reflected consciousness (which can also proceed in future 
revisions). It is evident from the above that this Sartrean concept of meaning has 
nothing to do of with the Fregean and the Russelian theories of meaning. Words 
in Sartrean theory are used always with meaning; they are not mere syntactical 
forms. It is only that their meaning sometimes (or always, if no revision occurs) 
remains empty, waiting for the fullness that the reflected consciousness shall 
grant to it. It nevertheless has a correspondence with every day linguistic use: 
we grant meaning to words, and when we choose to not grant meaning it is
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again we who do this121. In this framework, linguistic use has realistic 
aspirations (at least): a realism that does not depend so much on external and a 
priori conditions, but at the synthesis of the Other's understanding of me and my 
own understanding of my own expressions as a language user. (See also the 
Critical Evaluation of the Essays, and the section on the Emotions, sub-section 
on Language.)
Finally, we shall investigate Sartre’s applied ontology in relation to Ethics122.
Some philosophers may consider Sartre's metaphysics to be the origin of and 
basis for an idealistic or utopian ethics, which is far from any ethical realism. To 
disprove such a claim we shall refer briefly to Sartre's theory of Authenticity, 
and the possibility of living an authentic life. Then we shall deal directly with the 
issues of ethical realism and idealism.
We have to point out from the start that freedom is a necessary notion in 
Sartrean metaphysics. We cannot but choose either to accept our true 
metaphysics and be in authentic existence, or try to conceal it in the form of 
bad/good faith.
It is important to note here that Good Faith is not "good" in the moral 
sense123. It is a form of faith and thus unacceptable by Sartre, since only the 
recognition of our true metaphysics is acceptable for him. "Good" is the faith
121 See Iris Murdoch, Sartre: Romantic Rationalist Chatto & Windus, Loudon, 1987, pp.64- 
80,138-150, and esp.p. 142.
.122 In my presentation and analysis of Sartrean Ethics I see a common line of evolving thought 
from the early work of Sartre to the lata; in this I disagree with Thomas GAnderson, who 
claims that there are two Sartrean Ethics: the ethics of authenticity and the ethics of integral 
humanity; see Thomas C. Anderson, Sartre*s Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral 
Humanity. Open Court, Chicago and La Salle, 111., 1993.
123 Mary Haight in A Study of Self-Deception. The Harvester Press, Sussex, 1980, pp.53-72, is 
on the right track of disengaging Sartrean Metaphysics from traditional moralistic ideas; 
however, it is doubtful if Sartrean Metaphysics can be disengaged from Sartrean Ethics, see 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, pp.468-471, and Jean-Paul Sartre, Truth and 
Existence. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 111., 1992, esp.pp. 68-75.
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that has as its base an approximation to Sartre's metaphysics, but which is 
"frozen" in time (with arrested possibilities for the future). Good Faith is a 
posited metaphysics of the unreflected consciousness, reflected and fully 
justified by the I. The I , always in need of justification for its chosen existence 
tries to escape the level of Bad Faith by choosing to be in Good Faith, i.e., 
attempts to explain the actions emanating from it based on a metaphysics which 
it postulates with certainty as valid, without knowing with certainty that such a 
metaphysics is valid. As we saw the area of unreflected consciousness is an area. 
which is totally inhospitable to epistemology. We can always postulate with 
phenomenology its ontology but never be certain on anything in it, except that 
we are always free in respect to our choices. When in “Good Faith” we try to be 
certain of something which we can never be certain; in addition, we try to be 
certain regarding our unreflected consciousness in the same way that we can be 
certain regarding our reflected consciousness. Such a metaphysics is alien to 
Sartrean ontology proper (reminding one of the Husserlian Transcendental Ego, 
which was rejected by Sartre), which distinguishes clearly and most decisively 
the two areas of reflected and unreflected consciousness.
Good Faith is not only a recognition of our Freedom in the metaphysics of 
our Consciousness, but also a "freezing" of such a recognition: in Sartre's words 
a "refuge" in Being. It is a desperate escape from Bad Faith to a faith and a 
belief in Being, without achieving certainty (it has no intuitive certainty of any 
sorts).124
In this way, authentic existence is possible, but very difficult to achieve, 
because the costs for living in this way may be very high (continuous creation of 
an /, chaotic view of ourselves, anxiety, anguish, and life filled with trembling 
over the infinity of our possibilities), and thus very rare.
124 See Sartre's Chapter on Bad Faith, in BN pp.47-70.
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We do not "inevitably" act in Bad or Good Faith, since we always have a 
choice (even if this is a very difficult choice, and frequently, due to our 
weakness, we choose to be in Bad or Good Faith). Sartre's Metaphysics here do 
not allow necessitation.
Good Faith is not related to Bad Faith in an "either-or" relation. First, they 
are not the only options we have to relate to our ontology (we can also choose 
authenticity). Secondly, an attempt at good faith (contemptible as it is to Sartre) 
is not liable to defeat a priori; it will depend upon the effectiveness of the 
"freezing" that I mentioned above, in relation to Good Faith. This supposed 
"inevitability" can not be logical nor causal, since there is no inevitability to 
begin with. It is causally possible for good faith to be sometimes sustained and 
some other times defeated, and at other times first sustained and then defeated, 
replaced by Bad, or yet another Good Faith, or authenticity; and this is also 
logically possible, since both good and bad faith are structures which, together 
with authenticity, have to do with reflected consciousness.
Considering Sartre's Ethical Theory we see Sartre distancing himself from all 
traditional views of Realism and Idealism. In his Notebooks for an Ethics, we 
see Sartre repeating the analysis of action found in the Essay we reviewed (that 
there is a synthesis of means and ends, and that this synthesis reveals itself with 
the appearance of the world; e.g., a revolutionary book reveals itself as to he 
written, a cry of pain reveals a person to be helped etc.), but also attacking both 
analytic (mainly Kantian) realism, and idealism. He finds that analytic realism 
considers man as a whole closed-in on himself and faced with another whole 
closed-in on itself, the world. Man's ends are solely the result o f his being and 
thus a priori; in order to realise them he relates to the world; the world in this 
way becomes an inessential means of realising one's ends. Such a disregard for 
the importance of the world leads one inescapably to ethical idealism.
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Sartre proposes that instead of this vicious circle in the fallacious game of 
traditional realism and idealism, one should regard as his start the being-in-the- 
world: the original and ontological relation of man to the world, with the 
understanding that man constitutes himself in and through surpassing the world 
toward the world. In this perspective the end and all its means become 
indiscernible: the world-yet-to-come clarifies the present world and the present 
world is a certain sketch of the world-yet-to-come, all the concrete features of 
the world-yet-to-come being provided to the project by those of the present 
world. The ends are learned in the world and not through an a priori intuition; 
they are learned by and through our employed and chosen means. Through our 
very perception of the world the ends-means whole is organised or re-arranged 
continuously.
But Sartre is not totally alien to realistic aspirations: he does not relativize 
ends; for Sartre the complex whole ends-means is an absolute, but its internal 
structures either mutually reinforce one another or are self-destructive. The 
indicated end may vanish through an internal contradiction of the complexus or, 
on the contrary, be reinforced125. The end, without being relativized, is not 
unconditional; there is a hierarchy of ends with more or less relative ends, the 
more relative being transformed into means themselves, which as means become 
involved with other ends that they cannot destroy by positing themselves as 
absolute ends. On the other hand, all the ends (from the more to the less 
relative) indicate the means which satisfy them and set aside the means that are 
incompatible to them126.
Sartre rejects all traditional naturalistic, realistic, and psychologistic 
conceptions of ethics which discuss ends as two external things which need 
balancing in a set of scales; he refers to the elasticity of ends that corresponds to
125 Notebooks for an Ethics, p.241.
126 Ibid, p.242.
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one's own elasticity: marginal means alter the ends in their content but not in 
their form ("one more change and it bursts"). Two opposing and contrary ends 
may be means in relation to a larger end: one's standing. Usually we choose the 
one that runs the lesser risk of upsetting this end. In this way the world appears 
with its pathways already drawn; this does not limit our freedom however; we 
can always change paths, even the world itself! 127 The ends-means complex has 
a life of its own which is revealed to me through and by my acts128.
The ends actually are transcendent noematic correlates, but not the correlates 
of pure intuition; they are rather the correlates of a creative act and of a (self- 
imposed) determination on one's freedom129.
Values do have a foundation in the world: the ends-means complex makes 
them part of the perceived world130.
In this way, Ethics for Sartre becomes a concrete Ethics: a synthesis of the 
universal (understanding within a larger group) and the historical (in the sense 
that existential ontology is itself historical: there is an initial event of the 
appearance of the For-itself through a negation of being)131. The structure of the 
universal (as a necessary structure of action) is derived from the consideration 
that any finite series of particular real men is a particular case of the infinite 
series of possible men. And the structure of the possible man comes from the 
concrete man: me, us.132 Ethics for Sartre becomes the theory of action; and 
action is abstract if it is not work and struggle133. In this theory of Ethics, there
27 Ibid, p.243.
28 Ibid, p.245.
29 Ibid, p.246.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid, pp.7-8.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid, p. 17.
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is no place for oppression: ethics as the theory of action is the ethics as a theory 
of conversion. Conversion cannot exist but as communication.
Communication does not exist by itself, it has to be brought about, and since 
it can not exist in a world of violence, it contains the will to end the universe of 
violence. This is brought about by establishing forms of communication such as 
Love, Appeal, Conversion. In these forms of communication subjectivity is 
radically divorced from realistic pre-suppositions134.
From all three the most successful is Conversion since it depends on myself 
(recognition of myself as ec-static For-itself) and since it leads to the recognition 
of the spirit as detotalized totality, away from tendencies to seek unity (as in the 
substantialism of the spirit- Fascism), or plurality (plurality- individualism) as in 
Appeal, without the need for the presence of an external observer or under the 
sign of oppression as in Love.135
Ethics thus through a special form of dialectics is the ethics of conversion 
and the ethics of action, away from all abstraction and categorisation; it 
becomes the source of authenticity in the world and it is itself the expression of 
this authenticity: to have the other in myself as another and yet as a free source 
of my acts, to will one's act both with his freedom and the freedom of others136.
Evidently in such an Ethics as the Sartrean Ethics there is no room for 
traditional realism and idealism. The only good is life and action in authenticity, 
and the only bad is life and action in alienation. Traditional Realism in the form 
of naturalism, the theory of duty, of right, and of values leads one inevitably to
134 Ibid,pp.45,470,450-9. Compare Sartre here to traditional (and non-traditional) views on 
Moral Realism as found in David McNaughton, Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. 
Basil Blackwell, 1994 (1988), pp.7-8, 39-41, 46-50, 134-44, 108-14, 39-40, 50-4,186-9, 134- 
6, 84-8.
135 Ibid, pp.8-10.
136 Ibid, pp. 10-12.
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Idealism regarding the Other and oneself. In these there is no understanding of 
freedom as self-alienation.
In order for our freedom to suppress alienation it has to universalise itself 
through conversion137. On the other hand Sartrean realistic aspirations do exist: 
Ethics becomes an Ontological Ethics, and the Good is what has to be done as 
distinct from the agent; it depends on subjectivity and an acting subjectivity, but 
it is beyond it. But it exists and it exists universally in each of our authentic 
actions, i.e., in each of our creations of ourselves. It has a transcendence (it is 
always beyond me as having to be done) and an objectivity (to posit the good in 
doing it is to posit Others as having to do it)m . In this objectivity and 
transcendence of the Good and of the Sartrean Ethics one can find a realism far 
from the traditional conceptions of it, but nevertheless of serious realistic 
aspirations.
iii) Can Sartre be a McCullochian Realist?
Gregory McCulloch in his book Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to 
Early Sartrean Themes 139 dedicates a whole Chapter140 to what he considers to 
be "Sartrean Realism". My attempt here is both a Critical Evaluation of what 
Sartrean Realism is according to McCulloch, and of Realism as a 
characterisation of Sartrean Theory in general.
137 Ibid, pp.468-470.
138 Ibid, pp.555-560,
139 Gregory McCulloch, Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Earlv Sartrean Themes , 
Routledge, London, 1994. Another commentator on Sartre who claims that he is a Direct 
Realist is Prof. Timothy Sprigge, in Theories of Existence, p. 130. I shall not discuss 
Prof.Sprigge’s claims because his claims do not include the claim that he gives an 
authoritative interpretation on Sartre. McCulloch’s claims however are another matter.
140 McCulloch, ibid, Chapter 7.
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In his description of Sartre's Theory, as related to the existence ("being") of 
the perceived world, McCulloch uses the term "Sartrean Realism" to mean the 
following:
1) Sartre is a Direct Realist141.
2) Sartre is a Non-Cartesian Realist142.
Both claims actually are reduced by McCulloch to one: Sartre is a Non- 
Cartesian (Direct) Realist143.
His argument for his claim is an Argument from Default: he gives a list of 
possible alternatives and then he eliminates the possibilities down to one, which 
he thinks is Sartre's own position. McCulloch's Argument thus seems suspect on 
at least three accounts: first, one may argue with him about the exclusion or 
inclusion of alternatives in his list of possibilities; secondly one may argue with 
him on the way he eliminates possibilities; and thirdly one may argue with him 
on whether Sartre's position has any relevance or similarity with the positions in 
the list.
We shall see that indeed McCulloch’s account is problematic on all three 
accounts.
But what exactly is his Argument from Default in relation to Sartre being a 
Direct Realist? The Argument goes as follows:
a) There are three possibilities open for Sartre in relation to the being of the 
perceived: Cartesian (Indirect) Realism, Berkeleyan Phenomenalism, and Direct 
(Naive) Realism.
141 Ibid, Chapter 6: Realism and Idealism, cfp.87.
142 Ibid,p.86, pp. 103-104.
143 Ibid, pp. 103-104, footnote 3: p. 118.
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b) Sartre rejects Cartesian Realism, i.e., Indirect Realism144: perception of 
material things is mediated by our ideas or sense-data or visual representations 
of them, of which we are directly aware.
c) Sartre rejects Berkelyan Phenomenalism145: perception consists in having 
the sense data: there is no mediation because there are no "external", mind- 
independent things.
Thus Sartre is a direct realist by default:
"Clearly then, first: since Sartre rejects both Cartesian realism and Berkeleyan 
idealism, he has to be a direct realist in perception by default. If he thinks we 
perceive material things, and denies that mediating entities exist, what other 
alternative is there?"146.
McCulloch brings as textual support for his claim the following text from 
Being and Nothingness: "Perception is articulated only on the ontological 
foundation of presence to the world, and the world is revealed concretely as the 
ground of each individual perception" (BN: 181). He also cites the following text 
in Being and Nothingness: " We shall best account for the original phenomenon 
of perception by insisting on the fact that the relation of the quality [i.e., 
perceived property such as colour] to us is that of absolute proximity (it "is 
there", it haunts us) [...] but we must add that this proximity implies a distance. 
It is what is immediately out of reach, what by definition refers us to ourselves 
as an emptiness [...] [it is] not a subjective impression." (BN: 187).
In addition, McCulloch considers Kantian Empirical Realism cum 
Transcendental Idealism (material things are not collections of ideas but 
somehow objective, and that perception of such objects is mediated by
144 McC.'s definition, ibid, p.87.
145 McC.’s definition, ibid, p.87.
146 Ibid.
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awareness of ideas) claiming that Sartre is not suspect of having affiliations with 
this philosophical position either147.
Later on he adds to the list of refuted alternatives Metaphysical Realism and 
Platonism148, where he actually recognises his mistake in excluding other 
possible alternatives, and claims: “[Since Sartre has already rejected Berkeleyan 
idealism, this makes him a Realist: there is no middle ground. But this]149 is not 
to say that there is only one form of realism: as remarked, Sartre is not a 
Cartesian realist. It seems that he is thus also committed to denying what is 
sometimes called metaphysical realism150 and sometimes Platonism15 \  If so, 
then he is probably committed to denying the correspondence theory of truth, as 
Putnam argues. But this is not so much because there is something wrong with 
the notion of truth or "objective reality", but because there is nothing mental 
(ideas or whatever) to correspond to it. Putnam often comes perilously close to 
missing this point152 and it is not clear that Morris' formulations of 
"conceptualism" can be sustained if the point is given due weight153."154
It is obvious from the above that McCulloch's list even with the additions he 
made later on is still far from inclusive of all possible alternatives. What happens 
to versions of the above theories which combine one or more elements from two 
or more of the stated possibilities? Surely a mixing up of theories is possible in 
more than the cited Kantian one! (Examples here could be a Platonist Direct 
Realist- things out-there are as we perceive them, but they are approximations 
and "inferior" copies/representations of what is true in some abstract and
147 Ibid, p.88.
148 Ibid, p. 118, footnote 3.
149 Ibid, pp. 103-4.
150 McCuloch here refers to H.Putnam, Realism and Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
151 McCulloch here refers to M.Morris, The Good and the True. Clarendon Press, OUP, 
Oxford, 1992.
152 Putnam, ibid, pp. 144-7, 207.
153 Morris, ibid, pp. 15-20.
154 McCulloch, ibid.
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immaterial form; a Non-Naive and Non-Mediated Direct Realist- realist about 
the world, with no mediations but not naive: things are not as we perceive them, 
etc.).
Still, even if we do accept that the list is all inclusive that leaves the questions 
of the procedure that McCulloch adopts and of whether what he says is relevant 
to Sartre unanswered.
In fact these two questions are related in this way: an Argument from Default 
such as McCulloch's, in order to work, has to take into account the fact that it 
can provide conclusive evidence if and only if a) there are no other relevant 
alternatives left outside the investigated list and b) if the characterisations 
contained in the list and the theory thus characterised are compatible.
We saw that the first of the conditions is not satisfied. We shall see that the 
second is not also satisfied from a close investigation of Sartrean Text.
The cited texts in McCulloch are taken out of context: the first text refers to the 
totality of being as negated in the lack of being in consciousness; the second 
refers to quality, and quality for Sartre is "nothing other than the being of the 
this when it is considered apart from all external relation with the world or with 
other thises" (BN: 186).
From both contexts it is evident that the cited Sartrean texts have nothing to 
do with what McCulloch is doing (Sartre is not concerned with what the 
theories put forward by McCulloch are concerned about: the "truth" or "reality" 
of perception as distinguished from the world out-there), and actually make 
references to the "Sartrean Porridge-like Stuff1 (which is the unconscious 
environment) seem useless155. Sartre believes that characterisations such as truth
1SS For these strange characterizations, see McCulloch, ibid, p. 115, and footnote 10, p. 120.
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and reality are human/mind-dependent characterisations (for more see Sartre’s 
account of time, space, and qualities156 - McCulloch’s account of some of these 
is inadequate and leaves them as questionmarks157).
We can safely say that McCulloch's account of Sartrean Realism leaves much 
to be desired, and should not be accepted as a valid characterisation of Sartrean 
theory, not only because of the logical flaws in McCulloch’s claims, but also of 
the very strong position Sartre has taken in his Introduction of Being and> 
Nothingness in which he attempts repeatedly and in different areas of 
metaphysics (in modality, in the philosophy of time, in perception, epistemology 
and ontology) to distance himself from traditional Realism, Idealism and 
Phenomenalism (in all their varieties)158.
iv) Can Sartre be a Hegelian in his views on Being?
Some commentators write about Sartre as some sort of Hegelian. This 
characterisation needs a brief discussion since if Sartre is a Hegelian he is a 
traditional Realist (or Idealist -depending on which angle you look at Hegel’s 
philosophy), a Realism (or Idealism) that he explicitly rejects. So, what exactly 
happens here, is Sartrean theory self-contradictory or not?
It will be useful to examine some of the claims of one of the commentators 
who claim that Sartre and Hegel converge in significant issues in their 
philosophies159.
156 BN Introd., and pp.3-46,107-219.
157 See McCulloch, ibid, pp. 111-117.
158 For more discussion on this point see above my sub-section on whether Sartre is a realist, 
and Sartre's Introduction in BN, esp. p.xxiii where S. claims that he is an agnostocist about 
Being; p.xxxvi where S. distances himself from phenomenalists; pp.xxxvii-xxxviii, where 
Sartre distances himself from Kant and the transcendental idealists; p.xxxv, pp.xxxix-xl 
where he rules out both realism and idealism; and pp.xl-xliii where Sartre distances himself 
from the usual terminology and ideas of Realists, Idealists and Phenomenalists.
159 See Pierre Verstraeten, "Hegel and Sartre", in Christina Howells, ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to Sartre. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp.353-372.
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The first (and most important) issue that these commentators bring up is the 
frequency of Sartre's citations of Hegel's ideas and writings. However, I have to 
note that this is no proof of Sartre's allegiance to Hegel: one can cite the work 
of someone with great frequency because he is more than convinced that the 
cited work is wrong and fallacious, and wants to make as explicitly as possible 
his difference from the cited work.
As philosophical issues of convergence are cited their similarity in their 
treatment of the limited and the unlimited, the unlimited and the infinite, the 
being-for-itself, being-for-others and the recognition of consciousness, is 
pointed out. In all these it is claimed that the two thinkers are not only treating 
similar ontologically issues more or less similarly, but that Hegel has influenced 
Sartre to the extent that he has turned him into his disciple against his will. 
These claims cannot but be totally unfounded. The claims both are based on 
problematic isolation of passages and surface analysis, without taking notice of 
the underlying dynamics of Sartre's positions, and on serious confusions both of 
Hegel's and Sartre's own thought. To illustrate let us deal only with one issue: 
being-for-itself (since it is the main concern of this thesis).160 It is claimed that 
the for-itself in Hegel has the same ontology as the Sartrean for-itself461. To 
support the claim, passages from Hegel's Science of Logic are compared to 
Sartre's Being and Nothingness. In these passages the for-itself as self-related 
negation is made to be the same as Sartre's theory of the for-itself based on it 
being a nihilation (and thus made-to-be by the in-itself) and an internal negation: 
by means of the in-itself it makes known to itself what it is not and consequently 
what it has to be.
Can we accept such a thesis? I think not.
160 Other theses are not far from similar refutations; see for example the most severe refutation 
of the thesis regarding the role of the Other and the Master-Slave analogy in BN pp.236-244.
161 Verstraeten, ibid, pp.362-3.
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Such a thesis disregards Sartre's rejection of all noumenal beings which in the 
form of principles and laws compose the for-itself; for Sartre the being-for-itself 
is the transphenomenal being of phenomena, and in this it is aided by the 
Sartrean theory of Intentionality.
For Hegel even though consciousness of the object is the phenomenon of the 
object and is self-external162, in his Logic he talks about the Being-for-itself as 
being One,163 This One being-for-itself is for Hegel completed Quality; as such, 
its ontology contains abstract Being and Being modified as non-substantial 
elements. However, Sartre himself in his Notebooks for an Ethics164 (the work 
with the most citations of Hegel) attacks such a notion of Quality. (This comes 
as no surprise: Quality for Hegel is in a determinate mode, immediate and 
identical with Being; a something is what it is in virtue of its quality, and losing 
its quality it ceases to be what it is; quality is a category only of the finite and for 
this reason it has its proper place in Nature, not the world of Mind.)165 Sartre 
sees in Hegel's theory of consciousness a theory that provides as an ontology of 
consciousness a series of unactualized determinations (talents). In this way 
consciousness has an immediate and unactualized essence (and we can easily 
understand how great an anathema essentialism is for Sartre's theory of 
consciousness). Sartre finds that Hegel's account is far from being adequate, 
since it does not account for the ontology of consciousness as the drive to: a) 
impose its form on what is not it, b) to transform itself into the element of other- 
being, i.e., to transform itself into a marble, gold, etc., to enrich itself for itself 
with the depth that these elements gain in the realisation of a project, c) to make 
itself sacred as that reality endowed with an infinite depth by all other 
consciousnesses.
162 See Hegel's Philosophy of Right transl. with notes by T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1952, pp.315-316.
163 See Hegel's Logic, transl. by William Wallace, Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 141-2.
164 Notebooks for an Ethics, pp. 122-3.
165 See Hegel's Logic, ibid, p. 134.
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In Hegel's Philosophy of Right, we see how his theory of consciousness 
works, and why Sartre rejects it with such a great emphasis. Hegel's theory of 
consciousness does great service for his ideas of absolute rights and property166 : 
in that work Hegel makes consciousness exist for another consciousness only on 
the basis of ownership (I am distinct from another on the basis of what I own or 
what I can own). Sartre attacks exactly this connection in Hegel, and accuses 
him of completely disregarding the very notion of creativity. He sees in Hegel's 
work the givenness of originally determined nature: Hegel's notion of found 
effective reality. Hegel sees in it qualities and talents, accepting the 
psychological idea of the passive, purely contingent "gift" of being (analogous 
to a "beautiful voice"). Work is opposed to the "gift", only as this gift is passing 
over to actualisation. In this way, consciousness sees itself in the work as in a 
mirror and there is nothing more in the work than in consciousness. Action 
"simply translates an initially implicit being into a being that is made explicit" 
and consciousness "has to hold on to the original content of its essence"167.
Nothing can be more alien to Sartrean theory than this crypto-essentialism 
and determinism. Sartre finds this Hegelian exposition of the relation of 
consciousness to the world, and the formula of "one only finds in things what 
one has put into them" absurd. Since, even for one to find in things what one 
has put into them, even for this, it is necessary that one subsequently find there 
infinitely more than one wanted to; with Hegel this is logically impossible!168 
Sartre acknowledges the fact that the additions in this "framed" picture of the 
world are made by the existence of others, but he complains (with good 
justification) that this ontological "safety-valve" appears too late. And even with 
this late arrival, the concept of work is doomed to two equally flawed
166 See Hegel's Philosophy of Right pp.37-38.
167 See Phenomenology of the Spirit p.239. First translation in Hegel: The Phenomenology of 
Mind, transl., by J.B. Baillie, Allen and Unwin, London, 1931.
168 See Sartre, ibid, pp. 123-4.
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ontological possibilities: either the individual finds himself in the work (because 
it is his, and the distinction between a content which is explicit for 
consciousness only within consciousness itself, and an intrinsic reality outside it 
no longer exists) or the work appears as an alien, discovered reality169. Sartre 
finds these possibilities flawed since they condemn one in extreme subjectivism. 
Sartre accuses Hegel of transforming without any warrant an ontological issue 
into an epistemological one: the work has an ontological relation to me not only 
an epistemological; Hegel speaking about consciousness only on terms of 
knowledge thinks that it suffices for consciousness to project a conscious 
modality on the world as a screen, in order to immediately see it there. However 
in this way Hegel locked the ontology of consciousness into an extreme 
subjectivism, thus allowing it to exist in a climate of Idealism; moreover, this 
Idealism is permeated by determinism170.
We should not be surprised by such a strong emphasis on divergence rather 
than convergence. Sartre would never accept history in the way Hegel thought 
about it. The lack of the ontological considerations and conclusions that led 
Sartre to the philosophy of time that he has (with the future demanding a 
creative act more or less ex nihilo), makes Hegel's metaphysics alien to Sartre's 
thought. But this serious divergence would not be sufficient if their theories of 
consciousness had a serious convergence. We saw however, that this is 
impossible: Hegel's theory of consciousness is permeated by essentialist and 
idealist pre-suppositions, which are rejected by Sartre from his very 
Introduction to Being and Nothingness (see above, the sub-section on whether 
Sartre is a Realist, and on whether he is a McCullochian Realist).
169 Sartre, ibid, p. 124.
170 See Sartre, ibid, pp. 124-5.
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With these few remarks and brief analysis, I think it is made more than 
obvious that Sartre and Hegel differ greatly in their metaphysics and their 
commitments to realism and idealism.
v) Sartre and Wittgenstein on Reality.
This section was mainly devoted to Sartre and the investigation of whether, 
Sartre was a Realist or not. We saw that Sartre attacked ferociously both 
Realism and Idealism. We also saw that his attack was mainly on the 
metaphysics employed by these two rivals (often successive states in one's 
philosophical development), even though he also has an epistemological critique 
on them.171
This small subsection shall deal mainly with Wittgenstein. Even though 
Wittgenstein's main concerns had to do with epistemology and language, and 
not with metaphysics, we shall attempt to see whether the interpretations 
offered regarding his later philosophy cannot give evidence regarding his 
metaphysical suspicions (since it would be an "anathema" to speak about 
Wittgensteinian metaphysics in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy).
We will try to see in particular whether Wittgenstein was a Realist or not. If 
he is clearly a Realist in his work (and especially a Realist in the traditional 
sense), then surely we cannot claim that Sartre had similarities to Wittgenstein. 
Once we establish that on such a fundamental area as Metaphysics and Ontology 
they differ, and in such an important area then we surely have to do with two 
very different theories.
171 See for an under-developed epistemological critique, BN, pp.216-2I8.
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Well, I think from the start we can be certain that Wittgenstein's later thought 
is not a Realist nor an Idealist philosophy. He attacks both directions with 
outmost severity. One can claim, following many commentators of Wittgenstein, 
that all the later work is exactly a refutation of earlier insistence on Realist and 
Idealist pre-suppositions172.
Actually, some recent work maintains that Wittgenstein is an anti-realist or 
an irrealist173, some other that he is a scepticist174.
Without going through the arguments in detail, I would like to venture an 
analysis of what exactly it would be for Wittgenstein to be an anti-realist or a 
sceptic, and then based on this analysis to see if he is or is not a Realist.
Well, if someone is an anti-realist regarding meaning for some area in time 
(e.g. the past) then it is obvious that he has to be a realist for some other (even a 
community based realism)173. On the same considerations if someone is a sceptic 
regarding some area in time then, again, he has to be a realist for some other 
(even a community-based realism)176. In order for someone to not be a realist at 
all, he has to be a "global" anti-realist, but even he espouses realism at least in a 
theoretical sense, otherwise he would not be able to categorise a given 
perspective as anti-realist. A person who does not care about realism is in a 
different category: it would be a mistake to consider him a realist at either the 
theoretical or the practical level of his theory, since the issue of realism would
172 See Anthony Kenny, WiteensteiiL pp. 2, 10; A.C. Grayling, Wittgenstein. Oxford 
University Press, 1988, pp.63-111; David Pears, The False Prison: A Study of the 
Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Vols. I-II, Oxford University Press, 1987,I:pp.l0- 
12, 14, 17, 28-32, 65, 171, 184, 188, H:pp.233, 267n81, 268; Peter Winch, Trying to Make 
Sense. Blackwell, 1987, pp.37-8, 39-46, 53; Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas. 
Duckworth, 1978, p.xxxiii.
173 See Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, pp.xxx-xxxix, 145-165; Wright, Realism- 
Meaning and Truth, pp.85-106, 26-29; A.J.Ayer, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Penguin, 1985 
,pp. 111-145.
174 See Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language. Basil Blackwell, 1982.
175 See Dummett, ibid; and McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning. Blackwell, 1984, pp. 180-200.
176 See McGinn, ibid.
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not be on his theoretical map. Even a sceptic (and even more a pyrrhonian or 
pyrrhonist sceptic) considers realism to be important: without his allegiance to 
realism he would not have such strict standards regarding the certainty of 
knowledge.
Why do I claim all this? It is just to show that a phenomenological analysis 
the last 20-30 years in Wittgensteinian analysis and commentary, and of 
Wittgenstein's own views, is not foreign (again phenomenologically) to Sartre's 
espousal of realism, in his attack on both traditional Realism and Idealism.
In this way, we can say that Wittgenstein and Sartre are both on the same 
line of thinking regarding realism: they both consider it a theoretical possibility, 
even though they both attack ferociously traditional forms of realism (mainly 
naive realism, critical realism, dialectical realism, Fregean realism, and 
Husserlian realism). Of course they had different interests in their critique; for 
Wittgenstein it was his distrust for metaphysics and his emphasis of language, 
while for Sartre it was his metaphysical pursuits that brought him into this battle 
against traditional metaphysics.
Apart from these theoretical considerations, in the actual views they hold on 
such issues as meaning, decision theory and ethics177, freedom, action and rule-
177 One may complain regarding my claim that Sartre and Wittgenstein have similarities in 
their views about meaning that Sartre and Wittgenstein differ greatly on their views about 
meaning since Sartre is interested in the metaphysics, and Wittgenstein in the epistemology 
involved; I would respond that even if this is the case, one has to prove that epistemology and 
ontology are not related; for example one can claim following Eric Matthews that we can 
decide over disputes about knowledge-claims based on shared standards of rationality, and 
these standards can be context-dependent, but this context-dependence even though not 
against the notion of objective truth, is quite incompatible with the notion of a context-free 
“absolute truth”; in Matthews’ analysis (and our own) ontology and epistemology are 
connected, see Eric Matthews “Knowledge and Relativism” in Venant Cauchy, ed., 
Philosophy and Culture. Vol.2, Montreal Ed Montmorency, 1988, pp.898-901; indeed, it 
would be a very unnatural thing to do if we were not to connect them (some have actually 
tried with disastrous results; see the tradition of logical positivism). For an interesting 
commentary on Wittgensteinian views on Ethics and Moral Philosophy on which we can see 
similarities to Sartre’s theory, see Paul Johnston, Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy. 
Routledge, London, 1989; Colin McGinn, ibid, p. 134, n56.
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 168
following considerations, the emotions, the "look", relation of soul and body, 
and their relationship with others178, we see far more convergence than 
divergence.
However, it would be useful at this point to investigate Sartre's applied 
ontology more closely in order to find out whether Sartre and Wittgenstein 
indeed converge in that very important area of human interaction, generally 
called "the Emotions".
178 See for more discussion in Philip Dwyer, “Freedom and Rule-following in Wittgenstein 
and Sartre”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.l, No.l, September 1989, 
pp.49-68; Kathleen Wider, "Hell and the Private Language Argument: Sartre and 
Wittgenstein on Self-Consciousness, the Body and Others", Journal o f the British Society for 
Phenomenology, Vol. 18, No.2.,May 1987, pp. 120-132.
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V. INTENTIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS.
Sartre, mainly in his work The Emotions. Outline of a Theory179 puts forward 
a theory of the human emotions which in many ways is opposite to traditional 
psychological and psychoanalytic theories of the emotions, and which is a 
forerunner of the psychotherapeutic method (initiated mainly by Sartre's work) 
called existential psychoanalysis.
In our analysis of this work and of his views in Being and Nothingness, we 
shall refer briefly to his main theses, offering a critical evaluation and 
comparison with modem alternatives, and we shall attempt to tie them with his 
and our main concern which is consciousness and its most important 
characteristic: Intentionality.
We shall see that in order to fully appreciate the value of Sartre's Theory on 
the Emotions we must connect it with his contribution to the Philosophy of 
Language.
We shall see in this way through a brief comparative analysis with 
Wittgenstein’s positions on the emotions and language, that not only did the 
two philosophers have a lot in common in their philosophical positions, but that 
actually in these areas their perspectives are almost identical.
i) Sartre's Theory of the Emotions.
179 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions. Outline of a Theory, transl. by Bernard Frechtman, 
Philosophical Library, 1948; original: Esauisse d'une theorie des emotions. Hermann, Paris, 
1939; my edition, is from Jean-Paul Sartre: Essavs in Existentialism, ed. by Wade Baskin, The 
Citadel Press, N.J., USA, 1965, pp. 189-254, from now on EOT.
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Sartre's Attack on Traditional Views in Psychology and the Social 
Sciences.
In his work on the Emotions we see Sartre dismantling both psychological 
and psychoanalytic theories and rejecting them as being limited in their scope of 
investigation (the psychological), and as problematic in their theory of inner 
causation and signification (the psychoanalytic).
Regarding the psychological theories of the Emotions, Sartre first provides a 
philosophical analysis of their methodology and aims, i.e., a Philosophy of 
Science focused on Psychology. According to Sartre, Psychology, as a 
discipline aspiring to be positive, places an overwhelming emphasis on facts and 
draws from only two types of experiences, that which gives us the spatial- 
temporal perception of organised bodies, and the intuitive knowledge of 
ourselves that is called reflexive experience.
Psychology, as a Science of Man, is not interested in limiting and defining its 
object of investigation a priori, but is satisfied with an empirical idea of man as 
a number of creatures who present analogous natures to experience. The 
psychologist does not commit himself over the nature of the object under 
investigation, nor does he consider the men about him as his fettow-creatures. 
The psychologist should confer upon himself a human character, according to 
his own strict methodological considerations, only a posteriori, and he cannot 
regard himself as a privileged member of the group of individuals with a human 
character, except for the sake of experiments. In this way, he will learn only 
from others that he is a man and his nature as a man will not be revealed to him 
in any particular way by introspection. Introspection can for the psychologist 
only produce facts, of the same nature as "objective" experimentation.
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An idea of man can exist in such a discipline only as a sum, a synthesis, of the 
established facts which it allows us to unite, and as a unifying hypothesis 
invented to co-ordinate and grade the infinite collection of facts which have 
been brought to light. Even if a particular psychologist assumes a specific 
conception of man as a working hypothesis, before this ultimate synthesis were 
possible, this is done strictly as a personal act, without ever losing sight of the 
fact that it is a regulating concept.
In this way, psychology, insofar as it claims to be a science, can furnish only 
a sum of miscellaneous facts most of which have no connection with the others. 
This is due to the very principles of psychology : because of its aspiration to be 
positivistic and its expectation of the isolated fact, it disregards the essential, the 
necessary, what brings order, and places emphasis on the accidental, on the 
contingent, and on disorder.
Sartre accuses the psychologists here of short-sightedness and lack of 
scientific understanding, since they can not realise that it is impossible to get to 
the essence of things by accumulating disordered, and contingent accidents180.
And if it is only this that they are trying to achieve with their endeavour, i.e., 
just accumulate details of knowledge, their purposes of being a collector has 
little, if any, value for anyone else. If  on the other hand, they have the hope that 
their monographs and isolated collections of facts are going to provide the basis 
for an anthropological synthesis, then, according to Sartre, they are in total 
contradiction with themselves. This contradiction, evidenced in their hope to 
achieve an anthropological synthesis while having a methodology which allows 
them to collect only disordered, contingent and accidental facts, is not only a 
contradiction inherent in the Human Sciences, but it is also found in the Natural 
Sciences. The Natural Sciences have also the contradiction of hoping to
180 EOT, p. 192.
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understand the World as a synthesis, while having methodologies which through 
their criticism eliminated the concept of a unified World, and in its place have 
put the possible conditions of certain general phenomena. In this way man 
becomes of the same type as the world. Here Sartre meets Heidegger who 
believes that the notions of the World and of "Human Reality" (Dasein) are 
inseparable. In order not to contradict itself Psychology, according to Sartre, 
should forget about the notion of a human reality and of a man, if ofcourse such 
a notion can exist (according to Sartre such a notion cannot exist).
All this criticism regarding the methodology, scope, and purposes of the 
human science called Psychology is not without a purpose: Sartre endeavours 
with such a criticism to evaluate the contribution that this science has made 
towards understanding the phenomena called emotions. The psychologists 
investigate emotions as "irreducible novelties" in relation to the other 
phenomena which fall within the scope of their science, such as attention, 
memory, perception, etc. These other phenomena, no matter how hard we try, 
will always remain with no essential connection with the phenomena of 
emotions, with the emotions called and diagnosed as such due to what 
psychologists take as indications (facts) from experience. In this way, we 
conclude from the psychological (scientific) study of emotions that emotions are 
first of all and in principle accidents. All investigations into the possible 
conditions of an emotion, of whether the very structure of human reality makes 
emotions possible, and how it makes them so, appears useless and absurd to 
psychologists: "what good is it to ask whether emotion is possible precisely 
because it is?"181
The limits and definition of emotive phenomena are delineated by the 
psychologist based on experience which is somehow guided and sorted out with
181 EOT, p. 193.
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the help of a mysterious "invisible hand" (since the criteria for such limitations 
and definitions are never very clear). Facts group themselves before the eyes of 
the psychologist and confirm his idea of what emotion is and what it is not. He 
starts with a principle of demarcation and experience confirms such a principle 
without raising any questions regarding its validity.182
What is at stake for the psychologist is the study of the isolated emotions: he 
determines the factors of the complex state of the emotions, and he isolates the 
relevant bodily reactions, behaviour, and state o f consciousness. Based on 
these he will formulate laws and offer explanations, uniting these three types of 
factors in an irreversible order. For example, the follower of the Intellectual 
Theory sets up a constant and irreversible succession between the inner state 
considered as antecedent and the physiological disturbances considered as 
consequents. On the other hand the follower of the Peripheric Theory who 
believes that "a mother is sad because she weeps" limits himself in the reverse 
order (he starts from the physiological disturbances and ends with the inner 
state).
What is important for our purposes is that the psychologist will never seek 
the explanation or the laws of emotion in the general and essential structures of 
human reality, but in the processes o f the emotion itself making even the fullest 
and most complete of the descriptions and explanations of the emotion under 
analysis a fact closed in on itself i.e., a fret which will not permit an 
understanding of anything outside factual experience, and which repels anything 
associated with what can be an essential reality of man.
Reacting to such a climate of explanatory difficulties and problems, Husserl 
put forward the thesis that essences and facts are incommensurable, and that 
one who begins his inquiry with frets will never arrive at essences. For example,
182 Ibid, p. 194.
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if one begins his inquiry with the facts which are at the basis of the arithmetic 
attitude of the man who counts and calculates, he shall never arrive at the 
reconstitution of the arithmetic essences of unity, number, and operation. On the 
contrary, Husserl and the Phenomenologists, while retaining the value of 
experience (through the motto of "back to the things themselves", and the 
method of eidetic intuition), they place emphasis on the experience of essences 
and values, and recognise that only essences alone permit us to classify and 
inspect the facts which are available to us. Since they have implicit recourse to 
the essence of emotion, they can distinguish better and more efficiently than the 
psychologists the facts of emotivity among the mass of psychic facts, they can 
prescribe the explicit recourse to it, and with concepts set up the content of this 
essence once and for all. In this way, the idea of man is ho longer an empirical 
concept and a product of historical generalisations, but, on the contrary, it 
acquires an ”a priori" essence of human beinghood, and thus it provides a 
somewhat solid basis for the generalisations of the psychologist. This priority o f 
phenomenology over psychology is evidenced also by the situation we are faced 
in each one of our psychic facts. The essential structure of our psychological life 
(or "psychic facts" as Sartre calls them) is nothing else but man's reaction 
against the world. As such, our psychological life assumes man and the world 
and it can take its true meaning only after these two notions have been 
sufficiently elucidated. Any psychological theory to be valid has to start by 
going beyond the psychic and man's situation in the world, to the very source of 
man, the world, and the psychic: the transcendental and consecutive 
consciousness, which we attain by "phenomenological reduction" ("putting the 
world in parentheses").
Husserl and the Phenomenologists, taking advantage of the absolute 
proximity of consciousness in relation to itself try to find in the transcendental 
field the essences which preside in it and try to fix them with accurate 
descriptions in the form of precise concepts. Facts do not enter into their
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investigations and analyses at this level, since not only they do not exist at this 
level, but even if they existed they would not have any recource to general 
hypotheses to clarify anything and thus they would produce nothing but 
confusion and chaos. In this way, emotion is studied as "a pure transcendental 
phenomenon", not through the investigation of particular emotions, but "by 
seeking to attain and elucidate the transcendental essence of emotion as an 
organised type of consciousness".183
Heidegger, wanting to illustrate this quite extraordinary inquiry into "the 
human reality" speaks for an "assumption" of self which each one of us humans 
undertakes once we realise that the existent under scrutiny is ours (us), and thus 
as creators of it we are responsible for it, being its own possibility, and 
"choosing" ourselves in our (and its) being. These Heideggerian thoughts show 
yet another facet of the psychologists' confusion; the psychologists try to 
investigate something by first sterilising and disinfecting it from what cannot be 
sterilised and disinfected: their own investigating selves. Heidegger tries to 
show with this "assumption" that all human reality implies an understanding of 
self however obscure this understanding may be. This is exactly what the 
psychologists try to avoid considering: "In effect, understanding is not a quality 
coming to human reality from the outside; it is its characteristic way of existing. 
Thus, the human reality which is I  assumes its own being by understanding it. 
This understanding is mine. I am, therefore, first, a being who more or less 
obscurely understands his reality as man which signifies that I make myself man 
in understanding myself as such. I may therefore interrogate myself and on the 
basis of this interrogation lead an analysis of the "human reality" to a successful 
conclusion which can be used as a foundation for an anthropology"184.
183 Ibid, p. 196.
184 By anthropology here Sartre means the totality of the Human Sciences, amongst them 
Psychology. Ibid, p. 197.
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This inquiry into our own human reality has nothing to do with introspection 
however; in introspection we only meet facts, and in the understanding of our 
own human reality there are no facts, and much explanation and clearing up 
("authentication") is needed before this understanding becomes less obscure and 
thus of any use for a proper psychological introspection. In all this we see a 
total and absolute reversal of the way of the psychologists: we start from the 
synthetic totality that is man and establish the essence of man before making a 
start in psychology.
In the realm of phenomenology what is studied is not the fact but the 
phenomenon, i.e., that which manifests itself and whose reality is appearance. 
Human reality, for Heidegger, exists only when it assumes its own being in an 
existential mode of understanding; for consciousness to exist is, in a similar way, 
to appear in the Husserlian sense of this word, i.e., to appear as a self­
manifestation whose being is not hidden (partially or totally), but consists and is 
totally exhausted in its appearances (actual and possible). In this way 
appearance becomes the absolute and it is the only thing which must be 
described and interrogated. And because in the Heideggerian theory, in every 
human attitude we shall find the whole of human reality, emotion becomes the 
human reality which assumes itself and which "aroused" "directs" itself toward 
the world. In parallel lines (but also in a somewhat different climate, since 
Husserl is an essentialist and not an existentialist), the Husserlian theory claims 
that any phenomenological description of emotion will make evident the 
essential structure of consciousness, since an emotion is precisely a 
consciousness. However, Phenomenology does not only differ in what it 
considers as worthy of investigation and its methodology: it differs also in the 
questions which considers as most important. For psychology, the question of 
whether there exist types of consciousness which do not include emotion as one 
of their possibilities is not only insignificant, but also irrelevant; for 
phenomenology however, the question of what exactly a consciousness must be
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in order for emotion to be possible or even necessary is of paramount 
importance and indicates one of the main concerns in any phenomenological 
inquiry regarding the human reality.185
Out of this and the fear psychologists have for signification, they mistrust 
Phenomenologists, and reduce all psychic states into accidental frets. For the 
phenomenologist this reduction is absurd, since every human fact is in essence 
significative, and if you remove its signification you remove its nature as a 
human fact.
This important difference between phenomenology and psychology on the 
importance they give to signification explains why the psychologists consider 
emotions as psychophysiological disorders.
For the psychologists, emotions are without any signification, and thus they 
are considered simply as accidental frets of a psychophysiological nature, with 
no consequence nor any meaning for the human being that has them. In this way 
emotions become something alien to the organism that has them, something 
coming "from the outside", an intruder of sorts that disturbs or creates a 
problem in its day to day maintenance.
For the Phenomenologists, because emotions are considered as having a 
signification, i.e., as true phenomena o f human consciousness warranting 
explanation and analysis of what they stand for as any other true phenomena of 
human consciousness, they must be studied not for the record keeping of the 
relevant psychophysiological frets, but to develop the signification of the 
relevant behaviour and of the affected consciousness so that the thing signified 
becomes explicit. And for the phenomenologist the thing signified is a particular 
human reality, expressing from a definite point of view the human synthetic
185 Ibid, pp. 198-199.
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totality in its entirety. However, making emotion a particular human reality does 
not reduce it to an effect of human reality, nor a description of a specific 
accumulation of facts. Emotion for the phenomenologist is the human reality 
itself in a specific form. It has its essence, its particular structures, its law of 
appearing, and its signification. Facts by themselves cannot describe such a 
reality nor an accumulation of them. There is no outside intervention or 
intrusion, "it is man who assumes his emotion, and consequently emotion is an 
organised form of human existence".186
In this way, psychology can only be subordinate to phenomenology, i.e., it 
can only claim completeness as a discipline which studies man in situations and 
in its explanations regarding man's psychic life in situations, only after the 
notions of man, world, being-in-the-worid, and situation have been fully 
elucidated by an anthropology, i.e., a phenomenology of man. And since such an 
anthropology is far from being achieved currently, psychology must regard 
emotions and other psychic (psychological) events in human life as not only 
corporeal phenomena, but as "assumptions" of human reality by a specific man, 
conferring a significatory meaning on its corporeal manifestations. This can only 
be done if the consciousness which gives this significatory role on the corporeal 
phenomena has been interrogated frilly for the meaning of such phenomena, 
since specific emotions are what they are only insofar as they appear as such 
(e.g. joy as joy, sadness as sadness), and the meaning and characterisations of 
their appearance can only be described accurately by the consciousness which 
creates them.187
This change in the way psychology looks at emotions and other psychic 
(psychological) phenomena has as a consequence the shift of emphasis and 
attention from what has been previously accepted as the only methods of
186 Ibid, p.200.
187 Ibid, p.201.
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inductive introspection and external empirical observation, to the now necessary 
eidetic method of grasping and fixing the essence of phenomena. These changes 
however, will not mean the transformation of psychology into a phenomenology 
of sorts; psychology's aim can not be the thing signified as such, i.e., the human 
reality, since it is not the eidetic science par excellence which is 
phenomenology. The aim of psychology now can only be the phenomenon 
insofar as it is significative.
To the claim that the psychologist and in general any scientist of human 
behaviour becomes in this way some sort of a linguist, Sartre notes that the 
linguist studies a word such as for example "proletariat" insofar as it signifies 
this word (proletariat) and he will not enter into an investigation of the 
vicissitudes of the world as a carrier o f signification. In other words, the linguist 
is interested only in words only insofar as they signify themselves, in isolation, 
away from all function they may have as a behaviour of sorts for the individual 
who utters them or the society that uses them. Psychology and the other human 
sciences study human phenomena and their significations within specific 
vicissitudes of the world, man and man-being-in-the-worid carrying specific 
forms of significations.
What Sartre tried to prove with such an analysis of the aims and 
methodology of psychology is only that human reality appears to the 
psychologist as a collection of miscellaneous data because he has readily taken a 
point of view from which reality had to appear to him as such. For proving that 
emotion and other forms of human reality are significative phenomena, Sartre 
has to enter into the grounds of phenomenological psychology and treat 
emotion as a phenomenon.
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Sartre's Critique of the Classical Theories of the Emotions: James and 
Janet.
In a Chapter entitled "The Classical Theories" in his work on the Emotions188 
Sartre reviews his current literature and psychological, psychiatric, and psycho­
physiological work which he considers relevant to his attempt to prove that 
emotions are significative phenomena.
He starts with the Peripheric Theory of the Emotions, and the criticisms that 
it attracted summed up in the work of William James on the Emotions.189
As we have already noted, the Peripheric Theory of the Emotions came as an 
opposition to the Intellectual Theory of the Emotions or the postulation of a 
constant and irreversible succession between the inner state considered as 
antecedent and the physiological disturbances considered as consequents. The 
Peripheric Theory claimed that such a succession is a myth and that we should 
seek the explanation and the laws of emotion in the processes of the emotion 
itself position which is encapsulated in the phrase "a mother is sad because she 
weeps". We saw that Sartre rejects this Theory (the Peripheric) together with 
the Intellectual Theory, because both, in their own way, attempt to reduce 
emotions to frets. He saw in both of these theories attempts of psychologists to 
make emotions abnormal states in our psychic life, and de-signify them by 
reducing our psychic world and important decisions for our existence in the 
world to a collection of empirical facts.
The criticisms that Sartre cites against the Peripheric Theory of Emotions can 
be grouped in the following worries: How can we grant that commonplace
188 EOT, pp.203-215.
189 Mainly in WJames, "What is an Emotion?*, Mind, 1884; WJames, The Principles of 
Psychology. New York, 1890; also see W.B. Cannon, "The James-Lange theory of emotion: a 
critical examination and an alternative theory", American Journal o f Psychology, 39 (1927), 
pp. 106-24.
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organic reactions can account for qualified psychic states? How can 
modifications which are qualitative in their own right, correspond to other 
qualitative series of states which are irreducible among them? As an example of 
such worries he brings the problem of joy and anger; if the physiological 
modifications which correspond to anger differ only in their intensity from those 
which correspond to joy (as some proponents of the Peripheric Theory 
maintain) then why is anger, insofar as it presents itself to consciousness, not 
more intense joy? Even in the pathological case of "idiots" who pass from joy to 
anger while rocking on a bench and accelerating their rocking the "idiot" who is 
angry is not "ultra joyful"; even if he has passed from joy to anger very fast and 
continuously, anger is not reducible to joy.
Sartre sums up these worries against the Peripheric Theory of the Emotion 
by citing William James' distinction between two groups of phenomena in 
emotion, a group of physiological phenomena and a group of psychological 
phenomena, and James' thesis that the state of consciousness called "joy", 
"anger", etc., is nothing other than the consciousness of physiological 
manifestations- their projection in consciousness. The critics of James' 
examination of emotions as states of consciousness and their relevant 
physiological manifestations, do not recognise some sort of projection or a 
shadow cast in consciousness from the physiology. They find in consciousness 
not only something more but also something else. They find something more 
because one can, in imagination, push bodily disorders to the limit, and still not 
be able to understand why the corresponding consciousness would be a 
terrorised consciousness. Terror is an extremely painful, even unbearable, state, 
and it is inconceivable that a bodily state perceived for and in itself should 
appear to consciousness with this frightful character. The critics however, find 
also that emotion is something else, something radically different from 
physiological manifestations. Even if emotion perceived objectively presents 
itself as a physiological disorder, insofar as it is a fact it is not at all a disorder or
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an utter chaos. It has a meaning and a signification, and not as a pure quality of 
sorts, i.e., it exists in a certain relationship of our psychic being to the world, 
which cannot be described in terms of a possession of some kind of quality. This 
relationship of our psychic being with the world together with the consciousness 
of this relationship is an organised and describable structure of specific meaning 
and signification.
Even elaborate accounts of physiological and anatomical details, showing 
how specific neurological centres such as the cortico-thalamic area etc. are 
responsible for the appearance and development of emotions, fall short of 
reaching an answer of how a physiological disturbance, whatever it may be, can 
account for the organised character of emotion.190
This is exactly what, according to Sartre, Janet191 "understood quite well, but 
expressed unfortunately, when he said that James, in his description of emotion, 
lacked the psychic"192. Janet, having a desire to be as objective as possible, 
recorded only the external manifestations o f emotion. But even in the 
observation o f these external manifestations of emotions, he had to class the 
observed phenomena into two categories, psychic phenomena or behaviour, and 
physiological phenomena. Janet, wishing to restore to the psychic its 
preponderant role, made emotion a matter o f behaviour. Janet however, was 
caught into the trap of fact-finding psychologism and emphasised the 
appearance of disorder which all emotion presents. In this way, he made 
emotion a less well adapted behaviour, a behaviour o f disadaptation, a 
behaviour arising from a setback of sorts: when the task at hand is too difficult
190 Sartre refers to Sherrington, see C.S., Sherrington, "Experiments on the value erf vascular 
and visceral factors for the genesis of emotion", Proceedings o f the Royal Society, 66 (1900), 
pp.390-403.
191 Pierre Janet, 1859-1947, French psychiatrist, Professor of Experimental and Comparative 
Psychology at the College de France, very influential in German, Austrian, and French 
psychiatric and psychological circles.
192 Ibid, p.205.
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and we cannot maintain the superior behaviour which would be suitable to it, 
the psychic energy liberated is spent in maintaining an inferior behaviour which 
requires a lesser physiological tension.
Sartre at this point cites many examples from the plethora of examples which 
are analysed in Janet's books and mainly in Obsession and Psychasthenicr793. 
Amongst them the most common is the one found in a discussion and serious 
disagreement with a friend, where we remain calm as long as the contest seems 
equal, and become irritated the very moment we find nothing more to answer.
With such analyses Janet, according to Sartre, reintegrated the psychic into 
emotion: the consciousness which we take of emotion (and which is not an 
epiphenomenon, but only a secondary behaviour- "a behaviour of behaviour'') is 
no longer the simple correlative physiological disorder, it is the consciousness 
(behaviour) of a setback and a setback-behaviour. Such a theory is certainly a 
psychological thesis and has a quite mechanistic simplicity: "the phenomenon of 
derivation is nothing more than a change of path for freed nervous energy" .194
But even with such a reintegration of the psychic into emotion that Janet's 
theory provides, the theory is still problematic according to Sartre. Janet is using 
implicitly with the notion of a setback-behaviour a finality which is not only 
obscure, but which is also rejected by his theory. If Janet means by "setback-' 
behaviour" the automatic substitution of one (inferior) behaviour for a superior 
behaviour that we cannot maintain, then nervous energy could discharge itself at 
random and in accordance with the law of the least resistance, making the 
ensemble of the active reactions an absence of behaviour, a diffuse organic 
reaction and a disorder in place of an adapted reaction. This is exactly what 
James says about emotion!
193 Pierre Janet, Les Obsessions et la psychasthenie, Paris, 1903.
194 Ibid, pp.206-207.
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James gives to emotion the role of an ensemble of disorders which is brought 
about in the organism at the moment of an abrupt disadaptation. Of course, 
Janet gives more emphasis to the setback than James does. But if one is to take 
"setback" for an automatic derivation in an individual as a system of behaviour, 
then "setback”, as a behaviour, stands for a diffuse ensemble of organic 
manifestations. If "setback" is to have its full psychic signification, then one has 
to add to Janet's theory a foreign element such as the notion of consciousness 
which must intervene and confer this signification upon this ensemble, keeping 
the superior behaviour as a possibility, and grasping emotion precisely as a 
setback in relation to the superior behaviour. It is this notion of consciousness 
however, that Janet did not want to have in his theory at any price.
In feet, Sartre sees in MWallon195 the views of Janet as they would be 
acceptable to James. Wallon offers a model of psychological-physiological 
constitution such as this: the child as soon as it is bom formulates primitive 
organic reactions-adaptations as primitive behavioural systems with inherited 
elements. The more it grows it learns and realises new set-ups, new systems. 
But when, in a new and difficult situation, it cannot find the adapted behaviour 
that is suitable, it returns to the primitive one. Wallon's theory differs from that 
of James only on the new element of an organic unity which would connect all 
the emotive manifestations. James would accept this theory if it had been proven 
at his time, since Wallon's modifications are modifications of a strictly 
physiological order. In this way, Wallon, being a most apt theoretical bridge 
between James and Janet, proves the failure of Janet to reintroduce the 
"psychic" into emotion. Janet does not explain why there are various forms of 
setback-behaviour, and almost all of his analysed examples come back to slightly 
differentiated emotional upheavals (sobs, hysteria etc.) which are much closer to 
what is properly called emotional shock than to qualified emotion.
195 MWallon, article in Revue des Cours et Conferences, other details unknown.
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But Sartre finds that in some places in Janet’s works there is an element of 
finality in emotion, i.e., the setback behaviour is not purely automatic, but it 
becomes an object of choice. Sartre accuses Janet of confusing these two 
interpretations of emotion, and notes that only the interpretation of emotion 
with the element of finality can be called properly a psychological theory of the 
emotions, since it sees emotional behaviour as not a disorder but as an organised 
means aiming at an end. A variation in this emotional behaviour represents a 
particular subterfuge, a special trick, each one of them being a different means 
of eluding a difficulty.
Sartre, in a rather lengthy quotation from P. Guillaume's Psychology of 
Form.196 gives what can be acceptable from Janet's theory in "the pure theory of 
emotion-behaviour".197 Guillaume, utilising the work of Lewin19* and 
T.Dembo199 found that in a simple psychological test where it is impossible for 
one to achieve the specified goal there arises a variety of emotional responses, 
relative to the positive attraction of the goal and the negative attraction of the 
given barrier. An act of replacement or substitution (ersatz) of the barrier is 
involved, either by the subject's act of freeing himself from some of the imposed 
conditions and the nature of his task, or with the help of unreal, symbolic acts 
such as a specified behaviour (vain gesture), a re-description of the 
act/goal/task, or an imagination of fantastic, fictitious procedures outside of the 
real/imposed conditions which would permit its being accomplished.
If the acts o f replacement or substitution are impossible or if they do not 
produce sufficient resolution, the persistent tension manifests itself by the 
tendency to give up, to run away, or to retire into oneself in an attitude of
196 P. Guillaume's Psychology of Form, Bib. de Philosophie scientifique, pp. 138-142.
197 Sartre, EOT, 210-212.
198 Lewin, "Vorsatz, Wille und Bedurfiiis”, Psy.Forschung, VII, 1926.
199 T. Dembo, "Dcr Aerger als dynamisches Problem'', Psy. Forschung, 1931, pp. 1-144.
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passivity. Since the subject has agreed to subject himself to the positive 
attraction of the goal and the negative attraction of the barrier, he has also 
conferred a negative value on all other items in the field of his attention, so that 
all diversions foreign to the task are ipso facto impossible.
The subjects under such conditions see escape as a "brutal" solution since 
they have to break the general barrier and accept a diminution of the self (the 
breaking of their promises to keep the rules of the test). They also see 
withdrawing into themselves, their encystment, an act which raises a protective 
barrier between the hostile field and the self, as an equally feeble solution.
If we continue the test we will see the subjects get tangled in conditions of 
emotional disorders, which form yet other more primitive forms of the freeing of 
tensions. An example of such a condition for an emotional disorder is the 
appearance of violent anger. In an extreme simplification, in anger and in 
general all other emotions, there is a weakening of the barriers which 
separate the deep and die superficial layers of the self and which normally 
assure control of actions by the deep personality and the mastery of the 
self; a weakening of the barriers between the real and the unreal.200
From the feet that our chosen action is blocked, tensions between the 
external and the internal continue to increase, transforming all other items in our 
field of attention and giving them a negative character. The privileged direction 
o f the goal having disappeared, the differentiation between negative and positive 
items in our field o f attention is destroyed. Particular fects and the varied 
physiological reactions which are associated or even identified with emotions by 
psychologists, can have a signification and this signification can be intelligible 
only on the basis of this combined conception of the topology of emotion.
200 Sartre, ibid, p.212.
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Sartre sees in Guillaume's account a functional conception of anger: anger is 
not an instinct* nor a habit, nor a reasoned calculation; it is an abrupt solution of 
a conflict which assimilates Janet's distinction between superior and inferior (or 
derived) behaviour, and which takes on the full meaning of such a distinction by 
making the inferior behaviour an object of our choice when we choose to make 
fewer our needs and satisfy ourselves with less expense. Being unable, in the 
state of high tension, to find a delicate and precise solution to a problem we act 
upon ourselves, we lower ourselves, and we transform ourselves so that we can 
be satisfied with "crude" and less well adapted solutions (for example we shout 
or tear up a letter, stating the problem).
In the cases of emotional disorders, the subjects choose to avoid a well- 
adapted behaviour and resort to fits of hysteria etc., because in this way they 
will avoid coming face to face and providing information about the "heavy and 
undifferentiated pressure" which the world exerts upon them. In the cases of our 
anger at the moment when we are unable to provide an acceptable reply, the 
anger occurs due to our goal to "conquer" our opponent and our choice to use 
"derived" (<ersatze) means to achieve our goal: instead of witticism as a reply to 
the witticism of our opponent, we choose to intimidate and inspire fear to him, 
through the use of abuse and threats, which are equivalents for the witticism we 
could not find.
But even with this transformation of Janet's theory found in the theory of 
Guillaume, the theory still leaves much to be desired. In particular, the problem 
with Guillaume's theory is that it cannot give an account of what exactly it is 
that breaks the one form and forms the other (e.g., what destroys the one goal 
and creates the other, or what chooses to employ these means instead of other). 
Guillaume, according to Sartre, M ed to notice that an entity such as a 
consciousness, which alone, by its synthetic activity, can break and reconstitute 
forms ceaselessly, can also account for the finality of emotioa Emotion as "a
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 188
weakening of the barriers between the real and the unreal", as a destruction of 
the differentiated structure which the problem has imposed upon the field, and 
as a transformation of a given connection between the world and the self can 
only be accounted fully through the recourse to consciousness.
In this way, Sartre has led us in this examination of the Classical Theories of 
Emotion from the physiological theory of James to Janet's theory and distinction 
between superior and inferior behaviour, and then to the functional theory of 
emotion-form. In all these theories we saw that the one led to another by their 
very inadequacies in explaining fully the phenomenon of emotion, and we also 
saw that any such explanation has to have a recourse to consciousness, in order 
to account for the finality in emotion.
Sartre can start now with the very phenomenon of consciousness in order to 
elucidate how it accounts for the finality o f the emotions. But first, we have to 
see Sartre's critique of the alternative source for the finality and the signification 
of the emotions, that o f the psychoanalytic unconscious.
Sartre's Critique of the Psychoanalytic Theory.
After the analysis and critique that we saw Sartre exercising on the Classical 
Theories of the Emotions as represented by the work of empirical psychology 
and psychiatry, we can easily guess the main points of his attack on 
psychoanalysis.201
Sartre immediately points out that the psychoanalysts throw to the 
unconscious the organising theme of the emotion, disassociating the total 
organised character of the emotion, and granting it an inevitable character.
201 Ibid, pp.216-222.
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Phobias become in psychoanalysis refusals to re-live memories, anger becomes a 
symbolic gratification of sexual tendencies or a possible signification of sadism. 
Leaving aside the validity of such significations, Sartre questions the very 
principle of psychoanalytic explanation.
According to Sartre, the psychoanalytic interpretation considers the very 
phenomenon of consciousness as the symbolic realisation of a desire repressed 
by censorship. However, for consciousness this repressed desire does not exist 
in its symbolic realisation; it only exists for consciousness as what it appears to 
be: an emotion, a desire for sleep, theft, a phobia of something etc. If we had 
consciousness of (even a glimpse of) the symbolic realisation as symbolic 
realisation, then we would have to be dishonest (granted that we exhibit 
behaviour appropriate to what it appears to us as our desire). In psychoanalysis, 
the signification of our conscious behaviour is entirely external to the behaviour 
exhibited, since the thing signified is entirely cut off from the thing signifying. 
Only the psychoanalyst can decipher with appropriate techniques the 
signification of a given behaviour, as an archaeologist and linguist deciphers an 
ancient and forgotten language. The bond of causality and signification that 
unites the exhibited behaviour (the thing signifying) with the repressed desire 
(the thing signified) will only be perceived, recognised and identified once the 
necessary technical knowledge is applied.
Now, can we accept that consciousness o f a given behaviour is a thing in 
relation to its signification? That is, can we accept that signification comes to 
consciousness from without, from an entity other than consciousness? If we 
accept this, then we have to admit that consciousness is established as a 
signification without itself being conscious of the signification which it 
establishes. There is an apparent contradiction here, and the only way for this 
contradiction not to exist is to make consciousness a thing, to renounce entirely
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all Cartesian intuitions about the Cogito, and make consciousness a secondary 
and passive phenomenon.
If on the other hand, consciousness makes itself and does not exist merely as 
a thing, then it always is what it appears to be, and any signification that it 
possesses is contained in itself as a structure of consciousness. However, 
according to Sartre, even if this signification is contained as a structure in 
consciousness, this does not mean that it has to be perfectly explicit. One can 
accept many degrees of consideration and clarity. It only means that the 
signification comes from within, in it. If we accept the Cartesian Cogito and if 
its possibility is taken for granted, then consciousness itself is "the fact, the 
signification, and the thing signifiedV202
Sartre acknowledges that even though his other opponents (the proponents 
of the Classical Theories of the Emotions) were relatively easily refuted, the 
refutation of Psychoanalysis is more difficult, due to the conviction of the 
psychoanalysts that the signification is not being conferred upon consciousness 
from without.
For the psychoanalyst there is always an internal analogy between the 
conscious fact and the desire which it expresses, since the conscious fact 
symbolises by means o f the complex which is expressed, and this symbolisation 
is constitutive of the conscious fact itself. This is perfectly acceptable to all 
those who believe in the absolute value of the Cartesian Cogito (like Sartre 
himself). Now, if symbolisation is constitutive of consciousness, it is permissible 
to perceive that there is an immanent bond of comprehension between the 
symbolisation and the symbol. In this way, there is nothing "behind" 
consciousness and the relation between symbol, thing symbolised, and 
symbolisation is an interstructural bond of consciousness (with the only possible
202 Ibid, p.220.
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point of dispute being what exactly structure of consciousness is consciousness 
constituted o f in symbolisation).203
The problem arises for Sartre on the psychoanalytic thesis that consciousness 
symbolises under the causal pressure of a transcendent fact which is the 
repressed desire. This thesis makes the same mistake as the previously described 
theory, it makes of consciousness a secondary and passive phenomenon, 
allowing for the signification (symbolisation now) to take place in a non- 
conscious mode (in the psychoanalytic theory, it makes the relation of the thing 
signified to the thing which signifies a causal relation). According to Sartre, it is 
"the profound contradiction of all psychoanalysis to introduce both a bond o f 
causality and a bond o f comprehension between the phenomena which it 
studies" and he is convinced that "these two types o f connection are 
incompatible”.204
In addition, to promote these two bonds further, and as an expression of 
them, the psychoanalytic theoretician establishes transcendent bonds of rigid 
causality between the facts studied (for example, in dreams, a pin cushion 
always signifies a woman's breasts etc.), while the practitioner tries to get 
successful results by studying the facts of consciousness in comprehension, that 
is, the intra-conscious relationship between symbolisation and symbol (and not 
thing symbolised, symbolisation, symbol; as it was mentioned earlier, the 
relation o f thing-symbolised and symbol is one of causality primarily and 
consciousness secondarily).
Sartre accepts the results of psychoanalysis when they are obtained by 
comprehension. What he rejects is the value and intelligibility of the 
psychoanalytic theory o f psychic causality. What Sartre forces the psychoanalyst
203 Ibid
204 Ibid, pp.220-221, my bold and italics.
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to recognise is that since he uses comprehension as a psychoanalytic tool to 
interpret consciousness he should recognise as well that everything that takes 
place in consciousness must receive its explanation only from consciousness 
itself: "it is consciousness which makes /tee//* consciousness, being moved to do 
so by the needs of an inner signification".205
The psychoanalysts however, have a come-back here. They can offer 
problems for Sartre's theory as well. Sartre recognises this and puts forward 
their problems in accepting his theory so that he can answer them in his "Sketch 
for a Phenomenological Theory" (the following chapter). The problems have as 
follows:
i) If consciousness organises emotion as a certain type of response adapted to 
an exterior situation, how does it come about that it does not have 
consciousness of this adaptation? The importance of this question is evident 
from the start, since the psychoanalytic theory has no such problems in the 
union of signification and consciousness.
ii) Also, if consciousness organises emotion as a certain type of response 
adapted to an exterior situation, why in most cases do we struggle as a 
conscious spontaneity against the development of emotional manifestations (in 
mastering our fears, calming our anger etc.)? It seems that not only we do not 
have consciousness of the finality of emotion, but we repress emotion with ail 
our strength, as it invades us in spite of ourselves.
In the final chapter of his small book on the Emotions, entitled "A Sketch of 
a Phenomenological Theory", Sartre starts by pointing out yet another fallacy of 
the psychologists and the theorists which he has described up to now: they think 
that the consciousness o f an emotion is first a reflective consciousness, that is, 
as if the first form of the emotion as a fact o f consciousness appears to us as a
205 Ibid, p.221.
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modification of our psychic being and is perceived as a state o f consciousness. 
Indeed, many theorists take consciousness of emotion as the affective structure 
o f consciousness, as when we say "I'm angry, I’m afraid etc.".
What these theorists do not see however, is that fear is not originally 
consciousness o f  being afraid, any more than the perception of this book in 
front of me while working in the word processor is consciousness o f  perceiving 
the book.
Emotional consciousness is at first unreflective and on this plane it can be 
conscious of itself only on the non-positional mode: "Emotional consciousness 
is, at first, consciousness o f  the world".206
This issue, for Sartre, is so evident, that any need for a theoretical support is 
superfluous.207 Observations of everyday life such as our behaviour when we are 
afraid is more than enough; in these everyday cases we are afraid o f something, 
even when in those indefinite anxieties which we experience in the dark, in a 
sinister and deserted passageway, we are afraid of certain aspects o f the night or 
the world. Almost all of the psychologists have noted that emotion is set in 
motion by a perception, a representation-signal etc., but instead of enlarging on 
this, they think that the emotion then withdraws from the object in order to be 
absorbed into itself. It escapes their attention that the emotion returns to the 
object at every moment and is fed  there. For example, the psychologists 
describe the flight in a state of fear as if the object were not a flight from a 
certain object, as if the object fled did not remain constantly present in the flight 
itself, as its theme, its reason for being, that from which one flees. It also 
escapes their attention that we can not talk about anger in which one strikes,
206 EOT, p.223.
207 Ibid.
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 194
injures, and threatens, without mentioning the person who represents the 
objective unity of these insults, threats, and blows.
For Sartre, "the affected subject and the affective object are bound in an 
indissoluble synthesis" and in this way emotion becomes "a certain way o f 
apprehending the world* 202 From the psychologists he has mentioned in this 
work, Sartre sees only Dembo as having noticed this, although as he points out, 
Dembo gives no explanation for it.209
To analyse the example of anger, in yet another way, the subject who seeks a 
solution of a practical problem is outside in the world, perceiving the world 
every moment through his acts. His irritation in his failure to achieve a solution 
is a way in which the world appears to him; and between the action which is not 
carried out (the solution which is not reached) and the anger, it is not necessary 
for the subject to reflect back upon his behaviour. According to Sartre there can 
be a continuous passage from the unreflective consciousness "world-acted" 
(action) to the unreflective consciousness "world-hateful" (anger), without the 
mediation of a reflexive consciousness, with the second unreflective 
consciousness being a direct transformation o f the other.210
This view of Sartre may seem strange to most action theorists who believe 
that action is a constant passing from the unreflective to the reflective, from the 
world to ourselves. For these theorists, we first perceive the problem 
(unreflectiveness-consciousness o f the world), then we perceive ourselves as 
having the problem to solve (reflection); on the basis of this reflection we 
conceive an action insofar as it ought to be carried on by us (reflection), and 
then we go into the world to carry out the action (unreflective), no longer 
considering anything but the object acted upon, till new difficulties, or partial
208 Ibid, p.224.
209 Ibid.
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checks which might require a restriction of adaptation send us again to the 
reflective plane. In this way, action is constituted by "a constant going and 
coming".211
Sartre accepts this account as one of the possible analyses of our acting in 
the world. But he points out that most often an operation on the universe is 
carried out without the subject's leaving the unreflective plane. And this is not 
due to habit: habit can make us act with a specific series of acts in a specific 
order (e.g. writing particular words in a particular order), and it cannot explain 
the somewhat original everyday actions such as writing. The series of acts called 
writing cannot be termed unconscious; they are in their totality a present 
structure of our consciousness, only they are not conscious o f themselves. 
While writing, we take an active consciousness o f the words insofar as they are 
created ("bom under my pen" as Sartre says, ibid); we do not take them into 
account as being written by us. We intuitively grasp the words insofar as they 
have the structural quality of being created ex nihilo, of not being created by 
themselves, of being passively created. We wait creatively for the hand to write 
the word that we know, and expect to realise itself. But not in a way that we are 
conscious of the words being created while looking over the shoulder of 
someone else writing.
The essential difference between these two forms of waiting is the fact that 
my intuitive apprehension of what my neighbour is writing is of the type called 
"probable evidence". I perceive the words which his hand forms well in advance 
of its having completely formed them, through an intuitive perception, and the 
word is given as a probable reality (in the same manner as a table or a chair in 
front of me).212 In opposition to this, our intuitive perception of the words 
which we are writing delivers them to us as certain, in a somewhat special sense
211 Ibid, p.225.
212 See Sartre, ibid, p.226.
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of certainty: they are not certain in that they will come out for certain, but only 
that if they appear, they will appear as such. In this way for Sartre "the action 
constitutes a class o f certain objects in a probable world* (ibid, italics and bold 
mine). These objects, insofar as they are real, future objects, they are probable 
(since they have not occurred), but insofar as they are potentialities of the world 
(since, again, they have not yet fully occurred), they are certain (since they 
occur in intention).
Another difference is on whether these two kinds of waiting are making 
demands on us or not. The words which my neighbour is writing make no 
demands: we contemplate them only in their order of successive appearance as 
we would look at a table or a clothes-hanger. In opposition, the words which 
we write are exigencies: the very way we perceive them constitutes them in 
their appearance as potentialities having to be realised (demanding to be 
realised), only this demand is not directed at us, it just exists, and we feel it. As 
Sartre puts it: "The /  does not appear here at all. I simply sense the traction 
which they exert. I  feel their exigence objectively. I see them realising 
themselves and at the same time demanding to be realised farther*.2*3 We may 
think that the words that our neighbour is forming are demanding their 
realisation from him. But we do not fe d  this exigence. We do feel the exigence 
of what we write and it is directly present to us: "They tug at my hand and guide 
it. But not in the manner of live and active little demons who might actually 
push and tug at it; they have a passive exigence?.214 Our hand is seen (and felt) 
as an instrument by which the words realise themselves; it is an object in the 
world and at the same time present, lived, and felt. Any hesitation in the writing 
process or doubt, is just a conflict between rival potentialities. Action as 
spontaneous unreflective consciousness constitutes a certain existential level in
213 Ibid, p.227, my bold and italics.
214 Ibid, my bold and italics.
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the world, and in order to act it is not necessary to be conscious of the self as 
acting.
However, unreflective behaviour is not unconscious behaviour; it is 
conscious of itself non-thetically; it would be thetically conscious of itself if "it 
transcended itself and seized upon the world as a quality of things" (ibid) (i.e., it 
saw in things the behaviour demanded from a specific subject, me). In this way, 
according to Sartre, one can draw up a "hodologicaT' map of our environment, 
based and varied according to our acts and needs. In normal and adapted action, 
the objects "to be realised" have the appearance of having to be realised in 
certain and specified ways. The means to realise these objects appear as 
potentialities which demand existence. In this way, the world around us 
(German's umwelt), the world of our desires, our needs, and our acts, appears 
determined "as if it were furrowed with strict and narrow paths which lead to 
one or the other determined end, that is, to the appearance of a created 
object".215 We have a pragmadsde intuition o f the determinism o f this world 
when we apprehend the means to realise an object as the only possible way to 
reach the end (or if there are n means, as the only n possible means, etc.). 
Variation in the given paths is given by the decoys and traps which are scattered 
around here and there throughout our umwelt.
This world (our umwelt) is difficult. The difficulty of the world does not 
depend on our consciousness: it is not a reflective notion which would imply a 
relationship to us. It is there, on the world; it is a quality of the world which is 
given in its perception, in the same way that the above described paths towards 
the potentialities and the potentialities themselves and the exigencies of objects 
are given (e.g., books having to be read, etc.). This difficulty is according to
215 Ibid, p.228.
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Sartre "the noematical correlative of our activity whether undertaken or only 
conceived".216
From this phenomenological description of our situation in our world (our 
umwelt) we can easily understand what an emotion is. Emotion is a 
transformation o f the world. When the paths (means or ways to realise objects 
and ends) become too difficult, or when we see no path, we can no longer live 
in so urgent and difficult a world. Even though all the ways are barred, we must 
act. So we change the world, we live as if the connection between things and 
their potentialities were ruled not by deterministic processes, but by magic.217
However, this change is not a game nor is it an object of reflection, nor is it 
carried out with the consciousness that it is something we do. It is not a game, 
because we cannot help ourselves in not playing it: "we are driven against a 
wall, and we throw ourselves into this new attitude with all the strength we can 
muster" (ibid). It is not self-conscious nor the object of reflection, because "it is 
the seizure of new connections and new exigencies"218 At the moment we seize 
an object as an impossible to get hold of or to be achieved object, or when an 
object gives rise to a tension which cannot be sustained, our consciousness 
simply seizes or tries to seize it otherwise. We are familiar with such a change 
when we look at a picture which has no clear lines and forms, and subsequently 
are told that in there we shall find the form of an animal or something else we 
are familiar with. We immediately disregard our previous confusion and 
frustration and "see" the animal or our familiar something.
According to Sartre, "through a change o f intendon, as in a change o f 
behaviour, we apprehend a new object, or an old object in a new way" (ibid, 
bold and italics mine), and this change is done unreflectively. The connection
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid, p.229.
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between intention, behaviour, and the change in apprehension is not accidental 
here, nor in the very similar case of the emotions. These three are connected as 
follows: the impossibility of finding a solution to the problem objectively 
apprehended as a quality of the world serves as a motivation for the new 
unreflective consciousness; this new unreflective consciousness now perceives 
the world otherwise and with a new aspect, requiring a new behaviour through 
which this aspect is perceived and which serves as hyle for the new intention.
In the case of emotive behaviour, the difference lies in that it is not effective. 
its end is not to act upon the object, but only to confer upon it another quality, a 
lesser (or greater) existence or presence. According to Sartre "in emotion it is 
the body which, directed by consciousness, changes its relations with the world 
in order that the world may change its qualities'*.219 Sartre's attitude toward the 
emotions can be easily summed up in his celebrated phrase: "If emotion is a 
joke, it is a joke we believe in" (ibid, italics, bold mine). To understand this 
phrase, one has only to bring into his mind the situation he brought himself in 
when he had to change his mind about the desirability of a specific object once 
he realised he could not have it (an example exists in Aesop's story about the 
fox and the hard to reach grapes). It is as if we were playing a theatrical play, 
and better, a comedy on ourselves, from one hand allowing ourselves to want 
something very much and attempt, unreflectively, to get hold of it, and from the 
other to try to convince ourselves of its undesirability. This magical and 
incantatory ability we have to change the quality of the impossible to get hold of 
item of our environment allows us to boost the half-seriousness of the comedy 
we play on ourselves, and when the situation is more urgent, believe in the 
effectiveness of our incantations, and thus have emotion.
219 Ibid, p.230, bold, italics mine.
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Sartre pays special attention in his analysis of examples of emotions; he 
distinguishes between passive and active fear, passive and active sadness.220 The 
maladapted fainting from fear in the face of extreme danger (passive fear) is a 
behaviour of escape. Fainting is a refuge into the dream consciousness, an 
"unrealizing" consciousness, risen from the need to annihilate normal methods 
and the deterministic links which cannot be accepted. According to Sartre, all 
those who think that the physiological behaviour of passive fear is pure disorder, 
miss the point that this behaviour represents the abrupt realisation of the bodily 
conditions which ordinarily accompany the transition from being awake to 
sleeping.
On the other hand, all those who believe that active fear is rational behaviour 
miss the point that active fear is not prudence; it is an attempt to distance 
ourselves (psychically if not physically) from the dangerous object. With the 
flight, fainting is enacted; the magical behaviour which consists of denying the 
dangerous object with our whole body by subverting the vectorial structure of 
the space we live in comes about by abruptly creating a potential direction on 
the other side. In this way we forget the danger.
In this way, the true meaning o f an emotion such as fear is that it is a 
consciousness which, through magical behaviour, aims at denying an object of 
the external world, and which will go so far as to annihilate itself (if not actually, 
at least symbolically) in order to annihilate the object with it.
In the case of passive sadness (behaviour of seclusion, oppression, muscular 
resolution, pallor, coldness at the extremities, silence, solitude etc.), we find 
very rarely the occasion where someone really cherishes and utilises fully his 
time of grief to meditate profoundly upon it. In most o f the cases of passive 
sadness we find that one of the ordinary conditions of our action has
220 Ibid, pp.231-236.
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disappeared, and that the world nevertheless requires that we act in it and on it 
without that condition. With the exception of this condition that has changed, 
the world with its potentialities (of which only a very small percentage has also 
changed), that is, the tasks to do, the people to see, acts of daily life to carry out 
etc., have remained the same. The problem for us arises however, in that the 
means of realising the old potentialities (the ones we are used to realise), the 
ways which cut through our "hodological space" have changed, and we do not 
want them changed, and not only we do not want them changed, but we do not 
want ourselves to recognise and believe that they are changed. According to 
Sartre "sadness aims at eliminating the obligation to seek new ways, to 
transform the structure of the world by a totally undifferentiated structure".221 
This totally undifferentiated structure refers to the previously longed for and 
desired objects, which with sadness acquire an affectively neutral reality, and 
which allows them to be considered as perfectly equivalent and interchangeable. 
This neutralisation of the desired objects through sadness occurs due to our lack 
in power and will to accomplish the acts we had been planning through new 
ways of realisation. The neutralisation helps us in our behaviour of sadness since 
through this neutralisation the universe no longer requires anything of us.
According to Sartre in passive sadness we acquire two main attitudes (which 
are and the two usual forms of passive sadness), the one which forces us to "dim 
the light" and has as its noematic correlative"Gloom", and the other forces us to 
"withdraw into ourselves" and has as its noematic correlative "Refuge". In this 
way, when we find ourselves in passive sadness, we usually look for a dark 
corner in the no longer demanding universe which can be our comer, "a bit of 
darkness which hides its gloomy immensity from us".222
221 Ibid, p.233, my bold and italics.
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Active sadness according to Sartre can take many forms. Hysteria in the face 
of a confession we do not want to make, is a "Refusal'. Again here we see a 
negative behaviour which aims at denying the urgency of certain problems and 
substituting others. We do not want to make a confession or we want to make it 
in a different environment from the one we have. We bring this about by the use 
of our body and its pitiful state. With the psychosomatic disturbance we effected 
on our body, we gained the impossibility of our action in circumstances we did 
not want to have. In this way, with the emotional crisis we abandon (or we 
believe we abandon) our responsibility, due to a magical exaggeration of the 
difficulties of the world. The world preserves its differentiated structure, but it 
appears now (magically) as unjust and hostile, because it demands too much o f 
us, more than what is humanly possible to give.
The emotion of active sadness thus becomes a magical comedy of great 
importance: the sick person here resembles servants who, after having invited 
thieves in their master's house, have themselves tied up so that it can be clearly 
seen that they could not have prevented this; with the only difference that in the 
case of the sick person, he is "tied up by himself and by a thousand tenuous 
bonds".223 And to anyone who sees the painful feeling of freedom which the sick 
person wants to get rid of as necessarily reflective, Sartre responds the 
following: in the case of the sick person (and from his perspective) freedom 
appears not as his freedom to choose this or that behaviour, but as freedom 
existing in the object, to be created freely, as having to be accepted as given 
and being able to be transformed into a more acceptable existence.224 Of course, 
as Sartre himself acknowledges, there are "other functions and other forms of 
active sadness".225
223 Ibid, p.234, my bold and italics.
224 Ibid, pp.234-5.
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He ends his brief description of emotions by analysing joy into its two forms 
the joy-feeling (which for Sartre represents a balance, an adapted state) and joy- 
emotion (which is characterised by a certain impatience). With the joy-emotion 
we magically hold as our absolute property, and seize at one swoop as an 
instantaneous totality the "imminent", but not yet there, desired and longed for 
object. However, even if the longed for object is there in front of us, it still 
leaves much to be desired: it can only be given to us little by little, and that 
intensifies our joy-emotion.226 In this way joy (as an emotion) is "a magical 
behaviour which tends by incantation to realise the possession of the desired 
object as instantaneous totality".227 This behaviour not only anticipates this 
possession, but it is accompanied by the certainty that the possession will be 
realised sooner or later. Muscular hypertension, gestures, dances and songs, 
represent symbolically approximate behaviour, incantations which attempt to 
possess at one swoop, symbolically, the desired object, even though we know 
that the object we desire can only be acquired through a prudent, difficult 
behaviour which should be maintained for long. Examples of this magical 
behaviour are the elations, dances and songs of men who have just been told 
that their beloved woman loves them; they try to realise in one moment all the 
desired object they long for, even though they know that the woman will not 
become theirs (they do not want to think that a human being can never be 
determined in its behaviour- it is enough that the possibility of determination in 
their body is certain for them) if they do not persist in a long and prudent, often 
extremely difficult behaviour. In the dance or the song, the woman as a living 
reality does not exist; she exists as an object which through the dance or the 
song can be possessed in its totality by magic; the dance or the song just 
"mimics the possession".228
226 Ibid, p.235.
227 Ibid, p.236.
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Sartre with the above analysis only wants to show the functional role of the 
emotions, and not to exhaust the variety of emotions. He proposes however to 
deal with two more problems: the reducibility of emotions (that many emotions 
can be reduced to fewer, more basic ones), and their nature.
Regarding the first, he notes that even though all emotions have to do with 
the setting up by us of a magical world through the use of our body as a means 
of incantation, the individual emotions are irreducible and different one from 
the other, since “in each case the problem and the behaviour are different”.229 
To fully analyse each specific emotion, to grasp fully its significance and its 
finality it is necessary to know and analyse each particular situation. For 
example, some theorists maintain that if the fear of the timid person is suddenly 
moved to anger this anger is an ordinary type of anger; Sartre notes that this can 
not be so; it is fear which has been surpassed without in any way being 
reducible to fear.230 In this way, the infinite variety of emotional consciousness 
can only be understood by someone who has been convinced of the functional 
structure of emotion.
Regarding the nature of emotions, Sartre first notes that "behaviour pure and 
simple is not emotion, and pure and simple consciousness of that behaviour is 
not emotion either".231 With this obviously Sartre wants to supplement his 
rejection of reductivists, but he also indicates that were the behaviour related to 
emotions and the consciousness of that behaviour something "pure and simple", 
the finality of the emotion would be much more easily understood and 
comprehended, and consciousness would be able much more easily to get rid of 
unwanted emotions.232 Thus the ontology of the emotions is very complex and 
there are a lot of interconnections with the behaviour exhibited and the
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consciousness of that behaviour, with the result that its finality is found with 
difficulty and only with careful attention paid to the relevant ontology. With this 
kind of attention and care we can discern that there are false emotions which 
are not behaviour, i.e., there are emotions which do not have the appropriate 
ontology or there do not exist the appropriate interconnections between 
exhibited behaviour and the relevant ontology, and thus are false. Such are cases 
where we are given a gift that we do not like or do not like much; we may clap 
our hands, may jump, or may dance (behaviour which under other 
circumstances would be characterised as joy by an external observer). However, 
such behaviour is not that of joy; or better it is the behaviour of a false emotion 
(falseness here being not a logical characteristic of certain propositions, but an 
existential quality). False emotions nevertheless can be distinguished from those 
of an actor. The actor mimics joy and sadness, but he is neither joyful nor sad in 
reality, since his behaviour is addressed to a fictitious universe: "he mimics 
behaviourt but he is not behaving" ,233 In false emotion the behaviour exhibited 
is self-sustained and is voluntary, the situation is real and we conceive it as 
demanding this behaviour; in addition, we intend to invest magically real objects 
with certain false qualities.
Nevertheless false emotions are not imaginary, nor must they necessarily 
annihilate themselves later. According to Sartre "their falseness arises out of an 
essential weakness which presents itself as violence",234 He calls this weakness 
violence, since in the false emotion the desirability and agreeableness of the 
object which was just given to us as a present etc. exists as an exigence, a need 
and not a reality. If it has any reality, its reality is one of tributary and parasitic 
form, which we strongly feel. We know that we "project" it upon the object 
through our decision; once we stop our incantations it will immediately
233 Ibid, p.238, my bold and italics.
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disappear; but we can not do otherwise because the desirability of other objects 
associated with the given situation make our behaviour necessary.
On the other hand, the ontology of true emotions is always accompanied by 
belief. Any qualities which are conferred upon objects are taken by the person 
who has the true emotion as true qualities, that cannot be abandoned nor 
stopped at will; they have to exhaust themselves at their own time. Our 
behaviour itself cannot but sketch upon the object the emotional quality which 
we confer upon it. When we have a true emotion we are under its spell, 
"flooded" by it. The formal frame of our behaviour is filled with something 
opaque and heavy which serves as its matter. The physiological phenomena 
associated with behaviour are of a paramount importance here; they represent 
the seriousness of the emotion as a phenomenon of belief
This is exactly where the problem lies regarding those theorists (mainly of the 
peripheric sort) who separate the physiological phenomena from the behaviour 
(either making the behaviour a symbolisation and a consequence of the 
physiological phenomena or making the physiological phenomena a 
consequence of the behaviour). The physiological phenomena (hypertension, 
vaso-constrictions, respiratory difficulties etc.) at first present a certain analogy 
with the behaviour, symbolising quite well a behaviour which aims at denying 
the world or discharging it o f its affective potential by denying it; but then once 
they achieve the first step they enter with the behaviour into a total synthetic 
form and cannot be studied by themselves. However, they are separate from the 
behaviour with which they form a synthesis: we can stop ourselves from fleeing, 
but not from trembling.
In this way, behaviour and physiological phenomena form a peculiar sort of 
synthesis: emotion is a behaviour o f a body which is in a certain state; the 
emotion appears in a highly disturbed body which retains a certain behaviour,
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with the disturbance sometimes surviving the behaviour, and with the behaviour 
constituting the form and the signification of the disturbance. Without the 
disturbance the behaviour would be pure signification and an affective scheme. 
The synthesis necessitates a high level of disturbance so that the magical 
behaviour is believed,235
It is important to note at this point, that even though physiological 
phenomena and behaviour form a synthesis and are components of emotion, 
emotion has only consciousness as its point of departure; to understand this one 
has only to acknowledge that the body has a two-fold character: it is an object 
in the world, and it is something directly lived by consciousness. Since the body 
is both "outside" and "inside" consciousness, we can easily understand why 
emotion is a phenomenon o f belief. With consciousness not only do we project 
affective signification upon the world around us, but we live the new world 
which we have established. We live in the newly established world directly; we 
are interested in it; we endure the qualities which our behaviour has set up. This 
means that when in a dead-end our consciousness degrades itself into the 
magical world of emotions, it is a new consciousness facing the new world, 
establishing it with its most inward part and as directly as it can ever be. This 
new consciousness resembles the consciousness which is asleep. Like the 
sleeping consciousness, the new consciousness in emotion transforms its body 
as synthetic totality in such a way that it can live and grasp this new world 
through it.
In this perspective, physiological manifestations are very trivial disturbances; 
they represent the total and commonplace disturbance of the body while it puts 
itself on the level of behaviour. The behaviour alone will decide whether the 
disturbance will be in "diminution of life" or in "enlargement". Consciousness 
realises with the body an obscuring of itself (since the body is heavy and full of
235 Ibid, p.239.
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matter, not translucent) and lives it spontaneously. This obscuring even as a 
synthetic totality, can not be divided or localised in parts; only through scientific 
analysis and for the purposes of the study of the "biological-body" or "thing- 
body", we can localise and focus upon troubles in such and such organs.236
According to Sartre "the origin of emotion is a spontaneous and lived 
degradation of consciousness in the face of the world";237 and it is a degradation 
because consciousness, not enduring some aspect of or an event in the world, 
tries to grasp it in another way by approaching the consciousness of sleep, 
dream, and hysteria. However, Sartre notes two things in relation to this 
degradation of consciousness: first, consciousness does not thetically have 
consciousness o f itself as degrading itself it only has positional consciousness 
of the degradation of the world (which is brought about by the non-thetical 
degradation of consciousness and) which takes place in the magical level. It is 
only in this respect that someone can say that an emotion is not sincere. Also it 
is evident now that the finality of the emotion is not placed on the emotion by a 
thetic act of consciousness (that is why we cannot easily see this finality). This 
finality however, is not unconscious; it exhausts itself in the constitution of the 
object (one can say that it is non-conscious in relation to the thetic 
consciousness). The second thing that Sartre wants to note is that consciousness 
is caught in its own belief since it lives the new aspect of the world by believing 
in it, in a similar way to that of dreaming and hysteria. The captive 
consciousness is its own captive, and not by anything external; it does not 
dominate the belief that it strives to live, and it does so precisely because it is 
absorbed in living it.
The spontaneity of consciousness here can not be meant as being able always 
to deny something at the very moment that it posits this something; such a
236 Ibid, pp.240-241.
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spontaneity can be only the source of contradiction. Consciousness is by its very 
nature transcendental: it transcends itself making it impossible for it to 
withdraw into itself so that it may suppose that it is outside in the object; it only 
knows itself as in the world. Any doubt can arise only in relation to the 
constitution of an existential quality of the object, i.e., how dubious or how 
effective is the reflective activity of reduction of the new consciousness upon 
the positional consciousness (this doubt ofcourse can only mean more often the 
perpetuation, and less frequently the transformation or neutralisation of the 
emotion). In this way, as consciousness sees the magical world into which it has 
cast itself, it tends to perpetuate the world in which it holds itself captive. 
Consciousness becomes concerned with its emotion, rising in value: the more 
one flees, the more frightened he is. The magical world is delineated, takes 
form, is inflated and then is compressed against the emotion and arrests it. The 
emotion does not wish to escape; it can only attempt to flee the magical object, 
granting it thus a still stronger magical reality. And this captivity is not realised 
as belonging in consciousness, only as belonging to the object; the objects are 
captivating, enchaining, seizing continuously upon consciousness. Freedom can 
only come from a purifying reflection, or a total disappearance o f the 
affecting situation.238
The emotion would not be so absorbing if it apprehended in the object its 
conditions as they really are: that a certain object is terrifying, bringing joy etc., 
at this time, in this lighting, in such and such circumstances. What is 
constitutive of the emotion is that it perceives in the object something which is 
not; something which exceeds it and magnifies it beyond measure. Emotion 
appears in effect with its world; in the world which is joyful, sad, frightening 
etc., relations of consciousness with objects are exclusively magical. In the 
worlds of emotions there occurs what happens in the worlds of dreams and the 
worlds of madness: there is a world of individual syntheses maintaining
238 Ibid, p.242.
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connections among themselves and possessing qualities. These qualities are 
conferred upon the objects only by a passage to infinity, each particular quality 
represents the unity of an infinity of real and possible abschattungen of this 
quality (including border-line cases etc.); any qualities which the emotions 
confer upon the objects and the world they confer them ad aetemum, even if 
only tacitly. With emotions we affirm qualities upon objects and the world as 
their substantial qualities, and in this way we pass into infinity, establishing 
infinity as it were in the heart of the things and the world, as constitutive o f  
them.239
In this way, an overwhelming and captivating quality of the thing appears to 
us through the emotion, exceeds and maintains it; it spreads over from the 
present to the future and makes its presence felt and certain; in Sartre's words 
"it is a revelation of the meaning of the world"240
At this point of his analysis, Sartre explains the difference of delicate from 
weak emotions (two very frequent distinctions in theories of emotions). A 
delicate emotion in his theory is an emotion in which we apprehend an objective 
quality of the object through a behaviour which is barely outlined, through a 
slight fluctuation of our physical state.241 In addition, tins diminution presents 
itself as such (it is not a diminution effected by thetic consciousness); and it may 
effect an abrupt change, a domination by tins or another emotion, quite outside 
the control o f thetic consciousness (an example of this is a slight depression 
which gradually is built up, ending in panic in the face of a meaningless or a 
disastrous life).
Weak emotions are the emotions whose affective grasp of the object is slight; 
the difference from the delicate emotions is one of intendon, which is motivated
239 Ibid, p.243.
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by the situation and not by consciousness. The somatic state and the behaviour 
may be the same in delicate and weak emotions; the functional role of the two 
however differs, and the difference is one of intention in that functional role (the 
weak has a different intention and role from the delicate); an example of a weak 
emotion can be a slight sadness at the cloudy or rainy weather for a native of 
Scotland; notice how different (both in its nature and its effects) this slight 
sadness (as an example of a delicate now emotion) can be to one who is not a 
native of Scotland, who is native of a place with 300 days per year sunshine, and 
in addition, has associated negative thoughts and feelings with this weather!
Sartre's theory of the emotions can also accommodate phenomena which may 
appear to many as impossible to be explained by his theory; such phenomena are 
certain abrupt reactions* of horror and admiration which appear suddenly. In 
these sudden emotions it seems that there is no finality at all (at least not the 
kind that exists for other emotions). In addition, in these sudden emotions there 
is something immediate and direct about their perceptions; there is not even an 
impulse to flight, or behave in any way associated with usual emotions. 
However, as Sartre himself indicates, these emotions can also be explained by 
his theory; these emotions indicate that there is "an existential structure of the 
world which is magical".242 This magical structure of the world is magic 
performed on us; here the conditions of the situation have turned upside down; 
instead of performing magic and transforming the world through our emotions, 
the world performs magic on us through our emotions. The world reciprocates, 
and instead of revealing itself to consciousness as determined (situation that 
exists for normal emotions), it reveals itself as undetermined and with a finality 
of its own totally independent of our own; the magical thus proves not to be an 
ephemeral quality which we impose on the world, but it exists in the world 
independent of us (but revealing itself only to us).
242 Ibid, p.245.
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However, this category termed by Sartre as "magical" deserves special 
treatment and analysis if it is to be acceptable. Sartre provides this in the last 
few pages of his third chapter entitled "A Sketch of a Phenomenological 
Theory" in his short work on the Emotions.243 He maintains there that the 
"magical" governs the interpsychic relations of men in society and, in particular, 
our perception of others. As regards the ontology of the "magical" it is an 
irrational synthesis of spontaneity and passivity. It is "of passivity" because the 
magical occurs as an inert activity, a consciousness rendered passive. And that is 
exactly how others appear to us: consciousnesses as transcendent objects 
through a modification of passivity. This modification is not due to our relation 
to them, nor the effect of our passions; it is essentially necessary, since in order 
for others to be perceived by us as others they have to have their consciousness 
modified so as to appear and (as far as we are concerned) be passive (both 
through their bodily appearance to us, and with their characterisation as this or 
that man). With the meaning of a face we do not have a sign of consciousness 
but an altered, degraded consciousness, a passivity. In this way, a man is always 
a wizard for another man, and the social world is at first magical.
Of course there can be always deterministic views of the interpsychological 
world and imposed rational superstructures upon this world. But they can not 
be anything else but ephemeral and without equilibrium. They become 
ineffective as soon as the magical aspect of faces, of gestures, and of human 
situations appears as too strong. In these occasions of the apparent 
ineffectiveness of determinism and rationalism, consciousness seizes upon the 
magical as magical and forcibly lives it as such. Words such as "suspicious", 
"alarming" form in their phenomenological attributes categories of words which 
designate the magical insofar as it urges consciousness to live it. Abrupt 
passages from a rational apprehension of the world to a perception of the same 
world as magical, if it is motivated by the object itself and if it is accompanied
243 Ibid, pp.245-247.
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by a disagreeable element is what is termed as "horror", if it is accompanied by 
an agreeable element it is "wonder".
These abrupt passages into the magical are not foreign to the previous 
Sartrean analysis of emotions. They just formulate a second main form of 
emotions: with the first (of the type of love, hate etc.) we constitute the magic 
of the world to replace the deterministic activity which can not be realised, with 
the second it is the world itself which abruptly reveals itself as being magical.
With horror we suddenly perceive the upsetting of the deterministic barriers. 
The face of a stranger appearing on a window is not the face of a man who 
might attack us, but he is given as passive, in immediate connection on the other 
side of the window with our body, we live and undergo his signification, and we 
establish it with our own flesh (the freezing and stopping of breath). Our 
consciousness plunged into the magical world, draws the body along with it, 
insofar as the body is belief, and believes in it. The synthesis with the 
disturbance of our organism is perfected not with our behaviour, but with the 
appearance and expression of the face and movement of the other man's body. 
In this way, the first magic and signification of the emotion come from the 
world and not from ourselves.
Of course magic as a real quality of the world is not restricted to the human 
only; a disturbing interpretation of a landscape, certain objects in a room as 
traces of a mysterious entity bear the mark of the psychic, and perform magic on 
us through our consciousness.
Through these two types of emotions and many mixtures of the two (since 
most emotions are not pure), consciousness, by realising through a spontaneous 
finality a magical aspect of the world, manifests itself as magical. If  on the other 
hand, the world is given as magical, consciousness specifies and completes the
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constitution of this magic, diffusing it everywhere, or concentrating it on a 
single object.
According to the above analysis of emotion, emotion cannot be an accidental 
modification of a subject in an otherwise unchanged world; this can be the thesis 
of theorists of emotion who consider emotions as "accidents", or not very 
frequent and peripheral psychosomatic disturbances. Sartre's theory is far from 
this viewpoint. Sartre's theory accepts emotional apprehension of an object 
"only on the basis of a total alteration of the world".244 In order that an object 
may in reality appear terrible, it must realise itself as an immediate and magical 
presence face to face with consciousness. This can only be achieved in an act of 
consciousness which destroys all the structures of the world that might reject 
the magical and reduce the event to its proper proportions. The destroyed 
structures of the world are not destroyed by rationality or conscious rational 
arguments; the rational interpretations which give support to the appearance of 
emotions come after the appearance of emotions.
The structures of the world are destroyed in their perception, and destruction 
and perception occur at the same time. The structures have no more their 
character of instrumentality in the world. They are destroyed and perceived as 
the unitary basis for the appearance of the emotion. All structures of the real 
world which may stop or reject the magical and reduce the event to its proper 
proportions (even if employed in their previously effective use as a last attempt 
to escape the grip of the emotion) intensify the abruptness and strength of the 
emotion we strive to be freed from. An example of the dynamic of emotions is a 
nightmare where locks, steel doors, etc. can never stop the murderer or thief 
from achieving his goal; all these previously protective devices only intensify our 
horror and fear, since in order for the object of our fear to achieve its purpose it 
must be more cunning, more determined in its goal, and thus more ferocious. In
244 Ibid, p.248.
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short, the object of emotion becomes an object on the basis of a world which 
reveals itself filled with emotion.
In this way, consciousness can "be-in-the-world" in two different ways: first, 
the world can appear to it as a complex of instruments so organised that if one 
wished to produce a determined effect it would be necessary to act upon the 
determined elements of the complex; each instrument here refers to other 
instruments and there is no absolute action or radical change that one can 
immediately introduce into the world; this is the familiar way of our 
consciousness relating to the world, with our actions, our body, etc. The other 
way is for the world to appear to consciousness as a non-instrumental totality, 
modifiable by large masses with no intermediary. Categories of the world here 
act upon consciousness directly and are present to it with no distance. 
Consciousness aims at combating these dangers or modifying those objects 
without distance and without instruments by absolute and massive modifications 
of the world; this aspect of the world is coherent in Sartre's theory as the 
magical world. In Sartre's theory emotion is an abrupt drop o f consciousness 
into the magical; the abrupt vanishing o f the world o f instruments and the 
appearance o f the magical world in its place [ibid, p.250].
In Sartre's theory emotion is not and can not be a passive disorder of the 
human organism, coming from the outside to disturb an otherwise normal 
psychic life. Emotion in his theory is the return of consciousness to the magical 
attitude, one of the great attitudes which are essential to it, with the appearance 
of the correlative world, the magical world. In addition, emotion can not be an 
accident in our psychic life; it is a mode of existence of our consciousness, one 
of the ways in which it understands (in the sense of the Heideggerian 
Verstehen) its "being-in-the-world".
A reflective consciousness can always direct itself upon emotion, and 
recognise it as a structure of consciousness, always having meaning and
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signification for our psychic life. And here exactly is yet another difference 
between Sartre and other theorists of the emotions such as James: for them 
emotion is unexplainable; it has a pure and inexpressible quality. In Sartre the 
purifying reflection of the phenomenological reduction perceives an emotion 
insofar as it constitutes the world in a magical form. This phenomenological 
endeavour is recognisably far from the ordinary reflections upon our emotions; 
we ordinarily explain our emotions by reference to the object of consciousness, 
and not consciousness; and since objects become in this way all-powerful, 
passions constitute themselves and gain an independence from reflective 
consciousness.245
In his Conclusion to his short work on the Emotions, Sartre gives the 
purpose of his endeavour here as "an experiment for the establishment of a 
phenomenological psychology".246 His work's shortness is due to its being just 
an example of how his proposed phenomenological psychology can give 
signification and coherence to a psychic fact which for other theorists is a 
lawless disorder or an unanalysable and mysterious inner feeling. Sartre himself 
recognises that for the foundation of his phenomenological psychology one 
should start with the fixation on an eidetic image of the essence of the 
psychological fret which it is investigating; he claims he has done this on a work 
for the mental image 247 However, with this short work he has achieved at least 
the conclusion that emotions can be properly understood only with the 
comprehension of their signification for our psychic life, and only through the 
analysis achieved by his phenomenological psychology. And since this 
phenomenological psychology can only be useful as a tool once its limitations as
245 Ibid, p.251.
246 Ibid, p.252.
247 Probably he means the L'lmaginatiorr, in English, Imagination: A Psychological Critique: 
but he has also dealt with this issue in L'Imaginaire: Psychologie phenomenologique de 
Imagination', in English, Psychology of the Imagination (for bibliographical details see 
Bibliography).
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a psychological research have been clearly delineated, he goes on to attempt 
exactly this in his Conclusion.
The signification of a fact of consciousness always indicates the total human 
reality which becomes moved, attentive, perceiving, willing etc. With the study 
of emotions so far this principle has been verified; an emotion always refers back 
to what it signifies: the totality of the relationships of the human reality to the 
world. With the emotion our "being-in-the-world" is totally modified according 
to the very particular laws of magic. However, such a descriptive analysis has 
limitations: the psychological theory of emotion that Sartre offers supposes a 
preliminary description of affectivity insofar as it (the affectivity) is constitutive 
of our human reality, of being affective human reality. This comes as a total 
contradiction to the usual psychological methodology: ordinary psychologists 
start from the emotions or the inclinations which might indicate a human reality 
not yet elucidated, and hope to achieve the elucidation of this human reality as 
the ultimate and remote goal of all their research; however, such a hope can be 
nothing else but a pure ideal beyond the short-term reach of anyone who begins 
with the empirical.
Sartre's phenomenological psychology of the emotions places the description 
of affect on the basis of the human reality described and fixed by an a priori 
intuition. Sartre's mixture of the empirical or a posteriori (the study of the 
emotions as they are) with the a priori (the study of the emotions within the 
framework of the a priori intuitions for our consciousness and its relation to the 
world) makes his theory vulnerable to attack from the supporters of both these 
traditions in philosophy and psychology. Some can attack him for mixing two 
elements that can not be mixed; others for acknowledging the value of the 
empirical; and others for venturing into the relatively uncertain realms of 
intuition. Sartre has replied to the last and has indicated why their stubbornness 
in their common sense naivete of the empirical can create nothing but confusion
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and other additional problems for them. He has also replied to those who 
believe that a mixture is impossible; he attempts to give with his Conclusion a 
satisfactory reply to phenomenologists who mistrust the empirical. He replies to 
them that if phenomenology can prove that emotion is in essence a realisation of 
human reality insofar as it is affection, it will be impossible for it to show that 
human reality must necessarily manifest itself in such emotions. Empirical data 
mainly through observation and analysis are needed to establish that there are 
such and such emotions and only these; this need manifests without any doubt 
the factitiousness of human existence. It is this factitiousness which makes 
necessary a regular recourse to the empirical, since the factitious can not be 
properly investigated by honest de profundis intuition. It is also this 
factitiousness which prevents psychological regression and phenomenological 
progression from ever coming together. That is, the empirical data which we 
gather through observation and analysis in Sartre's phenomenological 
psychology will never be sufficient to replace the need for a priori intuitions 
into the signification of these empirical data.
ii) Critical Evaluation of Sartre1 s Theory
Relation of Sartre’s Theory of the Emotions as presented in his Being 
and Nothingness and his general Theory of Consciousness and 
Intentionality.
We saw in brief detail the main ideas contained in Sartre's short work on the 
Emotions. These include a rejection of the methodology, scope and aims of the 
(traditional and modem) psychological study of emotions; a wholehearted 
acceptance of Heidegger's inseparability of the World and Dasein and the 
establishment of phenomenology as the most appropriate way of elucidating
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phenomena of human consciousness such as emotions. We also saw him indicate 
the many problems traditional psychological and psychiatric theories (especially 
those of James and Janet) have on their views of the human emotions, the two 
most important being the limitation of the study on the behaviour of the body 
involved in emotion and the insistence on considering emotion as an abnormal 
psychological state. In addition, we saw Sartre accepting the symbolic character 
of emotions, but rejecting both the psychoanalytic insistence on externalising the 
source of this symbolisation and the introduction of a bond of causality and a 
bond of comprehension running side by side in psychoanalytic studies of 
emotion.
Sartre also attacked phenomenologists and psychologists who believe that 
consciousness of the emotion is first a reflective consciousness; he maintained 
here the theory of Intentionality (which we previously saw analysed in relation 
to his attack on Husserl) according to which consciousness first and most 
importantly is positional and not aware of itself as being consciousness of 
something. Only at a later time can this consciousness become consciousness of 
itself, and this again without being self-aware of itself doing this positing. With 
emotions, as with other forms of consciousness, we perceive, act in and respond 
to the world without our consciousness becoming reflexive: one unreflective 
consciousness ("world-acted') becomes a direct transformation of the other 
("world-hatefulFM) with no mediation from a reflexive consciousness.
The fact that emotions in this way form an indissoluble synthesis between 
the affective subject and the affective object, has serious consequences for their 
ontological commitments: emotions become certain ways of apprehending the 
world.
His views on the unreflective consciousness brought him in opposition to 
action theorists who think otherwise; we saw him maintain that our actions (in
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opposition to other people's actions) constitute a class of certain objects in a 
probable world. In order for us to think of an action we have already acted in 
intention, but in a way which is not publicly accessible. Our actions, our words, 
and the objects of our feelings demand from us to be realised in a way in which 
other people do not sense. They have what Sartre termed as "passive exigence". 
Our unreflective consciousness has nothing to do with the unconscious; it sees 
the world as full of paths leading to the appearance of created objects; in this 
way we gain a pragmatistic intuition o f the determinism of this world and, 
when we see this determinism as too difficult to accept, we respond with the 
help of emotions. That is why emotions are transformations of this difficult to 
accept world. They are our direct actions in the face of insurmountable 
difficulties. And since this means that we must overturn the previously intuited 
determinism, we decide to see the connections between things and their 
potentialities (the paths towards our longed for objects) ruled by magic.
However, all these processes are performed without realising that they 
depend on us for their existence; in order for magic to work one must believe in 
it. The body is directed by unreflective consciousness which is fully immersed 
now into the emotion and changes its relations with the world in order that the 
world may change its qualities. With this, our relation to our body and to our 
environment becomes one and the same thing: we get trapped fully into the 
emotional world we create.
Through the analyses of many types and forms of emotions, we saw Sartre 
proving the irreducibility and different character of emotions, which, while 
preserving their own different dynamics, unite in their symbolic meaning for the 
unreflective consciousness.
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Through an analysis of false emotions, Sartre concludes that emotions are 
phenomena of belief and freedom from them can only come from a purifying 
reflection or a total disappearance of the affecting situation.
Another distinction he made was between weak and delicate emotions, 
accepting that their difference lies in the intention, motivated by the situation, 
and not by consciousness.
Analysing his concept of magic, Sartre acknowledges that it governs the 
interpsychic relations of men in society, and in particular our perception of 
others, but he also points out that this irrational synthesis o f spontaneity and 
passivity exists as a real quality of the world, and as such, exists for disturbing 
interpretations of landscapes, etc.
Lastly, in his Conclusion to his work, we saw him accepting the value of 
empirical data, which we gain through observation and analysis, for the 
factitiousness of human existence. That is, once we accept the 
phenomenological truth about emotions as affections, the type and forms of 
emotions as manifestations of this need for affection can only be investigated 
through an empirical study.
The analysis of the phenomenon of emotion in his early short work on the 
Emotions, agrees up to a large extent with the theory contained in his Being and 
Nothingness. In Being and Nothingness (from now on referred to as BN), we 
see Sartre placing an emphasis in the investigation of the emotions which have 
gained permanence in our behaviour: the passions.
In BN pp.440-451 Sartre connects the issue of the passions not only with the 
issue of our freedom but also with the phenomenology of our language:
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"language informs me o f my thought"2** With a phenomenological analysis of 
the way we use the word "passion" to explain our behaviour, Sartre finds that 
passion is the emotion which we found as impossible to control; we name it 
"passion", because we have already decided to grant to it a deterministic role 
over our behaviour and restrict in this way our freedom. In BN p.443 Sartre 
gives the following account for Passions: they are first a project and an 
enterprise; they posit particular states of affairs as intolerable, forcing the for- 
itself to effect a withdrawal in relation to these states of affairs, and to nihilate 
them by isolating them and by considering them in the light of an end (i.e., of a 
non-being). In this way, passions not only have their own ends, which are 
recognised at the same moment at which they are posited as non-existent, but 
they have equal autonomy as our will. In fact, Sartre equates the existence of 
our freedom with that of our will and our passions thus: "Freedom is nothing 
but the existence of our will or of our passions in so far as this existence is the 
nihilation of facticity; that is, the existence of a being which is its being in the 
mode of having to be it."249 This "having to be" points to nothing else but the 
nihilating power of our will and our passions; this power is ontologically related 
to the for-itself which has as a consciousness the characteristic of Intentionality. 
Consciousness with the help of Intentionality relates directly with this or another 
mode, choosing in this way to act passionately or deliberately. Both will and the 
passions are intentional; they refer one to the choices of the for-itself to be 
deliberate or passionate. The for-itself projects itself as intellect (in the case of 
an act of will) or as body (in the case of a passion) in the past, present or future 
activity. In this way the for-itself confirms its ontology, i.e., that to be is to act.
Will and Passion are not fully autonomous however; the ends pursued by an 
act of will or an act of passion are not chosen by the will nor the passion. In 
addition, the end pursued is not where the difference between passion and will
248 BNp.451, my bold and italics.
249 BN, p.444.
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lies: the same end may be pursued by an act of will or an act of passion. Passion 
and Will are autonomous only in respect of the means employed. And that is 
where their ontological difference lies: the (different) subjective attitude in 
relation to a transcendent end.250
In this way we see Sartre in Being and Nothingness not only following in 
general his early ideas on the emotions and passions,251 but fully applying them 
in relation to the ontology of passions and their relation to Freedom. In Sartre's 
Cahiers pour urn morale (in English Notebooks for an Ethics)252 we see not 
only the analysis of emotions as presented in EOT, but it is there connected with 
his discussion of Freedom in much the same way as in Being and Nothingness. 
with the only addition being the emphasis on the subjectivity of emotions and
253passions.
The Importance of Sartre's Theory of the Emotions for Contemporary 
Discussions in the Philosophy of Mind.
All the elements in Sartre's theory of emotion that we see developed here 
form a continuity between his early work on the Imagination and Husserl's ego, 
and Being and Nothingness. In Being and Nothingness these elements find a 
more worked out form and classification.
250 [See Joseph S. Catalano, A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothineness. The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1980, pp. 196-202; I discuss this issue in 
my Unpublished Dissertation: Constantinos Ahtanasopoulos, "Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontological 
Theory of Freedom: A Critical Analysis", University of St. Andrews, 30th of September 1991, 
pp. 13-15.]
251 See Sartre's Esquisse, EOT, p.245.
252 Jean-Paul Sartre, Cahiers pour une morale. Editions Gallimard, 1983; Notebooks for an 
Ethics, transl. by David Pellauer, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 
1992.
253 But not the reality of the emotions/passions; see our section on Sartre and Realism, and 
Sartre's Notebooks of an Ethics, pp. 45, 470, 559.
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The attack on psychology which in many aspects resembles Husserl's own 
attack, from the very evident form which we see here in the very early works, 
becomes in Being and Nothingness more metaphysical; discussion there focuses 
on realism and the structures of being.
The cognitive but not self-reflective character of the emotions, their 
dependence on Intentionality of consciousness for their existence, their synthetic 
being and their very close association with (but not identity with) the body and 
behaviour, their created reality and roots in a perception of a world which is 
difficult, all these elements find development in his analysis of the problem of 
nothingness and the phenomenon of bad faith, in his investigation into the 
Being-for-Itself and the Being-for-Others, where analysis of the emotions takes 
the form of analyses of different attitudes toward others and one's self
It would be worthwhile to enlarge on these developments of Sartre's thought 
on the Emotions, but it would mean a significant enlargement on this work and 
since the topic of our investigation is Intentionality, it is better to stop here and 
enlarge only on the significance of Intentionality for the appearance and 
development of emotions. And, indeed, this significance is of paramount 
importance for the comprehension of the phenomenon of emotion.
For any true emotion to appear, there has to be in consciousness a direct and 
unreflected relation to the world. Once this relation is reflected true emotion 
disappears. In order for any true emotion to appear, unreflected consciousness 
has not only to perceive the world, but it has to perceive the world in such a 
way as to be engulfed in the emotion that this world demands from 
consciousness. A critical and reflected relation between consciousness and the 
emotion that the perceived world demands from it is impossible (that would 
falsify the emotion). As we saw in our investigation and analysis of Sartre's 
ideas in his critique of Husserl's ego, this unreflected and direct relation with the
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world is guaranteed only once we accept Intentionality as the most important 
characteristic of consciousness. In fact due to this Intentionality the 
phenomenology of emotion as presented by Sartre not only makes sense, but 
provides an explanation for the falsification of emotions. In false emotions we 
just force our consciousness to interfere and reflect upon the desired emotion, 
i.e., we force unreflected consciousness to become reflected, so that the 
behaviour we exhibit conforms with the standards of the behaviour we want to 
exhibit.
Intentionality in this way, as an aid to the phenomenology of emotions 
presented here, proves yet again the inferiority of the psychological theories 
(from the experimental to those based on advances in artificial intelligence) 
which forget that the behaviour associated with an emotion in its biochemical, 
somatic or verbal manifestations is but one very limited aspect of the emotion. 
The most important and most significant aspects of the emotions are the 
psychological processes and the dynamics that feed these processes, which are 
invisible to microscopes and electro-magnetic instruments. It is these processes 
and dynamics which can give an explanation to the phenomenon of emotion. 
Through Sartre's and our work we see that the significative role of these 
processes and dynamics for the manifestation of emotions cannot be properly 
understood and explained if the characteristic of human consciousness termed 
Intentionality is not properly understood and explained.
Attempts such as those of the Behaviourists, the Dimensionalists, James, 
Schachter, Lazarus, Izzard, Hofstadter, medical biologists, psychiatrists, 
computer mechanics and mathematicians not only misinterpret empirical data to 
suit their theories, but miss the most important fact about emotions: they are 
ways for our consciousness (invisible to electromagnetic instruments and 
microscopes) to exist in the world, to think and act in the world; with emotions 
we can get a glimpse of and proof for the importance and significance of the
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most intrinsic characteristic of human consciousness: that of Intentionality 
(which is equally invisible to instruments).254 Emotions can not be reduced to 
the behaviour of molecules, facial expressions, or epiphenomena of computer 
programmes. They have a signification and an aspect which not only is not, but 
cannot ever be exhibited and contained fully in any somatic manifestations. The 
theorists named above, as well as those criticised by Sartre, miss the most 
significant aspects and role of the emotions, and reduce them into something 
they are not and cannot be.255 As we shall see, even philosophers who have 
immensely influenced British and American Analytic Philosophy such as 
Wittgenstein have also condemned all such reductivist attempts on grounds 
similar to Sartre’s. In this way, reductivists who attempt to reduce or equate the 
phenomena of emotions to mechanical operations and silicon chips' 
performances can have a more or less universal condemnation.256
254 For modem theories of emotions, see Peter Lloyd, Andrew Mayes, et al., Introduction to 
Psychology: An Integrated Approach. Fontana, London, 1984, pp.437-447; Douglas R. 
Hofstadter, Goedel. Escher. Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. Penguin, London, 1979; Douglas 
R. Fofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett, The Mind's I. Penguin, London, 1981; Alan Ross 
Anderson, ed., Minds and Machines. Prentice-Hall, N.J., 1964; Dick Gilling, "The Keys to 
Paradise", in Simon Campbell-Jones, ed., Horizon: At the Frontiers of Medicine. BBC, 
London, 1983, pp.59-78; Margaret A. Boden, Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. The 
Harvester Press, Sussex, 1977; for a relatively recent behaviouristic account of emotions, see 
D.E.Broadbent, Behaviour. Methuen. London, 1961.
255 Even theoretical models and carefully worked out conditions in which they can work such 
as those found in Hilary Putnam's "The Mental Life of Some Machines", John O'Connor, ed., 
Modem Materialism: Readings on Mind-Bodv Identity. Harcourt, Brace and World, 
N.Y.,1969, pp.263-281; Jerry Fodor's "Banish DisContent", in William Lycan, ed., Mind and 
Cognition: A Reader. Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp. 420-438, miss the significance of their 
nature as theoretical constructs. For example a theory which does not work on the same 
theoretical presuppositions (rationalism, epistemological or ontological realism etc.) but is 
equally "scientific" can prove quite distinctive for them; see Thomas Nagel, The View from 
Nowhere. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, and James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New 
Science. Cardinal (W.Heineman), London, 1991 (1988), pp. 292-300.
256 For other philosophers in the British-American Analytic Tradition condemning 
reductivists see Cynthia Macdonald, Mind-Bodv Identity Theories. Routledge, London, 1992; 
Norman Malcolm, Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein. George Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1971; Colin McGinn, Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry. Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1993; John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT, London, 1992; John R. 
Searle, Minds. Brains and Science. Penguin, London, 1984; Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to 
be a bat?", in Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1979, pp. 165-180.
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Even the argument of computer theorists and reductivists,257 that there has 
not been enough time spent in laboratories to fully prove their case and that they 
will prove their case fully in the future, misses the most important point about 
emotions: we saw Sartre expressing the view that the way of empirical human 
sciences is the wrong way to understand anything related to humans; David 
Hume and his extreme empiricism on the issue of passions (as well as on 
anything else belonging to human activities and psychological make-up), has 
tom the idea of a unitary science of man into pieces.258 A piecemeal 
interpretation of man and his emotions is what laboratory psychologists and 
computer theorists try to offer us promoting the ideas of Hume at the 
experimental level. They try to offer us scholarship of the parts of man, but are 
lacking in explanations of how this pieces-man acts as a whole in any given 
situation. This is what Sartre and Wittgenstein (in his own way) try to do: offer 
a holistic idea of man, who through unreflective, but not unconscious, 
consciousness directs himself in the world, as one whole thing with a body, 
reasoning faculties, and immaterial consciousness.
Of course, Sartre's appeal to magic is an unnecessary jump into mysticicsm, 
and perhaps an empiricist may find it highly objectionable. But this is not a 
difficult problem for Sartrean Theory. Sartre's use of the term "magic'' is clearly 
metaphorical; its meaning as an irrational synthesis of passivity and spontaneity 
is clearly established by Sartre in his own text. It can be understood as a 
synthesis of man's spontaneity in the form of his will, in the face of adversities. 
Man reacts spontaneously in the face of an extreme adversity and changes either 
the world or himself, depending on which conditions of the world (which
257 Expressed mainly by P.Feyerabend in his "Materialism and the mind-body problem", in 
C.V.Borst, ed., The Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan, London, 1970.
258 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge), Oxford 
University Press, 1958; Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the 
Principles of Morals (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge), Oxford University Press, 1962; Essavs. Moral. 
Political and Literary. 2vols (ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose), Longmans, Green, London, 
1875.
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appears difficult) he sees himself able to change. In this way, he preserves his 
sense of absolute freedom through a direct act of his will, even in the face of an 
intuition of the deterministic difficulty of the world.
However, in order to show the value of what this account offers, let us now 
compare it to some of the alternatives.
For reasons expanded above we shall not turn to theories of emotions which 
have an extreme empiricist character. These cannot be acceptable in any 
comparative critique of Sartre, who places his theory on a totally different level. 
Sartre clearly thinks that piece-meal extreme empiricism is always the wrong 
perspective when we are trying to explain human actions (with I think a most 
valid justification), and we have to respect his most essential convictions, if we 
are to improve or offer any valuable critique.
Plausible candidates for theories of emotions from which we can formulate a 
valuable critique on Sartre's theory of emotions can be found in the works of 
Ryle and Kenny.
Ryle in The Concept of Mind259 puts forward a theory of emotions with 
which he thinks he refutes the supporters of the "ghost, in the machine" (i.e., 
Cartesians). In this book he maintains that "emotion" is used to designate at 
least three or four different kinds of thing, which he calls "inclinations" (or 
"motives"), "moods", "agitations" (or "commotions"), and "feelings". 
Inclinations and moods, including agitations, are not occurrences and do not 
therefore take place either publicly or privately. They are propensities, not acts 
nor states. They are, however, propensities of different kinds and their 
differences are important. Feelings, on the other hand, are occurrences, but the
259 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind. Penguin, London, 1949, pp.81-111.
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space that any mentioning of them should take in descriptions of human 
behaviour is very different from that which the standard theories accord to it. 
Moods or frames of mind, unlike motives but like maladies and states of 
weather, are temporary conditions which in a certain way collect occurrences, 
but they are not themselves extra occurrences. For Ryle, emotions as 
explanations of people's behaviour can be either motives or inclinations from 
which intelligent actions are done, or else moods, agitations or perturbations, of 
which some aimless movements are signs. He rejects the idea of emotions as 
impulses, and of impulsive actions based on emotions as para-mechanical myths 
of the occult antecedents of actions. In short, emotions are nothing else but 
behaviour trends to behave in a specific way (that way which is depicted when 
we say that someone has a particular emotion).
Kenny in Action. Emotion, and Will, but more recently in The Metaphysics 
of Mind 260 accepts that one can experience an emotion only if one can manifest 
it. Kenny believes that emotions are more closely linked with actions than 
beliefs. And of course even though some emotions can be private events, Kenny 
does not accept that all emotions can be private.
It is evident from our above exposition of Sartre's theory of the emotions, 
that both Ryle and Kenny are missing a very important point: emotions cannot 
be restricted to some of their manifestations, for example behaviour. The 
behaviour of emotions (linguistic or not, it is irrelevant) is only an aspect of the 
emotions: perhaps the poorest, since one can mime emotions, or fake them.
The theories of Ryle and Kenny however, bring out one other aspect of 
Sartre's philosophy that Sartre himself saw no need to develop frilly at this stage 
of the development of his philosophy. This aspect is his views on Language. The
260 Anthony Kenny, Action. Emotion, and Will. Routledge, London, 1963; The Metaphysics 
of Mind. Oxford University Press, 1992, pp.50-65.
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work of Ryle and Kenny depends on a theory of Language, since they base their 
observations, distinctions and (re-)structuring of traditional classifications on 
linguistic modes of expression regarding emotions. They see contradictions in 
the traditional (mainly Cartesian) talk about emotions and they try to formulate 
a theory of emotions (and other "elements" of our mind) which shall do away 
with these contradictions: again a theory based on common sense language. 
What will mainly concern us here is: Can Language be considered an emotion- 
free vehicle of thought? Can Language be considered as an "objective" means of 
communication, and thus be a certain basis for universalizable observations 
regarding our mental life?
These questions we will attempt to answer through an investigation of what 
Sartre considers Language to be, and what he considers to be its significance 
and its meaning.
iii) Sartre and Language.
Sartre himself refers to Language in connection to his views on the 
Emotions, both in the short work on the Emotions that we saw, and in his Being 
and Nothingness, where Language becomes a continuation and furtherance of 
our goal in our Love towards the Other: the captivation of the Other’s Freedom, 
and the bestowing of a fullness of Being on us. In his Being and Nothingness. 
Part Three, entitled "Being-for-Others", Chapter Three, with the title "Concrete 
Relations With Others", after a description in Ontological terms of what exactly 
is love in relation to the Other, Sartre proceeds to describe the nature of 
Language, the second of the three steps of our First Attitude toward others: 
Love, Language, Masochism (the Second Attitude is Indifference, Desire, Hate, 
Sadism)261.
261 BN, pp.364-379.
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Aiming at seducing the Other (i.e., producing in the Other the consciousness 
of his state of nothingness as he confronts the seductive object: me), and making 
myself a fascinating object (i.e., an object full of being in the presence of the 
Other's non-thetic consciousness of being a nothingness) I constitute myself as a 
meaningful object and thus employ various ; Through
these expressions, I try to direct the Other 
towards the depth of my objective and hidder 
By suggesting, through the employment of 
undifferentiated other real and possible ac 
which transcends me and present myself a 
dead-possibilities, to the exact extent to v 
that is, I try to make the Other believe 
may desire, even these, I can offer to he 
to the beloved, so that I can constitute myself as - 
between her and the world; I manifest through my acts and expressions infinitely 
varied examples of my power over the world (money, position, "connections", 
etc.).
In short, I try to propose myself as unsurpassable through the presentation of 
myself as a being constituted by an infinity of depth, and as identifiable with the 
world. But this proposal is not enough by itself; to make myself a fascinating 
object, I do not only need to besiege the Other through this proposal I am 
putting forward, but I also need the consent of the Other's freedom; I try to 
capture this freedom and its consent by making it recognise itself as a 
nothingness in the face of my plenitude of absolute being.262
In this whole attempt to transform ourselves into a fascinating object for the 
Other, we employ various forms of expression which necessarily presuppose a
SQBMBb• fast ifut c .,_
262 BN, ibid, p.372.
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language. Sartre acknowledges this and maintains that these are not only 
language but a fundamental form of language. The existence, the learning and 
use of a particular language is a matter of psychology and history; however, 
language as a fundamental form of expression is not a phenomenon added on to 
being-for-others: it is originally being-for-others. For Sartre language has to 
do with my subjectivity (my for-itself) experiencing itself as an object for the 
Other. Language in this way becomes an original relation o f one subject with 
another subject, discarding all talk about the "discovery", or "invention" of 
language.
In the inter-subjectivity of the for-others, the recognition of the Other as 
Other already provides and accounts for the existence of language. In this way 
(that whatever I do, my acts as freely conceived and executed, my projects 
launched toward my possibilities have outside of them a meaning which escapes 
me and which I experience as escaping me) Sartre assimilates Heidegger’s "/ am 
what I  say", and transforms it into the Sartrean aphorism"lam  language".263
Even though for Sartre language is fundamental to human existence, he 
distances himself from both the theorists who claim that language is a kind of 
human instinct in our human nature, divesting thus language from all subjectivity 
(one could name them "the objectivists on language"), and the theorists of the 
opposite extreme who believe that language is an invention of our subjectivity 
(one can name them "the subjectivists on language"). Language also lacks the 
independent existence associated with the "being-outside-of-self' of the 
Heideggerian Dasein.
263 BN, ibid, pp.372-3; for Heidegger, Sartre quotes A. de Waehlens, La philosophic de 
Martin Heidegger, Louvain, 1942, p.99, and Heidegger’s own text: Martin Heidegger, 
Horderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung, p.6; in English, Existence and Being, transl. by 
Douglas Scott, Henry Regnery, Chicago, 1949, p.297.
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For Sartre, language forms part o f the human condition; with language my 
for-itself proves its existence as a being-for-others, and in this way avoids the 
narcissistic extremes of solipsism. But with language I also surpass this proof 
and, utilising this guaranteed access to the world (language), I move toward 
other possibilities of contact and action in the world: I can change (or at least do 
my best to change) the Other's perception of me. Thus, language becomes 
indistinguishable from the recognition of the Other's existence.
Language arises at a primitive level as the condition of my being through and 
because of the Other's look: it is subsequent to the other primitive attitude 
confronting the Other (Love). These succeed each other in a circle, each 
implying the other. Language at this level is not seduction; seduction as the 
complete realisation o f language does not presuppose any earlier form of 
language; language is revealed by seduction entirely and at one stroke, as a 
primitive mode of the being of expression.264 By Language Sartre means all the 
phenomena of expression; the articulated word, in all its forms, both written and 
oral is just a derived and secondary mode of expression, whose appearance can 
be made the object of a historical study, but is far too poor in ontological 
significance to encompass all language.
In seduction, where language reveals its ontology entirely and at one stroke, 
language also reveals its true aim and goal: causing the Other (and our being- 
for-others) to experience.265 This aim and goal is extremely important; if 
language aimed at giving to be known, a mainly epistemological endeavour, then 
the whole attempt at expression may easily be futile in the end; the Other can 
engage in a sceptical refutation of our epistemological claims and thus our 
attempt to become the object of fascination prove to be worthless. If on the
264 [... la seduction ne suppose aucune forme anteriure du langage: elle est toute entiere 
realisation du langage; cela signifle que le langage peut se reveler entierement et d'un coup 
par la seduction comme mode d'etre primitifde Vexpression. (L'etre et le neant, pp.422-423).
265 Ibid.
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other hand we try to cause the Other to experience (what we want the Other to 
experience) then we will eventually achieve our goal: we will entrap the Other 
into our situation, our proposed fullness o f being, with extremely few chances 
of escape. The Other will be a prey (and will always be a prey) as long as our 
trap and the devices in it keep the Other from ever using his/her own devices 
(mainly reason) to escape.
In our drive to find a fascinating language, we proceed blindly, since we are 
guided only by the abstract and empty (general) form of our object-state for the 
Other. And even if we were able to fully control the fascinating language which 
we employ, we could not conceive what effect our gestures and attitudes would 
have, since they would have to wait for a freedom (the Other's) to take them 
and confer upon them (any) meaning. In this way, the "meaning" of our 
expressions always escapes us. We never know exactly if we signify what we 
want to signify, nor even if we are signifying anything at all! Due to this lack of 
knowing what we actually express for the Other, we constitute our language as 
an incomplete phenomenon of flight outside ourselves. At the moment we 
express ourselves we can only guess at the meaning of what we express, and, 
since in this perspective to express and to be are one, we can only guess the 
meaning of what we are.
For Sartre thus the Other becomes the focal point for the use of language: 
the Other is always there, present and experienced as the one who gives 
language its meaning. With each of our expressions and gestures, each of our 
words, we have a concrete proof of the alienating reality of the Other. This is 
exactly the truth, "the realisation of the human condition" according to Sartre, 
which psychopaths suffering a psychosis of influence know so well when they 
speak about people "stealing" their thoughts. Actually for Sartre, the very fact 
of expression is a "stealing" of thought since thought needs the co-operation of 
an alienating freedom in order to be constituted as an object. Of course
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"stealing" here has no materialistic associations (as it may have in the case of 
psychopaths), but refers to the ontological shift in the ownership of ourselves: 
instead of us owning us (as both objects and subjects), someone else owns us 
through our words (mainly as an object, but also as an Other- which 
ontologically can not be an object, since it is another "alienating freedom").
In this way, language in its first aspect becomes sacred. It is sacred, since our 
words (the sacred objects) are in the world (as verbal/written behaviour) and 
point to a transcendence beyond the world. This transcendence is the freedom 
of the one who listens or reads in silence and which is revealed to us with each 
use of language.
For the hearer and the reader we are and always will be meaningful objects. 
Our attitudes, expressions and words can only indicate to them other attitudes, 
expressions and words. The Other is "locked" in our object state and perceives 
our transcendence as unreachable. Thus language for the Other becomes a 
magical object: it is an action at a distance (and thus uncontrollable by the 
Other) whose effect the Other knows exactly and with precision (knowledge 
that we cannot have). In this way, the word is sacred for us who utter or write 
it, and magic when the Other hears it.
Our body has this ontological and epistemological resemblance to our 
language: we cannot have the knowledge we desire in our relation to the 
Other. We can not hear ourselves speak nor see ourselves smile. This similarity 
makes Sartre acknowledge that: "The problem of language is exactly parallel to 
the problem of bodies, and the description which is valid in one case is valid in 
the other"266
266 BN, p.374.
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But even if our drive towards fascination (through our language) succeeds in 
producing a state of fascination in the Other, it cannot by itself succeed in 
producing love. We know this and that is why we do not feel satisfied by only 
seducing the Other. Seduction can only provide the Other-as-object, but never 
the Other-as-subject.
Love can be bom in the beloved only from the proof that he has regarding his 
alienation and flight toward the Other; however, the beloved will be transformed 
into a lover only if he projects being loved. His wish as a lover is not to 
overcome a body but the Other's subjectivity as such.267 This comes as a 
consequence of Sartre's earlier views regarding the emotions.
In his views on language we see Sartre placing an equal emphasis on 
behaviour (his talk about the similarity between our language and body) and the 
thought "behind" language (his talk about expression being a "stealing of one's 
thought"). Note here that Sartre can never be classified as a behaviourist of 
sorts in relation to his theory of language: for that one would need a stronger 
claim than a mere "similarity" between language and body. Perhaps a talk about 
"identity", even a "type-type/token-token identity", or some kind of 
supervenience theory may be enough for some kind of analogy to contemporary 
discussions in language, but Sartre never attempts such a comparison nor can 
we see any indication in his work to support such comparisons in any way.
On the other hand, in his views on the emotions (in both the earlier works 
and now in BN) we see Sartre grant to behaviour an even smaller role: here 
behaviour is not only unimportant, but also ontologically the most insignificant 
aspect of an emotion. We see Sartre claim that what is important to love is not 
the behaviour of seduction or fascination, but the projection that we do of 
ourselves as being loved by the Other. We surpass in this way the world of
267 BN pp.374-375.
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objects, of bodies and behaviours, and we transcend it to achieve a connection 
in the level of subjects, of freedoms and subjectivities. We overcome our drive 
to possess the Other-as-object, and we replace it with our Love towards the 
Other-as-subject that loves us.
Love in this way is not the behaviour of the lover, or the behaviour of the 
loved, or even the behaviour of both the lover and the loved; love is for the 
lover to be held captive by his very demand to be loved. Actually, the lover as a 
subject wants to be loved by the Other-as-Subject as an object (because his for- 
itself desires to be transformed into an in-itself by the beloved), and in this way 
he transforms love into a drive towards an alienation of his and the Other's 
freedom. This "escape" from one's freedom in an original intuition, the target of 
both lover and beloved, can only be a contradictory ideal for the for-itself. Each 
one of the lovers wants the Other's love, without realising that this can occur 
only on the condition of the offer of love to the Other. In this way, love 
relations are a system of indefinite reference under the ideal standard of the 
value "love", or, in other words, of a fusion of consciousnesses in which each of 
them would preserve his otherness in order to found the other.268 Actually what 
we see here is a total rejection of behaviour from Sartre, and an ontological 
reference of one consciousness to another, with no limitations from behaviours 
and bodies.
In this way, the futile character of all emotions gains its ontological 
significance and the true meaning of the "magical" comes to the forefront: 
emotions and any other drive of consciousness towards the Outer with the help 
of Intentionality is doomed to failure. In our drive to free ourselves from the 
agony and extreme pain of having an absolute freedom, freedom to create and 
destroy the world with a single glance, we seek the help of the Outer, the world 
as the foundation of our freedom; the Outer however cannot help us because it
268 BN, pp.374-376.
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is itself created by our consciousness. Our agony is, in this way, only multiplied, 
since through a transversal of Intentionalities the Outer becomes the foundation 
of both our agony for our absolute freedom, and for choosing this Outer to 
escape from it. Intentionality in this way becomes a true Pandora's box and a 
devil for our consciousness: a Pandora's box because it may look like a 
salvation, but actually is a menace; a devil because instead of using it to help us 
in our true ontological connection with ourselves (life in authenticity) we use it 
to deceive ourselves, and through the magical which it grants to the Outer we 
use it to control our consciousness and alienate it from its true character as an 
absolute freedom.
iv) Wittgenstein and Sartre on the Emotions and Language.
Ludwig Wittgenstein269 in his own position on the emotions is not far from 
Sartre's theory.
Wittgenstein not only considers the behavioural manifestations of emotions 
as not important (since one can mime them), but also maintains that "emotions 
colour thoughts", or that emotions cannot exist without thought and thought 
without its colour, emotions.
It is important to note in relation to our claim that Wittgenstein disregards 
the behavioural manifestations of emotions, that some of the commentators on 
Wittgenstein's later thought may look upon our claim with extreme disbelief and 
doubt. They see an important influence of logical behaviourism in Wittgenstein's
269 In Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. (pb.ed.)Vols I-H, (ed. 
and transl. by G.E.M.Anscombe and G.H.von Wright), Blackwell, Oxford, 1980 (1990), 
mainly para. 836, pp,148e-149e. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 
2nd ed., transl. by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, 1968 (1953), pp. 174,187-189.
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later thought, and claim that Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle (in his Concept of 
Mind) are very much alike in their logical behaviourism (some even claim that 
Ryle actually got his views from Wittgenstein- Ryle himself supports this in 
some of his work)270.
I am opposed to all commentators who make a logical behaviourist out of the 
later Wittgenstein. I follow here the line of commentators like Peter Winch,271 
P.M.S. Hacker,272 Norman Malcolm,273 AC. Grayling274 and David Pears.275 In 
their books these commentators (Wmch et al.) claim that not only was 
Wittgenstein opposed to a clear behaviourist perspective, (in both their forms of 
psychological and logical- like that of Carnap and the Vienna Circle), but he 
also adhered to some elements of the philosophical opponent of behaviourism, 
that of innatism.276
What actually makes some commentators think that Wittgenstein was a 
logical behaviourist (and thus for our purposes a reductivist in the theory of 
emotions) is Wittgenstein's over-emphasised opposition to Caitesianism. They
270 See P.MS. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind. Volume 3 of an Analytical 
Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Part I: Essays, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
(phed.) 1993, p. 114; Gilbert Ryle’s “On Bouwsma’s Wittgentdn” in Konstantin Kolenda, 
ed, Gilbert Rvte~ On Thinking Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979.
271 In Peter Winch, Trying to Make Sense. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987, article entitled: 
Eine Einstellung zur Seele, pp. 140-153.
272 In PM.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind Volume 3 of an Analytical 
Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Part 1: Essays, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
(pb.ed.) 1993, pp.97-126.
273 In Norman Malcolm, Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein. George Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1971, esp. pp.80-103.
274 In AC. Grayling Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, pp.87-98.
275 In David Pears, The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy. Vol. H,Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, p.270.
276 Innatism here is not reducible to the Cartesian ideas about the Inner. For a commentator on 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind, who claims a similar view to the one expressed here, see 
Malcolm Budd, Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge, London, 1989. For a 
very interesting and supportive to my claims about Witgenstein view see Stephen Mulhall  On 
Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects. Routledge, London, 1993 
(1990), esp. pp.53-90,152-3,91-155.
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disregard his anti-behaviourism, and especially his opposition to the Vienna 
Circle and those influenced by it, like Carnap and Bertrand Russell.
In particular, Winch, when analysing Philosophical Investigations, Part n, 
Section iv and especially Wittgenstein's "My attitude towards him is an attitude 
towards a soul", finds that even though Wittgenstein has accepted the use of the 
word "belief' in the ascriptions of particular states of thought and feeling to. 
other people, he objects to using the same word in ascriptions of the general 
view we have of them. In other words, when it comes to acknowledging that a 
specific being in front of us has or hasn’t the necessary conditions for having 
emotions and other states of consciousness, we act and speak at a different level 
than that of mere belief. Our reaction towards this being is more or less 
unreflective and this unreflectiveness is part of the primitive material out of 
which our concept of a human person is formed. In addition, this unreflective 
attitude does not have as an object the behaviour (even the linguistic behaviour) 
of the being in front of us, nor the being itself in its physical and somatic 
existence. That is why Wittgenstein uses the word "soul". He wants to indicate 
that our relation with the being in front of us is more internal than any 
behaviourist (linguistic or not) or any physicalist/reductivist perspective would 
allow. And what will really surprise all behaviourists and physicalists is that 
Wittgenstein believes that this internal relation is not an attitude we can adopt or 
abandon at will. It is not only unreflective but it looks almost instinctive (i.e. 
both necessary and not having to do with logical laws etc.). Both of these 
characteristics of our internal relation to others (unreflectiveness and 
instictiveness) and their ontology (as not being able to be translated to any 
behavioural pattern and computer programme, since they are unreflective and 
instinctive and thus not able to follow logical or behavioural laws) quite 
probably make behaviourists and physicalists see such an interpretation of 
Wittgenstein as their worst nightmare coming true!
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P.M.S. Hacker on the other hand, through a detailed investigation into the 
origins and the development of the philosophical forms of behaviourism still 
thriving at the time of Wittgenstein (Vienna Circle, Carnap, Russell, et al.), and 
a comparative analysis between Wittgenstein and the behaviourists, finds that 
"despite these important converging lines, it is fundamentally misguided to 
classify Wittgenstein’s descriptions of the grammar of psychological expressions 
as a form of logical behaviourism".277 According to Hacker, Wittgenstein did 
not deny the existence of the mental (as psychological behaviourists do) nor did 
he reduce the mental to behaviour (as logical behaviourists do). What 
Wittgenstein tried to do is to explore the grammar of the expression or 
manifestation of the Inner. In fact he was opposed in his account of the Inner to 
many of the logical behaviourists' strategies. First, in Philosophical 
Investigations, para. 571, he opposed the reduction of the psychological 
explanation of processes in the psychical sphere to some sort of physical 
nomologic explanation, in the way physical explanations are applied in the 
sphere of the physical (Hacker also discusses in connection to this: 
Wittgenstein’s remarks in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Vol.I, 
paras. 287, 288, 292).
Secondly, the relations of behavioural expression to what it is an expression 
of are not external: they are internal or grammatical (and not of the sort an 
unobservable entity has to its causal effects). The mental is a criterion of the 
behavioural expression: it is possible for pain to occur without being manifest, 
and it is possible for pain-behaviour to be displayed without there being any 
pain. This grammatical relation, though distinct from entailment, nevertheless 
allows for certainty even if it a defeasible certainty.
277 Hacker, ibid, p. 115.
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Thirdly (and as a consequence of the second point), the logic of expression 
(Ausserung) is not the logic of correlation of distinct domains, and the grammar 
of psychological words used in verbal manifestations of the mental is not the 
grammar of names of objects (PI para. 293).
And Hacker concludes: "One might say that behaviourism, no less than 
dualism, failed to appreciate the grammatical (logical) significance of the fact 
that "I have a pain" is an expression of pain."278
Later on Hacker directly attacks the logical behaviourist interpretations of 
Wittgenstein by analysing the claims of C.L.Hull279, that from "colourless 
movements" and "mere receptor impulses as such" (as opposed to intentional, 
goal-directed behaviour) one can deduce or construct psychological concepts 
such as purpose, intention, desire, etc. Hacker repeats his claim that 
Wittgenstein distances himself from such behaviourist theories, and he rejects 
directly all claims that the Wittgensteinian theory of the criterion is a novelty 
that Wittgenstein offered for the logical positivist camp of the Vienna Circle, to 
save it from apparent difficulties of mediation between observable behaviour and 
psychological state.280 What Hacker mainly brings against the logical- 
behaviourist interpreters of Wttgenstein is the fact that they disregard the 
emphasis that Wittgenstein himself places on the surroundings, and in general 
the context within which a given behaviour occurs. In this way, the Inner and 
the Outer intermingle and become so inter-dependent that the outer becomes a 
criterion for the inner and the outer becomes unavoidably and essentially 
describable in terms of the inner.281 Hacker closes his attack on the logical- 
behaviourist interpretation of Wittgenstein, through a very apt interpretation of 
PI, p. 178: "The human body is the best picture of the human soul"; Hacker
278 Hacker, ibid, p. 117.
279 In C.L.Hull, Principles of Behaviour. New York, 1945.
280 Hacker, ibid, p. 124.
281 Hacker, ibid, pp. 124-126.
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writes that Wittgenstein wrote this not because the soul is manifest in something 
bodily, but precisely because the soul is manifest in behaviour 282
I think that this survey mainly into the work of Winch and Hacker suffices as 
an adequate support for my claim that Wittgenstein is not a logical behaviourist.
It also suffices as a support for my claim that in connection to his views on 
the emotions and his claim that "emotions colour thoughts", Wittgenstein made 
exactly the point that Hacker makes in connection to C.L.Hull's theory of 
"colourless movements". Wittgenstein, stressing the context within which an 
emotional behaviour is observed or stated, directly attacks the behaviourist 
(psychological and logical) presuppositions about behaviour (psycho-somatic or 
verbal) which make it the sole criterion for the existence of an emotion. When 
he mentions the fact that one can mime behaviour without actually having the 
emotion concerned, Wittgenstein further supports his attack on behaviourism 
and provides sufficient grounds for making the claim that he is clearly an anti­
behaviourist.
Of course I do not claim (nor do any of the cited commentators) that 
Wittgenstein clearly adhered to some sort of innatism, or that he supported 
some theory in relation to emotions which makes them "things inside the head". 
Wittgenstein was neither an innatist nor a behaviourist. What I actually want to 
point out with all this in mind is the equal emphasis Wittgenstein and Sartre 
place both on the behaviour associated with an emotion (and any other psychical 
process) and on the context within which this emotion occurs. With 
Wittgenstein the context will be clarified through a grammatical investigation of 
the language-game associated with the emotion concerned (we must not forget 
that "behaviour" itself and what counts as "behavioural evidence" are specific
282 Hacker, ibid, p. 126.
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language-games), and through an understanding that the language-game is 
independent of philosophical pre-suppositions and theories. (Our language has a 
life of its own- a "form of life", with primary, primitive experiences which 
cannot be reduced to or analysed in terms of other experiences.) With Sartre 
one has to use existential psychoanalysis in order to clarify the symbolic 
character of a given emotion within one's plan and choice of life.
I also want to emphasise that most of the philosophical theories that 
Wittgenstein tried hard to dismantle were the target of Sartre as well. Both 
attacked theories from "both sides of the tunnel": both criticised in a very 
rigorous way behaviourists, physicalists, innatists and especially Cartesians. 
Both tried to incorporate elements from all of the criticised theories, 
Wittgenstein having as a guide the grammar of specified language-games, and 
Sartre guided by the phenomenological ontology of the human situation.
In relation to their views on Language, we see that both differentiate 
themselves from behaviourists, even though they both emphasised the 
behavioural aspect of language. Sartre actually gave linguistic behaviour equal 
worth with the thoughts that are expressed by it, and he emphasised the 
similarity of language and body. Wittgenstein on the other hand, while 
emphasising that linguistic behaviour and its grammar are the sole guide for 
meaning and thought as expressed in employed language-games, criticised in his 
own way the theory that linguistic behaviour is the sole guide in determining the 
meaning and the thought expressed. He spoke of "forms of life", and language- 
games that do not follow laws and specifiable rules. In the later works one can 
clearly see a sceptic (or at least an anti-realist) Wittgenstein who does not 
hesitate to dismantle behaviourism in all its forms, since behaviourism as a
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philosophical movement and a tradition considers itself immune to scepticism 
and anti-realism.283
It would be useful next, before our concluding section, to investigate how 
Sartre escapes some of the criticisms that commentators have made on his 
concept of Intentionality.
283 See for example the work of Crispin Wright, in Crispin Wright, "Wittgentein's Rule- 
following Considerations and the Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics", in Alex George, 
ed., Reflections on Chomsky. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, pp.233-264; Crispin Wright, 
Witteestein on the Foundation of Mathematics. Duckworth, London, 1980; Crispin Wright, 
"Rule-following objectivity and the theory of meaning", in S.Holtzman and C.Leich, eds, 
Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981, pp.99-137; and 
Saul Kripke in Saul A.Kripke, Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language: An Elementary 
Exposition. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, (1982) 1989; of course Kripke's views are not without 
problems; I discuss these problems in detail in my unpublished "A Critique of Kripke's 
Wittgenstein", paper read at the Postgraduate Section of the Conference of the British Society 
for (he Philosophy of Science, St Andrews, September 1993; also see John McDowell, 
"Wittgenstein on Following a Rule", Synthese, 58 (1984), pp.325-363; Paul A. Boghossian, 
"The Rule-Following Considerations", Mind, 98 (1989), pp.507-549; Alex Miller, 
"Boghossian on the Sceptical Solution", The Oyster Club, June 1992, pp. 15-17.
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VI. CRITIQUES ON SARTRE’S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY
In this section of the Thesis, an analysis of certain critiques of Sartre's theory 
shall be attempted. In particular, the views of Jitendra N. Mohanty,284 Richard 
E. Aquilla,285 John R. Searle,286 and Maurita J. Harney287 shall be critically 
discussed and compared to Sartre's own theory. These theorists have been 
selected both because they have dealt directly with the topic of our Thesis 
(Intentionality), and because they have produced a theory that challenges 
Sartre's. Two of them (Mohanty and Aquilla) have directly discussed Sartre's 
theory. Even though these theories are not the only ones who might produce a 
serious threat to the plausibility of Sartre's theory of Intentionality, they 
represent the types or kinds of objections that can be presented: we have 
critiques based on the metaphysics and ontology employed by Sartre (Mohanty, 
Aquilla), on linguistic considerations (Searle), and on both ontological and 
linguistic considerations (Harney):
i) Jitendra Nath Mohanty: Intentionality and Indian Philosophy of 
Consciousness.
Mohanty in his study of the concept of Intentionality wishes to continue his 
own previous work on the logical aspects of Husserl’s theory of meaning.288 In 
this work he studies the noetic aspect of Husserl's theory of meaning, i.e., the 
nature of consciousness and of its contact to the world through Intentionality.
284 In Jitendra Nath Mohanty, The Concent of Intentionality. Warren H. Green, St.Louis 
Missouri, USA, 1972.
285 In Richard E. Aquilla, Intentionality: A Study of Mental Acts. The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, University Park and London, 1977.
286 In John R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
287 In Maurita J. Harney, Intentionality. Sense and the Mind. Martmus NijhofE, The Hague, 
1984.
288 J.N.Mohanty, Edmund Husserl's TheOrv of Meaning Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964.
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 247
After a detailed study of the concept of Intentionality found in Brentano, he 
tries to prove that any attempt to "explain away" Intentionality is doomed to 
failure.289 In particular he attacks idealist attempts to claim that consciousness is 
free from reference to objects and thus "explain away" Intentionality as useless 
metaphysical jargon, vulnerable to the principle known as Ockham's Razor. He 
also attacks realists who deny any peculiar reference of consciousness to an 
object, and who claim that there is a real relatedness of consciousness to its 
object, in which both relata are equally real, their qualitative differences 
notwithstanding. Such realists replace intentional directedness either by a neutral 
compresence or by a causal relation, or at best by some relation which cannot be 
further analysed, but which is nonetheless real for that.
He finally dispenses with attempts (mainly from philosophers in the British- 
American Analytic tradition) to attack all theories of Intentionality as either 
having too many commitments to the "cursed" Cartesian dualism, or as wrong 
analyses and descriptions of our mental states when we act or use language. In 
response to these attacks, he claims that these philosophers, who claim that the 
objects of intentional attitudes are linguistic entities and so that all intentional 
sentences can be replaced by sentences relating people to linguistic entities, are 
trying to reduce Intentionality to such a linguistic relation because they are 
concerned about the notion of the mental290 and other dualistic notions that 
have been associated with Intentionality.291
Mohanty maintains that the concept of Intentionality does not stand or fall 
with the concept of the mental in general, and is committed neither to a
289 Mohanty, The Concept of Intentionalitv. pp.37-50.
290 See Carnap in R Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudo-problems in 
Philosophy, transl. by RA. George, Routledge &Kegan Paul, London, 1967; Quine in W.V.O. 
Quine, The Wavs of Paradox and Other Essavs. Random House, New York, 1966.
291 Such as Brentano's notion of mental acts; see Russell in B.Russell, The Analysis of Mind. 
Allen &Unwin, London, 1961 (1921).
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philosophy of the ghost in the machine, nor to dualism.292 It is also not 
committed according to Mohanty to the mechanistic or naturalistic type of 
thinking about the mind, or even about the body.293 In addition, any talk about 
mental acts is mistaken, since an act is what is characterised as such by 
Intentionality; intentional directedness itself (reference to, or being-about), is
294not an act.
What the reductionists of Intentionality cannot understand, according to 
Mohanty, is that the Intentionality thesis is neutral as between realism and 
idealism and quite compatible with both; and that the true nature of 
Intentionality cannot be grasped unless one refuses to ontologize, keeping 
faithful to the precepts of phenomenology.295
In his critique of other theories of Intentionality, Mohanty incorporates 
Sartre's theory in his target, even though he finds it more faithful than 
Heidegger's to the Husserlian dogma of the irreducibility of Intentionality and of 
the necessity of placing it in the realm of consciousness.296
Mohanty finds that Merleau-Ponty's and Paul Ricoeuris criticisms on Sartre 
are accurate, and he follows them up to a great extent. He adopts Merleau- 
Ponty's attack on the Sartrean dualism of the for-itself and in-itsel£ his proposed 
degrees of Intentionality and his notion of bodily Intentionality as an original 
phenomenon, irreducible to the Intentionality of consciousness or of thought -
292 Here Mohanty cites Quinton in "Mind and Matter", in Smythes, ed., Brain and Mind 
Modem concepts of the Nature of Mind. The Humanities Press, New York, 1965, who claims 
that the Brentano thesis rules out behaviourism, and that Intentionality is compatible with an 
identity theory according to which the identity between bodily and mental states is not logical 
but contingent; Mohanty rejects the first claim of Quinton, see Mohanty, ibid, p.l97n22, and 
thus differs from our Thesis that behaviourism is indeed ruled out by a theory of Intentionality 
such as Sartre's,
293 See Mohanty, ibid, p.50.
^Ibid.
295 Ibid.
296 Instead of the Dasein as in Heidegger's; ibid, pp. 128-137.
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even though he finds that this attack leaves the for-itself ill-defined and curiously 
vague.297 Mohanty however considers Ricoeur's critique of Sartre’s for-itself to 
be more successful, since he directs the attention to the volitional interpretation 
of Intentionality. The Husserlian ego is not to be thrown away as an 
unnecessary metaphysical burden (as Sartre tried to prove, with his notion of 
pre-reflective consciousness and the for-itself), but accepted as a special case of 
pre-reflective consciousness, the pre-reflective volitional consciousness. In this 
consciousness "I see a tram car" is not reducible to "This is a tram car"; on the 
contrary, in the pre-reflective volitional consciousness, and in making one's 
mind act in a certain way, one posits one's self as the agent of the decision. This 
reference to the subject pole is still pre-reflective, not an inspection or reflective 
observation of oneself. This is what is termed by Ricoeur "pre-reflective self- 
imputation"-. I figure in the project as the one to whom the action can be 
imputed. Moreover, this relatedness of an intention to the self is not revealed so 
explicitly in other kinds of acts, and this is why Sartre’s idea of the pre- 
reflective consciousness is still useful, though not universally applicable. The 
Sartrean dogma of the transparency of consciousness however must be dropped, 
since in the volitional pre-reflective consciousness one finds the I  or ego, and 
thus not transparency, emptiness and nothingness. For Ricoeur pre-reflective 
consciousness is transparent in all other modes but the volitional mode. In this 
way he believes in the transparency of consciousness, but not in its complete 
transparency.
In addition, Ricoeur, being more faithful to Husserl than the majority of 
existentialist phenomenologists, keeps the notion of hyle and accommodates the 
psycho-analytic notion of the unconscious within the framework of his 
phenomenological theory of consciousness. He believes that consciousness 
always contains within itself affective matter which is never fully transparent to 
it; in this way there is infinite room for self-questioning and self-interpretation in
297 Ibid, pp. 137-143.
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the areas of need, emotion and habit. When this affective matter is left 
meaningless and unformed, it gains extreme weight and becomes too 
burdensome, leading one to psychiatric illnesses. With the help of the 
psychoanalyst the patient gives meaning to this unformed matter for the first 
time and thus is delivered from his painful burden.
Ricoeur looks upon the world as the intentional correlate of the body and 
regards the body as essentially open to the world, and consequently as 
intentional. Ricoeur accepts that outer perception is always from a point of 
view; through dialectic he attempts to prove that in perceiving an outer object, 
we anticipate all possible points of view of all possible percipients; thus we 
come to mean the thing itself, not a perspective of it, as the object being 
perceived, even if this meaning-intention can never be totally fulfilled. Further, 
the power of creating absurd significations (e.g. "round-square") shows that 
Intentionality is not exhausted by fulfilled presence, and that it is a 
transcendence of the limitations imposed by the world.
However, one should not be fooled by the emphasis on the creativity that 
Intentionality allows us in Ricoeur’s account: Ricoeur is not Sartre. According 
to Ricoeur, absolute creativity is totally un-Husserlian; for Husserl, the 
creativity of consciousness is tied to a "transcendental guide", the object of 
sense, and without such a "transcendental guide", the flux of consciousness 
would submerge us. Given this indispensability of the layer of sense, 
Intentionality becomes a less than absolute contact with the world, and the idea 
of objects (individual or eidetic) as totally self-given is de-emphasised, and 
restated in the light of the dialectics of intention and fulfilment. In this way, 
phenomenology is not a philosophy of "freedom" but of "sense".298
298 Ibid, pp. 143-8.
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Mohanty finds that through these criticisms on Sartre we can see where the 
problems start for Sartre's theory: his emphasis on the Husserlian transcendental 
ego leads him to disregard the fact that this ego was later (in Ideen II) said to be 
constituted in a manner radically different from that of objects. In fact, 
according to Mohanty, Ricoeur has shown quite well that although the pure 
ego (even in the form of transcendental subjectivity) is not to be met within the 
stream of consciousness, a reference to the ego (covert or overt) may 
nevertheless accompany all acts, and make subsequent reflection possible.
Another source of worry regarding Sartre’s theory is the proclaimed 
"openness", absolute transparency, emptiness and nothingness of 
consciousness.299 According to Mohanty, one can claim Intentionality as against 
a representational theory of consciousness, but one need not attribute a passive 
openness to it. Mohanty claims that such an open and passive consciousness is 
not a human consciousness; he prefers man condemned to meanings, the active 
Sinngebung, to a man condemned to be free. Mohanty finds that only Husserl’s 
theory of the noema can accommodate both these facts about our consciousness 
(Intentionality as against representationalism, and consciousness as active 
Sinngebung).300 And once Sartre’s theory of the transparency of consciousness 
is seen as a problem, Sartre's attack on the functionalism of Intentionality 
becomes one more source of difficulties. Sartre claimed that functionalism at the 
level of consciousness would end in an infinite regress; and since it is not 
evident to unreflective consciousness that such an infinity exists, we should 
discard such a prospect. Mohanty claims that once we accept that consciousness 
is not transparent, we need not be so certain regarding its contents.
Finally, he sees that the recognition o f bodily intentionalities in the later 
Husserl (Ideen 77, 777, and Phanomenologische Psychologie) does not lead
299 Ibid, p. 150.
300 Ibid, p. 150-1.
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phenomenology to monistic reductionist moves, of the sort that make bodily 
Intentionality a pale reflection of the Intentionality of consciousness, or the 
Intentionality of consciousness an epiphenomenon of bodily Intentionality.
What Mohanty goes on to establish in the later sections of his book is the 
precise relationship between these two radically different sorts of Intentionality. 
In addition, he believes that these two types or kinds of Intentionality cannot be 
investigated a priori, but must become the topic of a descriptive 
phenomenological investigation. In this way, the body-mind dualism is 
transformed into a dualism of intentional relations.301
In fact, he actually maintains that through an investigation into the concept of 
Intentionality, and its relationship to consciousness, one is led to a 
phenomenology of subjectivity.302 The nature and concept of subjectivity and 
Intentionality can be defined by Mohanty as follows. They constitute a higher 
order reflective concept emerging in the attitude of phenomenological reflection. 
Intentional reference is pre-reflective as well as post-reflective, and the concept 
arises from a certain type of reflection. It is not a generic but an analogical 
concept: it does not designate the common essence of all intentional 
phenomena, but as we move from acts to intentionalities which are not acts, or 
from the mental to the bodily domain, the sense of Intentionality radically alters 
so that we not only encounter different sorts of intentions but also intentions 
which are as intentions different.303
This, theory of Intentionality is radically different both from Heidegger’s304 
and Sellars'305. Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world itself is covertly 
intentional; and Sellars' realist commitment to an isomorphism between intellect
301 Ibid, pp. 151-2.
302 Ibid, p. 178.
303 Ibid, p. 182.
304 In Martin Heidegger, Seirt und Zeit, Max Niemeyer, Tubingen, 1953.
305 In W. Sellars, Science. Perception and Reality. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1963.
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and the world, as "a necessary condition of the intellect's Intentionality", is 
rendered non-sensical by the intentional inexistence of the intentional object.306 
Mohanty proceeds to other possible objections, but since they are not directly 
related to Sartre's theory we will not examine them.
It is obvious from the above account that Mohanty has a lot in common with 
Sartre, but also some great differences. We saw that both Mohanty and Sartre 
oppose reductionist tendencies regarding Intentionality, and both (together with 
Wittgenstein) seem committed to reducing ontology to the minimum. Mohanty 
however opposed reductionism because he thought that all the concerns of the 
reductionists can be accommodated in his theory of Intentionality; Sartre on the 
other hand takes a clear stand and condemns all traditional realist and idealist 
theories as ill-founded and circular. In addition, the Sartrean theory of 
Intentionality could never be satisfied with an identity theory, or any traditional 
form of behaviourism. We also see Mohanty's theory agreeing with many of our 
"essentials" for any theory of Intentionality,307 but disagreeing with the majority 
of considerations which exist for Sartre. In this we see the value of Sartre's 
theory: it can protect theories of Intentionality from incorporating extreme 
positions, and from letting themselves open to reductionist exploitation.
We see this reductionist exploitation in full blood in Mohanty’s citations of 
Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricoeur, whose intentional misunderstandings of Sartre 
make Sartre's theory look like just another version of the reductionism that he 
(Mohanty) himself propounded in his definition of Intentionality30*.
306 Mohanty, ibid, pp. 186-7.
307 See my Introduction in the first section of the thesis.
308 It is important to note here that Mohanty does not see Sartre’s diffusion of dualisms. It is 
frequent to accuse Sartre of preserving all dualisms in the for-itself in-itself differentiation. 
This could not be further from the truth; see my Section on Realism, and David E. Cooper, 
Existentialism Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp.79-94, 39-78.
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He seems that he deliberately ignores the Sartrean arguments against 
subjectivity and any structure (Kantian, Husserlian, or any other) that can 
guarantee objectivity through its subjectivity, and the Sartrean theory of 
consciousness as pure activity; and also Sartre’s essential distinction between 
what is posited, reflected and thus passive (full of reviewed and revisable 
meanings, etc.) on the one hand, and on the other the unreflected consciousness 
which is pure activity, because it is translucent, an emptiness and a nothingness. 
He also ignores Sartre’s critique of the Freudian unconscious, and the drive 
behind that critique to keep the freedom and creativity of unreflected 
consciousness intact, and Sartre’s theory of the body and its intentional relation 
to the world, other bodies, and its owner. Note also his emphasis on sense and 
meaning, to the detriment of the creativity of unreflected consciousness; and 
Anally note that in his account the absolute freedom of unreflected 
consciousness is sacrificed for the existence and restraints of transcendental 
meaning and subjectivity.
Taking into consideration the Sartrean critique of the Husserlian 
Transcendental Ego, of functionalism and the burdening of unreflective 
consciousness with opaque structures such as meanings and subjectivity, we 
need not fall into the trap of Mohanty's concept of Intentionality. Intentionality 
is an ontological guarantee for the transparency of consciousness, its emptiness 
and its nothingness, its essence as pure activity. We have seen from Sartre's 
investigation that any denial of these attributes to unreflected consciousness is a 
fatal mistake, reducing Intentionality to unnecessary metaphysical garbage. Our 
investigation of Mohanty's theory, shows that such a reductionist drive, in an 
otherwise valid climate for the proper description of consciousness, can lead to 
the extremities of subjectivism and transform body-mind dualism into a mere 
relational dualism: a dualism closer to a double-aspect theory (or in Mohanty’s 
account the Naiyayika and Samkara Indian philosophies) than to a 
phenomenological theory of consciousness and Intentionality.
Constantinos Athanasopoulos, 255
ii) Richard E. Aquilla: Intentionality as the Study of Mental Acts.
Aquilla’s investigation lies in the realm of ontological and metaphysical 
enquiries related to the status of objects of mental states, and of the relation 
that unites awareness and the world. He defines Intentionality as the 
phenomenon of awareness or conception when it is construed in the de dicto 
sense (i.e., when we just report that a mental state is, or involves, the awareness  ^
or conception of some object). He also defines mental states that exhibit this 
feature as mental acts.309
He finds that there are two main alternatives in the philosophy of 
consciousness having to do with Intentionality: the first emphasises the object of 
awareness, and supposes that some unique sort of relation between mental acts 
and their objects is necessarily involved whenever we have awareness and 
conceptions o f such objects. This alternative has to face the difficulty of objects 
which do not exist; and in the face of such a difficulty Aquilla reviews 
Meinong's theory310 that a relation with objects of awareness does not in fact 
require that there be any such objects for one to be related to; Russell's theory311 
which just claims that we do not have any such awareness, Bergmann's theory312 
that the realm of "real existence" comprises only a vanishingly small part of the 
total realm of being; and finally the theories of Frege and the later Husserl,313
309 Aquilla, ibid, p.ix.
310 In Alexius Meinong, "liber Gegenstande hoherer Ordrtung* and "Uber 
Gegenstandstheorie*, in Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 
Leipzig, 1929, 2:382-3, 492; Uber Annahmen, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 
1910.
311 Mainly in B.Russell, Analysis of Mind (see above for bibliographical details), and The 
Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press, London, 1943.
312 Gustav Bergmann, Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong. University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison, 1967, and Logic and Reality. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1964.
313 Frege mainly in Gottlob Frege "On Sense and Reference1 in Translations from the 
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, transl. by Peter Geach and Max Black, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1960; and "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry", transl. by AM. and
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who claim that we are always in fact aware of objects of a sort which are simply 
overlooked by materialistic theories of reality. His second alternative is the one 
found in Brentano and the early Husserl, who emphasises the act rather than the 
object of awareness or conception; this alternative attempts to account for the 
awareness or conception of objects solely by appealing to the internal contents 
of such acts. Aquilla attempts to combine elements from both alternatives and, 
without claiming the "content theory of consciousness" to support the view that 
the very notion of a "mental content" which, by virtue of its quasi-linguistic 
character, is capable of performing these functions, can be explicated only if we 
presuppose that there exist certain primitive relations of immediate 
apprehension, of the objects given to consciousness.
I think that the key issue here is what exactly is meant by "mental content". 
Aquilla, after an attempt to prove that we cannot avoid a distinction between 
the "contents" and the objects of mental acts, maintains that to be aware of an 
act's intentional character is not to be aware of some actual relation with the 
object of that act's intention, but it involves awareness of some other dimension 
present in the act. Aquilla designates this dimension by the term "content".314 It 
is obvious how great is the difference between Aquilla's theory of Intentionality 
and Sartre's. To prove the existence of Intentionality in the form of a primary 
relation or mental state directed toward certain sorts of objects, via the study of 
mental contents as semantically significant features of possible mental states (for 
that is how Aquilla later describes these contents) is totally to ignore two very 
important features of Sartre's theory: first, that semantic features enter into the 
consideration of the posited consciousness, and not of the non-reflected one; 
and secondly that Intentionality is a fundamental characteristic of the unreflected 
consciousness, not of the reflected.
Marcelle Quinton, Mind, 65, No.259 (July 1956); Husserl mainly in Philosophical 
Investigations.
314 Ibid, p. 119.
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Taking into consideration Sartre’s attack on any attempt to merge the quite 
distinct ontologies of these two modes of consciousness, one cannot but 
consider the attack of Aquilla on Sartre as irrelevant315. Sartre's theory has 
nothing to do with states of affairs "containing only that [the intentional] object 
itself as its constituent". Far from this, Sartre attacks any content theory for 
Intentionality and consciousness. Repeatedly we see Sartre opposing any 
attempt to place the object in consciousness, and not only in the Cartesian way 
that Aquilla rejects.
iii) Searle: The Intentionality of Speech Acts.
Searle starts his investigation into the Philosophy of Mind and Intentionality 
by relating his current work316 to his earlier work on speech acts.317 He believes 
that "the capacity of speech acts to represent objects and states of affairs in the 
world is an extension of the more fundamental capacities of the mind (brain) to 
relate the organism to the world by way of such mental states as belief and 
desire, and especially through action and perception".318
For Searle speech acts are a type of human action, and the capacity to 
represent through speech acts is part of a more general capacity to relate to the 
world. These two positions make it necessary for the theory of speech acts to 
include an account of the mind’s more general capacities and of its relation to 
the world.
315 See Aquilla, pp.l58-9n8 and p.61.
316 See Intentionality. pp.vii-i.
3,7 See John R. Searle, Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press, 1969; Expression and 
Meaning. Cambridge University Press, 1979.
318 Intentionality. p.vii.
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Searle considers sentences to have the status of objects in the world. As 
such, they cannot have an intrinsic capacity to represent; they need something 
else, by and through which they can refer and represent. This is the 
Intentionality of the mind.
The Intentionality of Mental States is what can be considered as fundamental 
to Searle’s Speech Act Theory: without this Intentionality the SAT (Speech Act 
Theory) would be doomed to a vicious circle. IMS ( the Intentionality of Mental 
States) has intrinsic characteristics which make these states stand by themselves, 
with no need to refer to anything else.
A sentence for Searle is a syntactical object on which representational 
capacities are imposed. Beliefs and desires by contrast are not such syntactical 
objects: their representational capacities are not imposed but intrinsic. The fact 
that beliefs and desires have intrinsic representational capacities, does not 
however affect in any way their being a social phenomenon. Thus the forms of 
Intentionality underlying language are social forms.319
Searle, in his theory of Intentionality, goes consciously against 
Functionalism, Behaviourism, and Turing-machine type of theories which deny 
the specific mental properties of mental phenomena. But he distances himself 
from dualisms as well: What he believes is that "mental phenomena are 
biologically based: they are both caused by the operations of the brain and 
realised in the structure of the brain".320 In this way, Searle links human biology 
to all possible theories of consciousness and Intentionality. For him "it is an 
objective fact about the world that it contains certain systems, viz., brains with 
subjective mental states, and it is a physical fact about such systems that they 
have mental features".321 His solution to the Body-Mind Problem is not to deny
319 Ibid, pp.vii-i.
320 Ibid, p.ix.
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the reality of mental phenomena, but to “properly appreciate” their biological 
nature.322
An obvious criticism to this view is to ask why, if mental phenomena are 
biological, can they not be fully explained in biological terms. Searle’s reply is 
that it is the particular nature of these phenomena that prohibit one from ever 
giving a complete explanation of their occurrence strictly on biological terms. 
To support his claim he refers to the role of Intentionality in the structure of 
human action: not just its description, but its very structure.323
Searle defines Intentionality in this way: Intentionality is that property of 
many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of 
objects and states of affairs in the world.324
Then he points out some important points in his definition:
a) Only some states and events have Intentionality. In this account beliefs and 
desires "must always be about something", but things such as nervousness and 
undirected anxiety and depression need not be.325 In this way he distinguishes 
between directed and undirected mental states.
b) Intentionality and Consciousness are distinct.
Some Intentional states such as beliefs and desires may not be conscious at one 
or another point; as an example Searle brings forward his own belief that his 
grandfather spent his entire life in the USA. Since he has not thought about it 
before, this was an unconscious belief up to the point where he thought about 
it. Searle also makes a distinction between the Intentional state and what it is 
directed at.
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c) Intentions and intending have no special status in his Theory of 
Intentionality, they are just one form of Intentionality among others. In relation 
to this he also clears up the confusion related to "mental acts". Beliefs and 
desires for Searle have nothing to do with the description of "acts". All 
Intentional states are merely events and states, and not acts.326
Searle includes in his list of Intentional states belief, love, joy, elation, 
irritation, shame, lust, sorrow, pleasure, anxiety etc. He thinks that "it is, 
characteristic of the members of this set that they either are essentially directed 
as in the case of love, hate etc. or at least they can be directed as in the case of 
depression or elation.327 He also points out that one may have an Intentional 
state even for things non-existing.328
Searle also investigates the relation between Intentional states and speech 
acts, to determine the relation between the Intentional state and the object or 
state of affairs at which it is directed. He finds that Intentional States represent 
objects and states of affairs in the same sense of "represent" that speech acts do 
this, though he attempts to show329 that speech acts have a derived form of 
Intentionality. Thus they represent in a different manner from Intentional States, 
which have intrinsic Intentionality.
Searle notes however that by associating Intentionality and Language in this 
way he does not want to claim that Intentionality is essentially and necessarily 
linguistic. On the contrary, he acknowledges the fact that animals and infants, 
which have no language in the ordinary sense and no ability for speech acts, 
nevertheless have Intentional States.
326 Ibid, pp.79-111.
327 Ibid, p.4.
328 Ibid.
329 ibid, pp. 160-179.
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He gives two reasons why we cannot but attribute Intentionality to animals: 
a) We can see the causal basis of the animal's Intentionality as very similar to 
our own; and b) we cannot make sense of their behaviour otherwise.
Searle stresses that even though he shall use language heuristically to make 
clear the nature of Intentionality, he nevertheless believes that language is 
derived from Intentionality and not conversely. As he puts it: "the direction of 
pedagogy is to explain Intentionality in terms of language; the direction of 
logical analysis is to explain language in terms of Intentionality”330.
He further on points out to four points of similarity and connection between 
Intentional states and speech acts331:
a) The distinction between prepositional content and illocutionary force, a 
distinction familiar within the theory of speech acts, carries over to intentional 
states. Searle believes that just as someone can order someone else to leave the 
room, predict that he will leave the room, and suggest that he leave the room, 
so one can believe that someone else will leave the room, fear or hope that he 
will leave the room etc. Searle actually names what corresponds to the 
prepositional content of the Intentional state "representative content" or 
"intentional content".
b) Searle also carries over from speech act theory the concept of directions 
of fit: he distinguishes between classes of acts and states (the commissive, the 
assertive etc.) where direction of the fit is either word-to-world, or world-to- 
word, and he also believes that there are null cases where there is no direction of 
fit.
c) Searle believes that in the performance of each illocutionary act with a 
prepositional content, we express a certain Intentional state with this
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prepositional content, and the Intentional state is the sincerity condition of that 
type of speech act.
d) Searle also believes that the notion of conditions of satisfaction applies 
quite generally to both speech acts and Intentional states, in cases where there is 
a direction of fit.
In his "Minds, Brains and programs"332, Searle puts forward a theory of 
consciousness and the mind which comes as a continuation of his earlier work, 
but which also advances it in some way. The purpose that Searle's essay serves 
is to indicate that formal programs cannot have Intentionality: it can only exist 
in humans, and machines like humans. Only these can understand (as opposed to 
respond to) symbols and other modes of representation.
Searle's theory cannot but be full of problems for anyone with close 
proximity to the Sartrean theory of Intentionality. Both Searle and Sartre avoid 
talk about "mental acts"; in fact, it is strange for Sartre to do this, since he 
comes from a tradition that is based on this terminology. I think extreme caution 
about the ontology usually associated with the term has made Sartre unfaithful 
to the tradition. Sartre does not talk about "mental states" either, again due to 
ontological caution.
Searle's problems start from the fact that without actually defining analysing 
or even describing human consciousness, he charts its area, classifies it, and 
even draws parallels with the consciousnesses of the other inhabitants in the 
animal kingdom. Firstly, beliefs and desires are and can be objects, and their 
representational capacities can be imposed and not intrinsic. An example of this 
is the Bad/Good Faith Theory of Sartre, and the Unconscious of Psychoanalytic 
Theories.
332 See John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains and programs", Behavioural and Brain Science, 
Vol.3(1980), pp.417-24; see also his Minds Brains and Science. The 1984 Reith Lectures, 
BBC, London, 1984.
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Secondly, Searle's certainty that the intrinsic character of beliefs and desires 
(as having Intentionality) can co-exist with their being social phenomena is 
something totally private to Searle! Many commentators and interpreters of the 
later Wittgenstein, and especially his work on rule-following considerations 
have claimed that this certainty is a paper tower, ready to be blown away with 
any sceptical wind333.
Thirdly, Searle does not explain what happens to those pathological cases (or 
not so pathological in our days) where we believe, desire, fear, have anxiety 
about something but not a specific thing: for example we believe and fear that 
something bad will happen to us but we do not know what; or we are anxious 
about our love or financial life but we cannot pinpoint what it is we are anxious 
about, or we have a desire to feel pain and any pain will do.
Fourthly, in his theory, we see Searle disengaging beliefs and desires from 
such complex phenomena as depression and anxiety. Such a disengagement, 
even for the purpose of linguistic analysis, is totally unfounded in modem 
psychotherapy.334
Fifthly, there is Searle’s rather curious view that unconscious beliefs are 
beliefs. Surely beliefs are necessarily connected with claims of knowledge. If 
someone says he has a belief and that he does not know it, he is talking 
nonsense!335
333 See Kripke and his work on Wittgenstein and rule-following considerations.
334 See the work of Logotherapists, and existential psychoanalysts on which I have referred in 
the section on the Emotions.
335 To the obvious objection to my criticism here that common sense agrees with Searle’s 
account of unconscious beliefs I would respond like this: a) common sense does not use 
unconscious beliefs in the way that Searle is using them, nor the meaning of unconscious 
beliefs in common sense is the same to the one found in Searle; b) what exactly is the meaning 
that common sense gives to unconscious beliefs? Even if common sense believes that 
unconscious beliefs exist this does not mean that these things exist! See for example much of
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Sixthly, some of Searle's Intentional states have no specific objects or can not 
have any: undirected anxiety for example.
Finally, I disagree with Searle on the point that formal programmes have no 
Intentionality, or as he puts it "syntax is not semantics". To claim this, one has 
to wipe out a history of two thousand years of philosophy of language 
(beginning with Plato) based on the conviction that syntax depends on 
, semantics, and in this way, formal programmes on Intentionality. Without 
semantics there would be no syntax, without Intentionality there would be no 
formal programs. What makes human consciousness however, is not 
Intentionality, but the metaphysics of this Intentionality. I claim that machines 
can have Intentionality as much as humans, but their Intentionality does not 
exist in them due to their ontological make up. In this way, machines and 
formal programmes and anything non-organic can never achieve a truly 
authentic form of Intentionality. However, being organic is only a necessary 
condition: for a sufficient condition we need an ontology that is either human or 
comparable to it (i.e., belongs to a species that has a mind).
iv) Maurita Harney: Intentionality of Sense.
Maurita Harney's theory of Intentionality follows pretty much the same lines 
of thought as Aquilla's and Searle's. She begins by examining the paradox of 
two traditions with totally different pursuits and purposes, but having the same 
origin both in their thematic references and their conviction that mental 
phenomena can succeed in achieving objective reference. These two traditions
what the later Wittgenstein and Ryle among others have written about the Cartesian 
metaphysical garbage that common sense may believe in.
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are the Phenomenologists, and the Wittgensteinian circle of Anscombe, Geach 
and Kenny. Both have their origin in Brentano.
Harney believes that even though the conclusions that these two traditions 
draw are incompatible (in respect to mentalism), they nevertheless are based on 
premises which are not inherently inconsistent with one another. These premises 
are:
a) Mental phenomena can succeed in achieving objective reference (Thesis
1).
b) Mental phenomena are distinguished by the fact that their objects need not 
exist (Thesis 2).
Harney believes that a satisfactory theory of Intentionality must incorporate 
both of these theses. Actually, the central aim of her book, as she herself puts it 
is: "it is only by appeal to Frege's notion of sense that a satisfactory theory of 
Intentionality can be construed".336
She supports her claim about Frege's notion of sense by proving first that 
Brentano's theory of Intentionality is unavoidably mentalistic, and secondly that 
if Intentionality is understood as a feature of language rather than as a feature of 
phenomena, we can have a theory of Intentionality that escapes the fallacies of 
other mentalistic theories. Thirdly, she sets up a three-levelled semantical 
framework consisting of sign, sense, and referent. In this framework we can 
have both theses since it allows for signs (i.e., names) which have a sense but 
which do not refer to anything.
What can we say about such a theory?
336 Ibid, p.2. Hamey in her emphasis on meaning and the Fregean sense is not alone. For a 
thepry on Intentionality ephasising meaning see the work of Dagfinn Follesdal, and his 
“followers” Smith and McIntyre. For a similar “linguistic” approach see also Carlos J. Moya, 
Tfoq ffrHteophy of Action: An Introduction. Polity Press, 1990, pp.61-79.
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First, if it is valid, then the Sartrean theory has to be invalid. They have quite 
incompatible theories of consciousness: the theory of sense that is put forward 
by Harney totally destroys the Sartrean theory of the for-itself and Sartre's 
views about language. But is it valid?
The first problem we can see in Harney’s account exists also for Searle's and 
Aquilla's theories: without any definition or even a description of consciousness 
and its ontology, they proceed in charting and classifying its contents.
Secondly, we see an emphasis on the "objective" reference of mental 
phenomena. Taking into account the Sartrean attack on the objective-subjective 
dualism337 we cannot but view such an emphasis with suspicion. What interests 
Harney is the Sartrean posited consciousness; but what happens with the 
unreflected consciousness?
A related point is that, Harney's notion of "Sense" looks like both the 
Husserlian "noema" and the Fregean "Sense" (she actually admits that she is 
following them here).338 According to Sartrean theory both of these structures 
exist at the level of reflected consciousness. What is Harney's argument that 
they also exist at the unreflected level? There is none: she ignores Sartre's 
distinction. More importantly, she ignores the insistence of Sartre that 
Intentionality proper exists only at the unreflected level.
With all these considerations, I think it is evident that Harney's theory is not 
only problematic but irrelevant to a theory such as Sartre's.
337 See BN, Introduction.
338 See ibid, pp.3-9.
v n . CONCLUSION.
In our investigation into Sartre's theory of Intentionality we attempted to 
describe, analyse, and evaluate its metaphysics. In our analysis of Sartre’s 
theory, we saw that with few improvements it cannot only satisfy the main 
requirements for any successful theory of Intentionality339, but it can also prove 
quite devastating to some of the claims regarding our mind and consciousness 
put forward mainly from physicalists and the AI world, through its provision for 
a quite novel theory regarding the mind-body relationship. We saw that it is near 
to Wittgenstein's views, especially regarding subjectivism and objectivism, 
certainty, solipsism, realism and idealism. We also saw that Wittgenstein and 
Sartre are extremely close in the application of their philosophies in areas such 
as emotion and language.
In addition, we saw that the majority of contemporary theories of 
Intentionality, being Sartre's philosophical antagonists, leave much to be desired 
both in their employed metaphysics, and in their lack of self-conscious 
methodologies.
This thesis is presented with the hope that it will force theorists in the areas 
of Intentionality, the human mind and consciousness to reconsider their
339 Few words should be added here regarding the satisfaction of the requirements. Sartre’s 
theory is faithful to the legacy of Brentano, in regard to the three major truths I mentioned in 
my Introduction. Sartre’s theory allows for variability in the modes of Intentionality (some of 
these modes are emotions and imagination); it also allows for the inexistence of the object of 
our awareness (even though Sartre would not claim that the object of our awareness does not 
exist, he would accept that it may not exist, and in any way Sartre would accept that it does 
not matter if the object exists as we see it) (for this see his theory of Imagination and the 
analogon theory); finally it allows for things which are not ours to be “dressed” with 
Intentionality since they could easily be ours (see my analysis of emotions and the Other). 
Actually all three truths can be understood without major difficulties only through Sartre’s 
theory of Intentionality (and the improvements proposed here). My proposed revised version 
of Sartre’s theory also incorporates most of the additional suggestions proposed in the 
Introduction. A full analysis of these points would require at least 40-50 pages more on a 
thesis which is already too long. I hope I shall be able to develop these ideas fully in the years 
to come.
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“linguistic” accounts of Intentionality and Consciousness in the light of Sartre’s 
arguments.
I believe that our age has suffered far too much from an undue emphasis on 
absolutist, realist, and mechanistic ideas about man, the world, and their 
relation.
Let us assimilate the Promethean spirit of ontological liberation and freedom 
to which Sartre condemns us and escape the Olympian despotism of senses, 
meanings, and "revolutionary" AI economics!
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